threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for ray-project/ray

Threat: Head Node Compromise

• Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the head node, potentially through exploiting vulnerabilities in Ray services or via compromised credentials. Once compromised, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands, control the cluster, schedule malicious tasks, access sensitive data, and disrupt operations.
• Impact: Critical. Full cluster compromise, data breach, complete application disruption, reputational damage.
• Affected Ray Component: Head Node (Ray processes, infrastructure)
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Head Node Infrastructure: Harden OS, apply patches, use firewalls, network segmentation.
  • Restrict Access: Implement strong access controls, IAM, principle of least privilege.
  • Regular Security Audits: Conduct audits and penetration testing.
  • Monitoring and Alerting: Implement intrusion detection and security monitoring.

Threat: Head Node Denial of Service (DoS)

• Description: An attacker floods the head node with requests, exploits resource exhaustion vulnerabilities, or crashes Ray services on the head node. This prevents the head node from managing the cluster, leading to application unavailability.
• Impact: High. Application downtime, service disruption, potential data loss if tasks are interrupted.
• Affected Ray Component: Head Node (Ray services, API endpoints)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Resource Limits and Quotas: Implement resource management and quotas.
  • Rate Limiting: Limit request rates to head node API.
  • Input Validation: Sanitize inputs to prevent injection attacks leading to DoS.
  • Robust Error Handling: Implement error handling to prevent crashes.
  • Load Balancing/Redundancy (HA): Consider HA setup for head node if applicable.

Threat: Worker Node Compromise

• Description: An attacker compromises a worker node, potentially through vulnerabilities in Ray worker processes or via lateral movement from a compromised client or other node. Once compromised, the attacker can execute malicious code within the cluster, steal data, disrupt computations, or launch attacks against other nodes.
• Impact: High. Malicious code execution within the cluster, data breach, disruption of computations, lateral movement.
• Affected Ray Component: Worker Node (Ray worker processes, infrastructure)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Worker Node Infrastructure: Harden OS, apply patches, restrict access.
  • Containerization and Isolation: Run workers in containers for isolation.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Run worker processes with minimal privileges.
  • Code Review and Security Scanning: Review and scan code executed on workers.
  • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor worker nodes for suspicious activity.

Threat: Data Exfiltration from Worker/Object Store

• Description: An attacker compromises a worker node or gains unauthorized access to the object store (Plasma) and exfiltrates sensitive data processed or stored by the Ray application. This could be achieved through malicious code execution, exploiting access control weaknesses, or network sniffing.
• Impact: High. Data breach, loss of confidential information, compliance violations.
• Affected Ray Component: Worker Node (Ray worker processes), Object Store (Plasma)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Data Encryption in Transit and at Rest: Encrypt data in transit and at rest.
  • Access Control Lists (ACLs) for Object Store: Implement ACLs for Plasma objects.
  • Data Minimization: Minimize sensitive data processed and stored.
  • Data Loss Prevention (DLP): Implement DLP measures.
  • Network Segmentation: Segment network to limit impact of compromise.

Threat: Lateral Movement from Compromised Worker

• Description: An attacker, having compromised a worker node, uses it as a pivot point to attack other worker nodes or the head node within the Ray cluster. This can be done by exploiting network vulnerabilities, weak authentication, or shared credentials within the Ray cluster environment.
• Impact: High. Broader cluster compromise, escalation of privileges, wider data breach.
• Affected Ray Component: Worker Node (Network interfaces, inter-node communication within Ray cluster)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Network Segmentation and Micro-segmentation: Segment network to limit lateral movement within the Ray cluster.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Limit worker process privileges and network access.
  • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Deploy IDPS to detect lateral movement.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit for lateral movement paths within the Ray cluster.

Threat: Insecure Client Connection

• Description: The connection between the Ray client and the cluster is not properly secured (e.g., unencrypted, weak authentication). An attacker could intercept or hijack the connection to gain unauthorized access to the cluster, impersonate a client, or inject malicious commands.
• Impact: High. Unauthorized cluster access, data breach, malicious task submission, cluster disruption.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Client (Client-cluster communication channel, authentication mechanisms)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Authentication and Authorization: Implement strong client authentication (Ray auth, integrate with IDP).
  • Encryption in Transit (TLS/SSL): Encrypt client-cluster communication using TLS/SSL.
  • Secure Client Configuration: Securely configure Ray clients.
  • Restrict Client Access: Limit client connection sources.

