Objective: Compromise Application via diagrams Library
Attack Goal: Compromise Application via diagrams Library [CRITICAL NODE]
└───[OR]─> Exploit Diagram Generation Process [CRITICAL NODE] └───[OR]─> Exploit Input to diagrams Library [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─> Malicious Data Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───> Inject malicious data used in diagram generation (e.g., long strings, special characters) └───> Cause resource exhaustion or errors during diagram generation
└───[OR]─> Exploit diagrams Library Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND]─> Known Library Vulnerabilities (If any exist - check CVEs, GitHub issues) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───> Exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in diagrams or its dependencies └───[AND]─> Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───> Exploit vulnerabilities in libraries used by diagrams (e.g., Graphviz, Pillow, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───> Target known vulnerabilities in image processing or graph rendering libraries
└───[OR]─> Exploit Diagram Output [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─> Malicious Diagram Output Content └───> SVG Injection (if diagrams generates SVG) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───> Embed malicious JavaScript in SVG output
└───[OR]─> Exploit Diagram Output [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─> Output Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─> Path Traversal via Diagram Filenames (if application saves diagrams based on user input) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───> Control diagram filename to write output to arbitrary locations
└───[OR]─> Denial of Service (DoS) via diagrams [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───[AND]─> Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] ├───> CPU Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───> Generate extremely complex diagrams that consume excessive CPU during rendering ├───> Memory Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───> Generate diagrams with a massive number of nodes/edges leading to memory exhaustion └───> Disk Space Exhaustion (if diagrams are persistently stored) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───> Repeatedly generate and store large diagrams to fill up disk space
Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Application via diagrams Library [CRITICAL NODE]
This is the ultimate objective of the attacker and represents the highest level critical node. Success here means the attacker has achieved their goal.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Diagram Generation Process [CRITICAL NODE]
This node represents a major attack vector focusing on manipulating the process of creating diagrams using the diagrams library. Compromising this process can lead to various security issues.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Input to diagrams Library [CRITICAL NODE]
This critical node highlights the risks associated with the input data and definitions provided to the diagrams library. If input is not properly handled, it can be exploited.
Attack Tree Path: Malicious Data Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vector: An attacker injects malicious data into the application's data sources or user inputs that are used to generate diagrams. This data could be crafted to be excessively long strings, contain special characters, or be malformed in a way that causes issues during diagram generation.
Impact: This can lead to resource exhaustion (CPU, memory), application errors, or potentially information leakage through error messages. In severe cases, it might even trigger vulnerabilities in the diagrams library or its dependencies if the malformed data is processed in an unsafe way.
Mitigation: Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all data used in diagram generation. Limit the size and complexity of data processed.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit diagrams Library Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
This critical node focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities directly within the diagrams library itself or its dependencies.
Attack Tree Path: Known Library Vulnerabilities (If any exist - check CVEs, GitHub issues) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vector: Attackers exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the diagrams library or its dependencies. These vulnerabilities could range from code execution flaws to denial of service issues.
Impact: The impact depends on the specific vulnerability. It could range from denial of service to remote code execution, leading to full application compromise.
Mitigation: Regularly monitor security advisories for diagrams and its dependencies. Implement a robust dependency management process and promptly update to patched versions.
Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vector: Attackers target vulnerabilities in the libraries that diagrams depends on, such as Graphviz (for rendering) and Pillow (for image manipulation). These dependencies are often more complex and might have a larger attack surface.
Impact: Similar to known library vulnerabilities, the impact depends on the specific dependency vulnerability. It can range from denial of service to remote code execution.
Mitigation: Maintain an inventory of diagrams dependencies and regularly scan them for vulnerabilities using tools. Keep dependencies updated to the latest secure versions.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit vulnerabilities in libraries used by diagrams (e.g., Graphviz, Pillow, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
This is a more specific reiteration of the "Dependency Vulnerabilities" path, emphasizing the target libraries.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Diagram Output [CRITICAL NODE]
This critical node focuses on attacks that exploit the generated diagram output, particularly how it's handled and presented by the application.
Attack Vector: If the application generates diagrams in SVG format and serves these SVGs to users without proper sanitization, an attacker can embed malicious JavaScript code within the SVG. Impact: When a user views the malicious SVG in their browser, the injected JavaScript can execute, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. This can allow the attacker to steal user session cookies, redirect users to malicious websites, or perform other client-side attacks. Mitigation: If using SVG output, strictly sanitize the SVG content before serving it to users. Use Content Security Policy (CSP) to further mitigate XSS risks. Consider using raster image formats (PNG, JPEG) if SVG interactivity is not required.
Attack Tree Path: Output Handling Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
This critical node covers vulnerabilities related to how the application handles the output diagrams, especially file saving and access.
Attack Tree Path: Path Traversal via Diagram Filenames [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vector: If the application allows users to influence the filenames under which diagrams are saved and doesn't properly sanitize these filenames, an attacker can use path traversal techniques (e.g., ../../sensitive/file.txt) to manipulate the file path.
Impact: This can allow the attacker to write diagram output to arbitrary locations on the server's filesystem. This could lead to overwriting critical system files, gaining access to sensitive directories, or even achieving code execution if they can overwrite executable files.
Mitigation: Strictly sanitize and validate diagram filenames. Never directly use user input to construct file paths. Use secure file handling practices and consider using UUIDs or controlled naming conventions for diagram files.
Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS) via diagrams [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
This critical node focuses on attacks that aim to disrupt the application's availability by causing a denial of service through the diagrams library.
Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vector: Attackers exploit the resource-intensive nature of diagram generation to overwhelm the application's resources (CPU, memory, disk space).
Attack Tree Path: CPU Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: Generate extremely complex diagrams with a massive number of nodes and edges. Rendering these diagrams can consume excessive CPU resources. Impact: Application slowdown, service outage due to CPU overload. Mitigation: Implement limits on diagram complexity (e.g., maximum nodes/edges). Implement rate limiting on diagram generation requests. Use asynchronous diagram generation.
Attack Tree Path: Memory Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: Generate diagrams with a very large number of nodes and edges, leading to excessive memory consumption. Impact: Application crash due to out-of-memory errors, service outage. Mitigation: Implement memory limits for diagram generation processes. Monitor memory usage and implement safeguards to prevent out-of-memory errors.
Attack Vector: Repeatedly generate and store large diagrams to fill up the server's disk space. Impact: Application outage due to lack of disk space, storage issues. Mitigation: Implement limits on the number and size of diagrams that can be stored. Implement automated cleanup mechanisms for old diagrams. Monitor disk space usage.