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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mozilla/addons-server

Attack Surface: Malicious Addon Submission

  • Description: Attackers attempt to upload and distribute malicious code disguised as legitimate Firefox addons, bypassing security checks.
  • addons-server Contribution: addons-server is the primary component responsible for receiving, validating, storing, signing, and distributing addons. Its design and implementation are directly responsible for preventing malicious submissions.
  • Example: An attacker crafts an addon that appears benign but contains hidden malicious JavaScript that steals user data after evading the automated validation process.
  • Impact: Compromise of user data, installation of malware, redirection to phishing sites, widespread harm due to Firefox's large user base.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Multi-Layered Validation: Implement multiple, independent validation layers (static analysis, dynamic analysis, manual review for high-risk cases).
    • Strict Input Sanitization: Rigorously sanitize all input from the addon package.
    • Dependency Scanning: Analyze addon dependencies for known vulnerabilities and malicious packages.
    • Regular Validator Updates: Continuously update validation tools to address new bypass techniques.
    • Code Signing Enforcement: Ensure only properly signed addons can be installed. Protect signing keys rigorously.
    • Anomaly Detection: Implement systems to detect unusual patterns in addon submissions.

Attack Surface: Addon Signing Key Compromise

  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the private key(s) used for digitally signing addons.
  • addons-server Contribution: addons-server manages the addon signing process and interacts with the key management infrastructure. Its security directly impacts the protection of the signing keys.
  • Example: An attacker compromises a server or developer workstation with access to the signing keys, or exploits a vulnerability in the key management system.
  • Impact: The attacker can sign any malicious addon, and it will be trusted by Firefox, leading to widespread user compromise. This is a catastrophic scenario.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Hardware Security Modules (HSMs): Store signing keys in HSMs.
    • Strict Access Control: Implement rigorous access control for signing keys and related systems.
    • Key Rotation: Regularly rotate signing keys.
    • Multi-Signature Schemes: Consider requiring multiple keys for signing.
    • Auditing and Monitoring: Implement comprehensive auditing and monitoring of key access and signing.
    • Incident Response Plan: Have a plan to revoke compromised keys and notify users.

Attack Surface: API Abuse and Unauthorized Access

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the addons-server API to gain unauthorized access to data or functionality, bypassing authentication or authorization.
  • addons-server Contribution: addons-server defines and implements the APIs for managing addons, users, and other features. The security of these APIs is entirely dependent on the addons-server code.
  • Example: An attacker exploits an IDOR vulnerability to access or modify private addon data belonging to other users, or uses a brute-force attack to gain administrative access.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized modification of addons, service disruption, potential compromise of user accounts.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication: Implement strong authentication, including MFA for administrative accounts.
    • Robust Authorization: Enforce strict authorization checks (RBAC).
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on API endpoints.
    • Input Validation: Validate all input to API endpoints.
    • Secure Session Management: Use secure session management practices.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.

Attack Surface: Validator Bypass and Exploitation

  • Description: Attackers find ways to circumvent the addon validation process or exploit vulnerabilities within the validator itself (e.g., addons-linter).
  • addons-server Contribution: addons-server integrates and relies on the validator. The security of the validator and its integration within addons-server are crucial. This includes how addons-server handles the validator's output and errors.
  • Example: An attacker crafts an addon that triggers a buffer overflow in the addons-linter during validation, allowing arbitrary code execution on the server. Or, an attacker finds a logic flaw to sneak malicious code past the checks.
  • Impact: Server compromise, potential for remote code execution, bypassing of security controls, ability to upload malicious addons.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Fuzzing: Regularly fuzz the validator.
    • Sandboxing: Run the validator in a sandboxed environment.
    • Memory Safety: Use memory-safe languages or tools where possible.
    • Regular Updates: Keep the validator and dependencies up-to-date.
    • Code Review: Conduct thorough code reviews of the validator and its integration.
    • Input Validation (for the Validator): The validator itself should have robust input validation.