attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for mozilla/addons-server

Attack Surface: Malicious Addon Upload - Code Injection

• Description: Attackers upload addons containing malicious code (JavaScript, WebAssembly, etc.) through addons-server's upload mechanisms, aiming to compromise users' browsers or systems upon installation.
• addons-server Contribution: addons-server provides the core functionality for addon upload and is the gateway for addons to be distributed. Vulnerabilities in its upload processing and validation directly enable this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker uploads an addon via the developer portal of addons-server. This addon, once installed by users from the platform, executes malicious JavaScript to steal browsing data or perform actions on behalf of the user.
• Impact: Widespread user browser compromise, data exfiltration, malware distribution affecting users who install addons from addons-server, severe reputational damage to the platform.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers:
    • Strong Addon Validation: Implement multi-layered validation including static analysis, dynamic analysis (sandboxing), and manual review processes within addons-server.
    • Strict Content Security Policy (CSP) Enforcement: addons-server should enforce strict CSP for addon pages and contexts to limit the capabilities of uploaded code, even if malicious.
    • Regular Security Audits of Validation Pipeline: Continuously audit and penetration test the addon validation pipeline of addons-server to identify and fix bypass vulnerabilities.
    • Automated Malware Scanning Integration: Integrate with robust malware scanning services within addons-server's workflow to detect known malicious patterns in addon packages.
  • Users: (Limited direct mitigation, platform responsibility is primary)
    • Install addons only from verified developers and sources within the addons-server ecosystem if such verification exists.
    • Rely on the platform's security measures and report suspicious addons to the platform administrators.

Attack Surface: Addon Validation Bypass

• Description: Attackers discover and exploit weaknesses in addons-server's addon validation logic to upload malicious addons that should have been rejected.
• addons-server Contribution: The complexity and implementation of addons-server's validation system are the direct source of potential bypass vulnerabilities. Weaknesses in code, logic flaws, or incomplete coverage in validation rules create this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker finds a way to obfuscate malicious JavaScript code within an addon package that bypasses the static analysis tools used by addons-server. The addon is then published and distributed.
• Impact: Malicious addons are distributed through addons-server, leading to user compromise, data theft, and erosion of trust in the platform's security. Undermines the core security promise of the addon platform.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers:
    • Comprehensive Validation Rule Sets: Develop and maintain extensive and regularly updated validation rules within addons-server, covering various attack vectors and code patterns.
    • Fuzzing and Negative Testing: Employ fuzzing and negative testing techniques specifically against the addons-server validation engine to uncover edge cases and bypasses.
    • Security Research Collaboration: Engage with security researchers and bug bounty programs to incentivize the discovery and reporting of validation bypass vulnerabilities in addons-server.
    • Continuous Monitoring and Improvement: Continuously monitor the effectiveness of validation processes and adapt them based on new attack techniques and feedback.

Attack Surface: Compromised Addon Delivery Infrastructure

• Description: Attackers compromise the infrastructure (servers, CDNs, storage) managed or relied upon by addons-server to deliver addon files, enabling them to replace legitimate addons with malicious ones during distribution.
• addons-server Contribution: addons-server's architecture and deployment choices directly determine the delivery infrastructure. If addons-server uses insecure infrastructure or has misconfigurations in its delivery pipeline, it creates this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the CDN account used by addons-server to host addon files. They replace the legitimate file for a popular addon with a malicious version. Users downloading or updating this addon from addons-server will receive the compromised file.
• Impact: Wide-scale distribution of malicious addons affecting potentially all users of addons-server. Massive user compromise, data theft, and catastrophic reputational damage to the platform, potentially leading to complete loss of user trust.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers:
    • Secure Infrastructure Configuration: Implement robust security hardening and configuration management for all infrastructure components managed by or for addons-server involved in addon delivery.
    • Access Control and Monitoring: Enforce strict access controls and continuous monitoring of the addon delivery infrastructure managed by or for addons-server for unauthorized access and modifications.
    • Integrity Verification: Implement cryptographic integrity checks (e.g., signed URLs, checksums) within addons-server's delivery mechanism to ensure addon files are not tampered with during delivery.
    • Incident Response Plan: Develop and regularly test an incident response plan specifically for infrastructure compromise scenarios affecting addon delivery within the context of addons-server operations.

Attack Surface: API Authentication and Authorization Vulnerabilities

• Description: Weaknesses in the API authentication and authorization mechanisms of addons-server's developer and client-facing APIs allow unauthorized actions, such as malicious addon updates or data breaches.
• addons-server Contribution: addons-server's API design and implementation are directly responsible for the security of its APIs. Flaws in authentication, authorization, or session management within addons-server's API layer create this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker exploits an API authentication vulnerability in addons-server to impersonate a legitimate addon developer. They then use the API to push a malicious update to a popular addon, bypassing normal validation processes because they are authenticated as the developer.
• Impact: Unauthorized manipulation of addons, potential distribution of malicious updates, data breaches through API access, account takeover of developers, and denial of service attacks against API endpoints.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers:
    • Secure API Authentication: Implement robust and industry-standard API authentication mechanisms within addons-server, such as OAuth 2.0 or API keys with proper rotation and management.
    • Granular Authorization Controls: Enforce fine-grained authorization checks within addons-server's API layer to ensure users can only access and modify resources they are explicitly permitted to.
    • API Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Regularly audit and penetration test addons-server's APIs specifically for authentication, authorization, and injection vulnerabilities.
    • Rate Limiting and Abuse Prevention: Implement rate limiting and abuse detection mechanisms within addons-server's API infrastructure to protect against brute-force attacks and denial-of-service attempts.

Attack Surface: Admin Account Compromise

• Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to administrative accounts of addons-server, granting them full control over the platform and its functionalities.
• addons-server Contribution: addons-server's administrative interface and account management system are the direct targets. Weaknesses in admin login, password policies, or lack of MFA in addons-server directly contribute to this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker uses credential stuffing or brute-force attacks against the admin login page of addons-server. Upon successful compromise of an admin account, they can approve malicious addons, modify validation rules, access sensitive data, or disrupt the entire service.
• Impact: Complete compromise of the addons-server platform. Ability to distribute malicious addons at scale, access and manipulate all user and addon data, shut down the service, and cause irreparable reputational damage.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers:
    • Strong Admin Account Security: Enforce strong password policies, mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA), and account lockout mechanisms specifically for addons-server admin accounts.
    • Least Privilege and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Implement RBAC for admin functionalities within addons-server to limit the impact of a single compromised admin account.
    • Admin Interface Security Hardening: Harden the admin interface of addons-server, restrict access to trusted networks, and regularly audit for web application vulnerabilities.
    • Intrusion Detection and Monitoring: Implement intrusion detection and security monitoring systems for addons-server's admin interface and accounts to detect and respond to suspicious activity.