Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
94 lines (78 loc) · 8.64 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

94 lines (78 loc) · 8.64 KB

Threat Model Analysis for prefecthq/prefect

Threat: Agent Impersonation

  • Threat: Agent Impersonation

    • Description: An attacker gains access to an agent's credentials (e.g., API key or service account token) or compromises a machine running an agent. They then use this access to impersonate the legitimate agent, submitting malicious flow runs or intercepting/modifying task results. The attacker might use stolen credentials, exploit a vulnerability in the agent's host system, or leverage a compromised network connection. This directly impacts Prefect's agent-server communication and authentication.
    • Impact:
      • Execution of unauthorized code through Prefect.
      • Data exfiltration or modification via Prefect flows.
      • Disruption of legitimate flow runs managed by Prefect.
      • Potential lateral movement to other systems if the agent has excessive privileges.
    • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Agent, Prefect Client (when submitting flows), Prefect Server/Cloud (when receiving results). Specifically, the authentication mechanisms between these components.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Use strong, unique API keys or service account tokens for each agent.
      • Credential Rotation: Regularly rotate agent credentials.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate agents on the network, limiting their access to only necessary resources. This limits the blast radius of a compromised agent.
      • Least Privilege: Run agents with the minimum necessary permissions on the host system.
      • Monitoring: Monitor agent activity for suspicious behavior (e.g., unusual flow submissions, unexpected network connections). This requires configuring Prefect's logging appropriately.
      • Secure Configuration Management: Use a secure configuration management system to manage agent configurations and prevent unauthorized modifications.

Threat: Malicious Flow Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Flow Injection

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the Prefect Server/Cloud API (or a system that can submit flows) and injects a malicious flow definition. This flow could contain tasks designed to exfiltrate data, execute arbitrary code, or disrupt the system. The attacker might exploit a vulnerability in the API, use stolen credentials, or compromise a CI/CD pipeline that deploys flows. This directly targets the Prefect Server/Cloud's flow management capabilities.
    • Impact:
      • Complete system compromise via malicious flow execution.
      • Data exfiltration or destruction through Prefect flows.
      • Denial of service of the Prefect system.
      • Execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the agent running the injected flow.
    • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server/Cloud API, prefect.deployments.Deployment (if used for programmatic deployment), Flow storage (e.g., database, object storage).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • API Authentication & Authorization: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the Prefect API. Use RBAC to restrict access based on user roles.
      • Input Validation: Validate all flow definitions received by the API to ensure they conform to expected schemas and do not contain malicious code. This is crucial for preventing code injection.
      • Code Review: Implement a code review process for all flow definitions before deployment.
      • Secure CI/CD: Secure the CI/CD pipeline used to deploy flows, ensuring that only authorized users can modify the pipeline and that all code is reviewed and tested before deployment.
      • Flow Validation: Implement mechanisms to validate the integrity of flow code before execution (e.g., checksums, digital signatures).

Threat: Dependency Hijacking (of Prefect itself)

  • Threat: Dependency Hijacking (of Prefect itself)

    • Description: An attacker compromises a third-party library that Prefect itself depends on. This is distinct from a dependency used within a user's task. This compromised library could then be used to execute arbitrary code within the Prefect Server/Cloud or Agent processes.
    • Impact:
      • Execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the Prefect agent or server processes.
      • Data exfiltration from the Prefect system itself.
      • System compromise of the Prefect infrastructure.
    • Affected Prefect Component: Any Prefect component that uses the compromised dependency (Prefect Agent, Prefect Server/Cloud). This affects the prefect library itself.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Dependency Pinning: Pin the versions of all dependencies (including transitive dependencies) in Prefect's requirements.txt or pyproject.toml file (this is primarily a responsibility of the Prefect maintainers, but users should verify).
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan Prefect's dependencies for known vulnerabilities. Users should monitor for security advisories related to Prefect.
      • Prompt Updates: Update to the latest version of Prefect promptly when security patches are released.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker submits a large number of flow runs or tasks to the Prefect Server/Cloud, or crafts a malicious flow definition that consumes excessive resources (CPU, memory, disk space, network bandwidth) on the Prefect infrastructure, causing the Prefect Server/Cloud or agents to become unavailable. This directly targets the operational capacity of Prefect.
    • Impact:
      • Disruption of all legitimate flow runs.
      • System downtime of the Prefect service.
      • Potential financial losses.
    • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server/Cloud (API, scheduler, database), Prefect Agent (executor), prefect.engine (flow run execution).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the Prefect API to prevent an attacker from submitting too many requests.
      • Resource Limits: Set resource limits (CPU, memory, disk space) on tasks and flows within Prefect's configuration.
      • Timeouts: Implement timeouts for tasks and flows to prevent them from running indefinitely. This is a core feature of Prefect.
      • Scalable Infrastructure: Use a scalable infrastructure for the Prefect Server/Cloud and agents to handle increased load.
      • Monitoring: Monitor resource utilization of the Prefect Server/Cloud and agents, and implement alerts for unusual activity.

Threat: Configuration Exposure

  • Threat: Configuration Exposure

    • Description: Sensitive Prefect configuration information (e.g., API keys for Prefect Cloud, database credentials for the Prefect Server, storage configurations) is exposed through insecure storage, logging, or error messages. This is specific to the configuration of Prefect itself, not user-provided secrets within tasks.
    • Impact:
      • Compromise of Prefect infrastructure.
      • Data exfiltration from Prefect's storage.
      • Unauthorized access to other systems if Prefect's configuration includes credentials for those systems.
    • Affected Prefect Component: Prefect Server/Cloud configuration, Prefect Agent configuration, prefect.config (accessing configuration values).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Configuration Management: Use a secure configuration management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, environment variables with appropriate access controls) to manage sensitive configuration information for Prefect.
      • Avoid Hardcoding: Avoid hardcoding sensitive information in Prefect's configuration files or code.
      • Log Sanitization: Sanitize Prefect's logs to remove any sensitive information.
      • Error Handling: Configure Prefect to avoid exposing sensitive information in error messages.
      • Least Privilege: Grant only the necessary permissions to access Prefect's configuration information.