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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for prefecthq/prefect

Threat: Data Exposure through Prefect UI/API

  • Description: An attacker, either unauthorized or with insufficient permissions, could exploit vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the Prefect UI or API to access sensitive data managed by Prefect. This includes flow run parameters, task run results, logs, and potentially secrets if not properly managed.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach, exposure of sensitive data like API keys, database credentials, or business secrets managed or logged by Prefect. This can lead to data theft, unauthorized access to connected systems, and regulatory compliance violations.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server/Cloud UI, Prefect Server/Cloud API, Flow Run and Task Run metadata storage, Prefect Secrets module.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement and enforce robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in Prefect.
    • Regularly review and audit user permissions within Prefect.
    • Minimize logging of sensitive data within Prefect flows and tasks.
    • Utilize Prefect's secret management features or integrate with external secret stores to handle sensitive credentials used in flows.
    • Implement data masking or redaction for sensitive information displayed in the UI and API responses.

Threat: Insecure Prefect Server Configuration

  • Description: An attacker could exploit misconfigurations in the Prefect Server itself, such as default credentials, weak TLS/SSL settings, exposed administrative ports, or running outdated Prefect Server versions with known vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the Prefect Server, allowing the attacker to control flow executions, access all data stored within Prefect, manipulate configurations, and potentially pivot to other systems connected to Prefect.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server application, Prefect Server configuration, Prefect Server deployment process.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Follow official Prefect Server hardening guides and security best practices provided by Prefect.
    • Change default administrative credentials immediately upon Prefect Server deployment.
    • Enforce strong TLS/SSL configurations for all communication with the Prefect Server.
    • Restrict access to administrative ports and interfaces of the Prefect Server.
    • Regularly update Prefect Server and its dependencies to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Implement network segmentation and firewall rules to limit network access to the Prefect Server.

Threat: Prefect Server Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Attackers could discover and exploit vulnerabilities within the Prefect Server codebase itself. This could be through public vulnerability disclosures, bug bounty programs, or zero-day exploits targeting Prefect Server.
  • Impact: Similar to insecure configuration, potentially leading to full system compromise, data breaches, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution directly on the Prefect Server.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server application codebase, Prefect Server runtime environment.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Stay informed about Prefect security advisories and vulnerability disclosures from the Prefect team.
    • Promptly apply security patches and updates released by Prefect for the Prefect Server.
    • Implement a vulnerability management program to regularly scan and assess the Prefect Server for known vulnerabilities.
    • Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to provide an additional layer of protection against web-based attacks targeting the Prefect Server.

Threat: Compromised Agent

  • Description: An attacker could compromise a Prefect Agent instance. This could be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in the agent's environment, or through social engineering or insider threats targeting the agent's host. Once compromised, the attacker controls the agent process and its capabilities within Prefect.
  • Impact: Malicious flow execution under the agent's identity, access to resources and systems the agent has credentials for within Prefect and potentially external systems, data exfiltration from the agent's environment, and potential lateral movement within the infrastructure the agent can reach.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Agent process, Agent communication with Prefect Server, Agent's execution environment within Prefect.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure the environment where Agents are deployed, following security best practices for the underlying infrastructure.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization for Agent communication with the Prefect Server (API keys, tokens, secure agent registration).
    • Regularly update agent software and dependencies to the latest versions.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege to the agent's service account within Prefect and the underlying system.
    • Utilize infrastructure-as-code and configuration management to ensure consistent and secure agent deployments.
    • Implement monitoring and alerting for agent activity and resource usage within Prefect.

Threat: Agent Credential Theft

  • Description: An attacker could steal credentials used by the Agent to authenticate to the Prefect Server or access resources managed by Prefect. This could involve accessing agent configuration files, memory, or exploiting vulnerabilities to extract API keys or tokens used for Prefect communication.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to the Prefect Server and potentially other Prefect managed resources, allowing the attacker to impersonate the agent, execute malicious flows, access sensitive data managed by Prefect, and potentially disrupt Prefect operations.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Agent configuration, Agent runtime environment, Prefect Agent authentication mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid storing sensitive credentials directly in agent configurations.
    • Utilize secure secret management solutions (Prefect Secrets, external secret stores integrated with Prefect) to provide credentials to agents at runtime.
    • Encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit within the agent environment.
    • Implement proper access control and monitoring of agent environments to detect and prevent unauthorized access.
    • Regularly rotate agent credentials used for Prefect authentication.

Threat: Malicious Flow/Task Code Deployment

  • Description: An attacker with sufficient privileges within Prefect to deploy flows (e.g., compromised user account, insider threat) could inject malicious code into flows or tasks. This malicious code could be designed to exploit Prefect functionality to steal data, disrupt workflows, or gain unauthorized access to systems integrated with Prefect.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution within the Prefect environment during flow runs, data manipulation within Prefect workflows, system compromise of systems integrated with Prefect, denial of service of Prefect workflows, and potential reputational damage.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Flow deployment process within Prefect, Flow code repository integrated with Prefect, Prefect Server flow registration mechanism.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement strict access control over flow deployment processes within Prefect, limiting who can deploy and modify flows.
    • Implement mandatory code review and security scanning of flow and task code before deployment to Prefect.
    • Utilize version control for flow code and maintain audit trails for flow deployments within Prefect.
    • Implement CI/CD pipelines with automated security checks integrated into the flow deployment process for Prefect.
    • Enforce code signing for flow deployments to ensure code integrity and origin within Prefect.

Threat: Insecure Storage Configuration

  • Description: Misconfigured storage used by Prefect to store flow code, task results, and metadata could expose sensitive Prefect data to unauthorized access. This is specific to how Prefect utilizes storage and manages access to it.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach of Prefect data, data theft of flow logic and sensitive metadata managed by Prefect, potential manipulation of flow artifacts if storage is writable by unauthorized parties, impacting the integrity of Prefect workflows.
  • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect storage configuration, Prefect's integration with cloud storage or databases, Prefect data storage mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Securely configure storage buckets and access policies specifically for Prefect's storage needs, following the principle of least privilege.
    • Ensure storage buckets used by Prefect are not publicly accessible.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization for access to storage used by Prefect.
    • Encrypt data at rest and in transit within storage used by Prefect.
    • Regularly audit storage configurations and access logs related to Prefect's storage.