Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerability Exploitation
Description: Vulnerabilities in libraries that diagrams
depends on (primarily Graphviz, but potentially others) can be triggered by specially crafted input to diagrams
.
How diagrams
Contributes: diagrams
acts as a conduit, passing user-influenced data (node labels, edge attributes, etc.) to these underlying libraries. It doesn't directly execute malicious code, but it facilitates the exploitation of vulnerabilities in its dependencies.
Example: A hypothetical vulnerability in Graphviz's DOT language parser could be triggered by a specific sequence of characters in a node label. If a user can control that label, they could exploit this vulnerability through diagrams
.
Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) in the context of the process running diagrams
, potentially leading to complete system compromise. Data breaches, service disruption, etc.
Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability in the dependency).
Mitigation Strategies:
Regular Dependency Updates: Use a dependency manager (pip, poetry) to keep diagrams
and all its dependencies (especially Graphviz) updated to the latest patched versions. Automate this process.
Vulnerability Scanning: Integrate vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., Snyk, Dependabot, OWASP Dependency-Check) into your CI/CD pipeline to automatically detect known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
Input Sanitization (Limited): While not a primary defense against dependency vulnerabilities, sanitize user-provided data that will be used in the diagram (labels, etc.). Focus on escaping characters relevant to the output format (e.g., <
, >
, &
for SVG). This helps prevent issues within the rendered diagram and can offer a small degree of defense-in-depth.
Least Privilege: Run the diagrams
code with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid running as root. Use a dedicated user account or containerization (Docker) to isolate the process.
Attack Surface: XXE-like Attacks (via SVG Output)
Description: If user input influences the content of SVG diagrams, and those SVGs are rendered in a browser or other SVG viewer, there's a potential for XML External Entity (XXE) attacks.
How diagrams
Contributes: diagrams
uses Graphviz, which can generate SVG output. While Graphviz itself is likely secure against XXE, the consuming application must handle the SVG output securely.
Example: If a user-controlled node label is inserted directly into the SVG without sanitization, they might inject an XXE payload to read local files or access internal resources.
Impact: Potential for reading arbitrary files on the server, accessing internal network resources, or causing a denial of service.
Risk Severity: High (if user input is directly included in SVG and not sanitized).
Mitigation Strategies:
Disable External Entities: If the generated SVG is parsed by an XML parser, explicitly disable external entity resolution. The specific method depends on the XML parsing library used (e.g., lxml
in Python: parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False)
). This is the primary mitigation.
Sanitize SVG Output (Defense-in-Depth): As an extra layer of security, consider sanitizing the SVG output from diagrams
before displaying it, especially if you have any doubts about the security of the rendering environment. Use a library like bleach
(Python) to safely remove potentially malicious XML constructs.
Input Sanitization (Limited): Sanitize user-provided data that will be included in the SVG (e.g., node labels). This is less effective than disabling external entities but can help prevent simple injection attempts.