attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for ray-project/ray

Objective: Compromise Application Using Ray Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

• [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using Ray Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Ray Control Plane Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Unauthenticated Access to Ray Dashboard/API [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] Ray Dashboard Exposed Publicly
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Ray Dashboard configured without Authentication [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] Ray API Exposed Publicly
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Ray API configured without Authentication [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Command Injection/Code Execution via Ray Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Code via Ray Job Submission [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Craft Ray Job definition to execute arbitrary code on Ray cluster nodes. [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Code via Ray Actor/Task Definition [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Craft Ray Actor or Task definition to execute arbitrary code on Ray cluster nodes. [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Ray Control Plane Communication [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Send maliciously crafted serialized data to Ray Control Plane to trigger code execution. (Pickle vulnerabilities are relevant here) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Resource Exhaustion/Denial of Service (DoS) via Ray Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Submit Excessive Ray Jobs/Tasks [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Flood Ray cluster with a large number of jobs or tasks to overwhelm resources. [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Data Interception/Eavesdropping in Ray Data Transfer [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Network Sniffing of Ray Communication Channels [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Capture network traffic between Ray nodes to intercept sensitive data. (Ray communication might not be encrypted by default) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Ray Objects [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Retrieve sensitive data stored in Ray objects after gaining unauthorized access. [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • [OR] [HIGH RISK PATH] Vulnerabilities in Ray Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • [AND] [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Python Packages used by Ray [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • [HIGH RISK PATH] Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in libraries like protobuf, grpcio, numpy, etc., used by Ray. [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using Ray Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• This is the root goal of the attacker and represents the ultimate compromise of the application. Success at this level means the attacker has achieved their objective by exploiting weaknesses within the Ray framework.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Ray Control Plane Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Ray Control Plane is a high-risk path because it can grant the attacker significant control over the entire Ray cluster and the applications running on it.
  • Compromising the Control Plane can lead to code execution on worker nodes, data manipulation, denial of service, and complete cluster takeover.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Unauthenticated Access to Ray Dashboard/API [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Ray Dashboard configured without Authentication: If the Ray Dashboard is exposed publicly without authentication, attackers can directly access it.
    • They can monitor cluster status, jobs, and potentially gain insights into the application's operations.
    • In some cases, the dashboard might offer functionalities that could be abused to further the attack.
  • Ray API configured without Authentication: If the Ray API is exposed publicly without authentication, attackers can directly interact with the Ray cluster programmatically.
    • They can submit malicious jobs, actors, or tasks to the cluster.
    • This can lead to code execution on worker nodes, resource exhaustion, or data manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Command Injection/Code Execution via Ray Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Craft Ray Job definition to execute arbitrary code on Ray cluster nodes: Attackers can craft malicious Ray job definitions that, when submitted to the Ray cluster, execute arbitrary code on the worker nodes.
    • This can be achieved by exploiting insufficient input validation in job parameters or by leveraging features that allow code execution during job setup or execution.
  • Craft Ray Actor or Task definition to execute arbitrary code on Ray cluster nodes: Similar to job submissions, attackers can craft malicious actor or task definitions that lead to code execution on worker nodes when instantiated or invoked.
    • This can be achieved through similar input validation weaknesses or by exploiting features that allow dynamic code execution within actors or tasks.
  • Send maliciously crafted serialized data to Ray Control Plane to trigger code execution (Pickle vulnerabilities are relevant here): Ray often uses Python's pickle serialization format for communication. pickle is known to be vulnerable to deserialization attacks.
    • Attackers can send maliciously crafted pickled data to the Ray Control Plane. When the Control Plane deserializes this data, it can lead to arbitrary code execution on the Control Plane itself, and potentially propagate to worker nodes.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Resource Exhaustion/Denial of Service (DoS) via Ray Control Plane [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Flood Ray cluster with a large number of jobs or tasks to overwhelm resources: Attackers can submit a massive number of Ray jobs or tasks to the cluster.
    • This can overwhelm the cluster's resources (CPU, memory, network), causing performance degradation or complete service disruption for legitimate users and applications.
    • This is a relatively simple DoS attack to execute, especially if the Ray API is publicly accessible or not properly rate-limited.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Data Interception/Eavesdropping in Ray Data Transfer [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Capture network traffic between Ray nodes to intercept sensitive data (Ray communication might not be encrypted by default): If encryption is not enabled for Ray's inter-node communication, attackers on the same network can passively sniff network traffic.
    • This allows them to intercept sensitive data being transferred between Ray processes, including application data, intermediate results, or even credentials if transmitted insecurely.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Ray Objects [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Retrieve sensitive data stored in Ray objects after gaining unauthorized access: If attackers manage to gain unauthorized access to the Ray object store (through authorization bypass or other vulnerabilities), they can then retrieve sensitive data stored within Ray objects.
    • This can lead to data breaches and confidentiality violations if sensitive information is stored in Ray objects without proper access controls or encryption.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH RISK PATH] Vulnerabilities in Ray Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in libraries like protobuf, grpcio, numpy, etc., used by Ray: Ray relies on numerous third-party Python packages. Many of these packages may have known vulnerabilities.
    • Attackers can identify and exploit these vulnerabilities in Ray's dependencies. Successful exploitation can lead to various impacts, including code execution, denial of service, or information disclosure, depending on the nature of the vulnerability and the affected dependency.