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Attack Tree Analysis for prefecthq/prefect

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Prefect Flows

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Prefect Flows  |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                      |
         +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
         |                                                                                 |
+---------------------+                                                  +--------------------------+
|  Compromise Prefect | [HR]                                              |  Exploit Prefect Server  | [HR]
|       Server        |                                                  |      Vulnerabilities     |
+---------------------+                                                  +--------------------------+
         |                                                                                 |
+--------+---------+ [HR]                                   +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
|  Expose  |  Exploit| [HR]                                   |  API Endpoint |  Configuration  |  Database   | [CN]
|  Secrets |  Flow   |                                       |  Vulnerabilities|   Vulnerabilities| Vulnerabilities|
+--------+---------+ [CN]                                   +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
    | [CN]      | [CN]                                               | [CN]              | [CN]              | [CN]
    |         |                                       +-------+-------+   +-------+-------+   +-------+-------+
    |         |                                       |Auth   |Input  |   |Weak   |Exposed|   |SQLi   |Unauth. |
    |         |                                       |Bypass |Valid. |[HR]|Config |Config |[HR]|       |Access  |
    |         |                                       +-------+-------+   +-------+-------+   +-------+-------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Prefect Server [HR]

This is a high-risk path because compromising the server provides a central point of control and access to all managed flows and potentially sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: 1.a Expose Secrets [HR, CN]

  • Description: The attacker gains access to secrets used by Prefect flows (API keys, database credentials, etc.). This is a critical node because exposed secrets are a gateway to other systems and data. It's high-risk due to the potential for misconfiguration and the high impact.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Insecure Storage: Secrets hardcoded in flow code, stored in unencrypted environment variables, or placed in version control (e.g., Git repositories).
    • Misconfigured Access Controls: Insufficiently restrictive permissions on configuration files or secret stores.
    • Vulnerability Exploitation: Exploiting a vulnerability in the Prefect server or a related component to gain access to files or memory containing secrets.
    • Social Engineering: Tricking a user with access to the secrets into revealing them.

Attack Tree Path: 1.b Exploit Flow Code Vulnerabilities [HR, CN]

  • Description: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities within the user-defined flow code that Prefect executes. This is a critical node because it allows for arbitrary code execution within the flow's context. It's high-risk due to the prevalence of coding errors and the potential for high impact.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Command Injection: The flow code unsafely incorporates user-provided input into system commands, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands.
    • SQL Injection: Similar to command injection, but targeting SQL queries. If the flow interacts with a database and doesn't properly sanitize input, the attacker can manipulate queries.
    • Insecure Deserialization: The flow deserializes untrusted data without proper validation, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
    • Path Traversal: The flow uses user-provided input to construct file paths without proper sanitization, allowing the attacker to access files outside of the intended directory.
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If the flow generates HTML output that includes user-provided input without proper escaping, an attacker could inject malicious JavaScript. (Less common in Prefect flows, but possible if interacting with web interfaces).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Prefect Server Vulnerabilities [HR]

This is a high-risk path because the server is the central control point.

Attack Tree Path: 2.a API Endpoint Vulnerabilities [CN]

  • Description: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the Prefect Server's API. This is a critical node because the API controls all aspects of Prefect.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing the authentication mechanisms of the API, gaining unauthorized access.
    • Input Validation Vulnerabilities [HR]: Exploiting weaknesses in how the API handles user input. This is high-risk due to the potential for various injection attacks.
      • Injection Attacks (SQLi, Command Injection, etc.): Similar to flow code vulnerabilities, but targeting the API itself.
      • XML External Entity (XXE) Injection: If the API processes XML input, an attacker might be able to exploit XXE vulnerabilities to access local files or internal systems.
      • Improper Error Handling: Error messages that reveal sensitive information about the server's configuration or internal workings.

Attack Tree Path: 2.b Configuration Vulnerabilities [CN]

  • Description: The attacker leverages misconfigurations in the Prefect Server's setup. This is a critical node because it can expose the server to a wide range of attacks.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Weak Configuration [HR]: Using default or easily guessable passwords, leaving unnecessary services exposed, or failing to enable security features. This is high-risk due to the commonality of weak configurations.
    • Exposed Configuration: Making configuration files (which might contain sensitive information) publicly accessible.

Attack Tree Path: 2.c Database Vulnerabilities [CN]

  • Description: The attacker targets the database used by the Prefect Server (typically PostgreSQL). This is a critical node because the database stores flow definitions, run history, and potentially sensitive metadata.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • SQL Injection (SQLi) [HR]: Exploiting vulnerabilities in how the Prefect Server interacts with the database to execute arbitrary SQL queries. This is high-risk due to the potential for complete database compromise.
    • Unauthorized Access: Gaining direct access to the database due to weak passwords, misconfigured network access controls, or other vulnerabilities.