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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for prefecthq/prefect

Attack Surface: Unauthorized API Access

  • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to the Prefect Server's core API, enabling control over the Prefect deployment and data exfiltration. This is a direct attack on Prefect's central control mechanism.
  • How Prefect Contributes: Prefect's functionality is built around its API. The API's exposure and security are fundamental to the security of the entire system. Prefect provides the API; securing it is a shared responsibility.
  • Example: An attacker finds the Prefect Server API endpoint exposed without authentication. They use Prefect's own API calls to list deployments, retrieve sensitive data passed as parameters, and trigger a malicious flow (defined within Prefect) that exfiltrates data.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the Prefect deployment, data exfiltration, potential execution of malicious code via Prefect, disruption of services managed by Prefect.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Authentication: Enforce strong authentication for all Prefect API access (API keys, OAuth 2.0). Utilize Prefect's built-in authentication.
    • Authorization: Implement granular authorization (RBAC) using Prefect's user/workspace features to restrict API access.
    • Network Security: Restrict network access to the Prefect Server API. Do not expose it publicly without strong controls. Use Prefect Cloud's network security features if applicable.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting within Prefect (or at a network level) to prevent abuse.
    • Input Validation: Ensure Prefect's API server rigorously validates all input (this is primarily Prefect's responsibility, but verify).
    • Audit Logging: Enable and monitor Prefect's audit logs for all API requests.

Attack Surface: Agent Compromise (RCE via Prefect)

  • Description: An attacker gains remote code execution (RCE) on a machine running a Prefect agent, specifically leveraging the agent's role in executing Prefect flows.
  • How Prefect Contributes: Prefect agents are designed to execute code as part of flows. This inherent functionality creates the attack vector. The agent's connection to the Prefect server and its execution capabilities are the key.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a third-party library used within a Prefect flow. The Prefect agent, while executing the flow as instructed by the Prefect server, becomes compromised. The attacker then uses the agent's existing connection to the Prefect server to escalate their attack.
  • Impact: Full control over the agent machine, potential access to sensitive data accessible to the flow being run by Prefect, lateral movement within the network. The agent's connection back to the Prefect server could be abused.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Least Privilege: Run the Prefect agent itself with minimal privileges. Avoid root/admin. This limits the damage even if the agent is compromised via a flow.
    • Secure Agent Configuration: Follow Prefect's security best practices for agent configuration.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate agent machines. This limits the blast radius of a compromised agent.
    • Regular Patching: Keep the agent machine and all software Prefect might use patched.
    • Dependency Management: Carefully manage flow dependencies within Prefect. Use pinned versions, verify integrity.
    • Containerization: Run Prefect flows within containers (Docker, Kubernetes) using Prefect's built-in support. Follow container security best practices.
    • Intrusion Detection/Prevention: Monitor agent machines for suspicious activity related to Prefect flow execution.

Attack Surface: Insecure Deployment Configuration (within Prefect)

  • Description: Misconfigurations within Prefect's deployment system expose sensitive information or allow unauthorized modification of flow code managed by Prefect.
  • How Prefect Contributes: Prefect's deployment mechanism defines how and where flows are executed. This mechanism itself can be misconfigured.
  • Example: A Prefect deployment is configured to store flow code in a publicly writable S3 bucket. An attacker modifies the flow code within that bucket, and Prefect then executes the malicious code.
  • Impact: Execution of malicious code via Prefect, data exfiltration, disruption of services managed by Prefect.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Storage: Use secure storage locations as configured within Prefect (private S3 buckets with correct IAM policies, private Git repositories).
    • Secrets Management: Use a secure secrets management solution integrated with Prefect (e.g., Prefect's integration with HashiCorp Vault or cloud provider secrets managers). Do not store secrets in plain text in Prefect deployment configurations.
    • Least Privilege: Grant the minimum necessary permissions to Prefect deployments.
    • Review Deployment Configurations: Regularly review and audit Prefect's deployment configurations for security.

Attack Surface: Insecure Communication (MitM on Prefect Traffic)

  • Description: Attackers intercept or modify communication between Prefect components (agent, server, client). This is a direct attack on Prefect's communication channels.
  • How Prefect Contributes: Prefect relies on network communication between its components. The security of this communication is crucial.
  • Example: An attacker performs a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack on the network connection between a Prefect agent and the Prefect server. They intercept and modify flow run requests sent by Prefect, injecting malicious code.
  • Impact: Data interception, modification of flow run requests within Prefect, potential compromise of the agent or server via manipulated Prefect communication.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • TLS/SSL: Enforce TLS/SSL for all communication between Prefect components. This is a configuration option within Prefect.
    • Certificate Validation: Ensure that Prefect clients (agents and your code using the Prefect client library) properly validate the server's TLS certificate.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate Prefect components to limit the scope of MitM attacks.
    • VPN: Use a VPN to secure communication between Prefect components, especially across untrusted networks.