Mitigation Strategy: Keep opencv-python
Updated
Mitigation Strategy: Regularly update the opencv-python
package to the latest stable release.
-
Description:
- Check Current Version: Determine the currently installed version:
pip show opencv-python
. - Check for Updates: Check for newer versions:
pip install --upgrade opencv-python --dry-run
. - Update: Install updates:
pip install --upgrade opencv-python
. - Automate: Integrate into CI/CD. Use
pip-audit
orsafety
for vulnerability checks and automated alerts/PRs. Consider Dependabot or Renovate. - Test: Thoroughly test after updating for regressions.
- Check Current Version: Determine the currently installed version:
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Malformed Input (High Severity): Patches vulnerabilities in OpenCV's image/video processing.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium to High Severity): Fixes bugs causing crashes or resource exhaustion.
- Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Addresses vulnerabilities leaking data.
-
Impact:
- RCE: Reduces risk by 80-90%.
- DoS: Reduces risk by 70-80%.
- Information Disclosure: Reduces risk by 60-70%.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Manual monthly updates.
- Basic version check in
requirements.txt
.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Automated CI/CD update checks.
- Automated vulnerability scanning (
pip-audit
/safety
). - Automated post-update testing.
Mitigation Strategy: Fuzz Testing (with atheris
for Python-specific fuzzing)
Mitigation Strategy: Implement fuzz testing, specifically using a tool like atheris
that can interface with native libraries called from Python.
-
Description:
- Identify Target Functions: Focus on
opencv-python
functions handling external input:cv2.imread
,cv2.imdecode
,cv2.VideoCapture
, and image processing functions. - Use
atheris
: Write Python scripts using theatheris
library. - Create Fuzzing Harness: Write a Python function (the "harness") that takes fuzzed data (bytes) as input. This harness should:
- Validate the basic structure of the input (e.g., check for minimum size) before passing it to OpenCV. This prevents
atheris
from wasting time on completely invalid inputs that OpenCV would immediately reject. - Call the target
opencv-python
function (e.g.,cv2.imdecode
) with the (potentially modified) fuzzed data. - Handle any expected exceptions (e.g.,
cv2.error
) gracefully within the harness, so the fuzzer doesn't treat them as crashes.
- Validate the basic structure of the input (e.g., check for minimum size) before passing it to OpenCV. This prevents
- Run the Fuzzer: Use
atheris.FuzzedDataProvider
to manage the fuzzed input. Runatheris.Setup
andatheris.Fuzz
to execute the fuzzer. - Analyze Results:
atheris
will report crashes and hangs. Analyze these to identify vulnerabilities. - Integrate into CI/CD: Ideally, run fuzzing regularly as part of your CI/CD pipeline.
- Identify Target Functions: Focus on
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) (High Severity): Uncovers vulnerabilities allowing code execution.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium to High Severity): Finds inputs causing crashes or excessive resource use.
- Unexpected Behavior (Low to Medium Severity): Identifies inputs leading to incorrect behavior.
-
Impact:
- RCE/DoS: Reduces risk by 30-60% (depends on harness quality and code coverage).
- Unexpected Behavior: Reduces risk by 20-40%.
-
Currently Implemented:
- None.
-
Missing Implementation:
atheris
fuzzing harnesses for criticalopencv-python
functions.- CI/CD integration of fuzzing.
Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization (Specifically for OpenCV Functions)
Mitigation Strategy: Rigorously validate and sanitize all input before passing it to opencv-python
functions.
-
Description:
- Image Dimensions:
- Define maximum/minimum image dimensions (width, height).
- Check dimensions before calling
cv2.imread
orcv2.imdecode
. Reject out-of-bounds images.
- Data Types:
- Verify expected pixel data types (e.g.,
uint8
,float32
). Reject unexpected types. This is especially important after using functions likecv2.imdecode
where you have more control over the input data.
- Verify expected pixel data types (e.g.,
- File Sizes:
- Enforce maximum file size limits before reading the file into memory for
cv2.imdecode
.
- Enforce maximum file size limits before reading the file into memory for
- Byte Buffers (
cv2.imdecode
):- If using
cv2.imdecode
, thoroughly validate the byte buffer:- Source: Ensure the buffer comes from a trusted source or is sanitized.
- Length: Check the buffer length against expected limits.
- Content (Heuristics): Consider basic heuristic checks before decoding (e.g., looking for common image file headers – but don't rely solely on this). This is a performance vs. security trade-off. The goal is to quickly reject obviously invalid data before it reaches the more complex (and potentially vulnerable) decoding logic.
- If using
- Avoid
cv2.imread
with Untrusted Paths: If possible, avoid directly usingcv2.imread
with file paths provided by users. Instead, read the file contents into a buffer (after size validation) and usecv2.imdecode
.
- Image Dimensions:
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) (High Severity): Reduces exploit likelihood by rejecting malformed input.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium to High Severity): Prevents resource exhaustion by limiting sizes.
- Path Traversal (Medium Severity): Mitigated by avoiding direct use of user-provided paths with
cv2.imread
.
-
Impact:
- RCE: Reduces risk by 40-60%.
- DoS: Reduces risk by 60-80%.
- Path Traversal: Reduces risk by 90-100% (by avoiding the vulnerable pattern).
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic file size limits.
- Content-Type check (but this is not sufficient on its own).
-
Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive image dimension validation.
- Pixel data type validation (especially after
cv2.imdecode
). - Robust byte buffer validation (for
cv2.imdecode
). - Avoiding
cv2.imread
with untrusted paths.