Threat: Injection Attacks through Client API Calls

• Description: Client applications construct Ray API calls using unsanitized user input. This can lead to injection vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection, code injection) that allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands within the Ray cluster via the client.
• Impact: High. Arbitrary code execution in the cluster, data breach, cluster disruption.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Client (Client API usage, Ray API endpoints)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Parameterized Queries/API Calls: Use parameterized API calls to prevent injection.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize user input before API calls.
  • Principle of Least Privilege for Client Applications: Run clients with minimal privileges.

Threat: Ray Dashboard Web Application Vulnerabilities

• Description: The Ray Dashboard, being a web application, is susceptible to common web vulnerabilities like XSS, CSRF, insecure authentication, and injection flaws. Exploiting these can allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, steal credentials, manipulate data displayed, or perform actions on behalf of users within the Ray Dashboard context.
• Impact: High. Unauthorized access to cluster information, potential for actions on behalf of users, data manipulation in dashboard display.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Dashboard (Web application components, UI, API endpoints)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Development Practices for Dashboard: Follow secure web development practices.
  • Regular Security Updates: Keep Ray and Dashboard updated.
  • Input Validation and Output Encoding: Implement input validation and output encoding.
  • CSRF Protection: Implement CSRF protection.
  • Secure Authentication and Authorization: Implement strong auth and auth for dashboard.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit and penetration test the dashboard.
  • Restrict Access to Dashboard: Limit access to authorized users/networks.

Threat: Unauthorized Object Store Access

• Description: Lack of proper access controls to the Plasma object store allows unauthorized users or processes to access objects. This can lead to data breaches, data modification, or deletion of objects within Ray's object storage.
• Impact: High. Data breach, data loss, data corruption, unauthorized data manipulation.
• Affected Ray Component: Object Store (Plasma, object access mechanisms)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Access Control Lists (ACLs) for Object Store: Implement ACLs for Plasma objects (if available/feasible in Ray version).
  • Encryption at Rest for Object Store: Encrypt data at rest in Plasma.
  • Principle of Least Privilege for Object Access: Grant minimal access to objects.
  • Regular Security Audits: Audit object store access.

Threat: Data Corruption/Tampering in Plasma

• Description: Malicious actors or software bugs corrupt or tamper with data stored in Plasma. This can lead to data integrity issues, application failures, and incorrect results within Ray applications relying on Plasma.
• Impact: High. Data integrity issues, application errors, incorrect results, potential data loss.
• Affected Ray Component: Object Store (Plasma, data storage mechanisms)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Data Integrity Checks: Implement checksums or hashing for data integrity.
  • Immutable Object Storage (if applicable): Consider immutable storage for critical data.
  • Regular Backups and Recovery Procedures: Implement backups and recovery.
  • Monitoring for Data Integrity Issues: Monitor for data corruption.

Threat: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) on Inter-node Communication

• Description: Inter-node communication within the Ray cluster is not encrypted. An attacker intercepts network traffic between Ray nodes, potentially eavesdropping on sensitive data, manipulating communication, or injecting malicious messages.
• Impact: High. Data breach, manipulation of computations, cluster disruption, potential for further attacks.
• Affected Ray Component: Inter-node Communication (Network communication channels within Ray cluster)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Encryption in Transit (TLS/SSL) for Inter-node Communication: Encrypt inter-node communication with TLS/SSL (if supported by Ray).
  • Mutual Authentication: Implement mutual authentication between nodes.
  • Secure Network Infrastructure: Deploy Ray in a secure network environment.

Threat: Replay Attacks on Inter-node Communication

• Description: An attacker captures and replays network traffic between Ray nodes within the Ray cluster. This could be used to bypass authentication, re-execute commands, or disrupt communication flows within the cluster.
• Impact: High. Potential for bypassing authentication, disrupting communication, re-executing actions within the Ray cluster.
• Affected Ray Component: Inter-node Communication (Network protocols, authentication mechanisms within Ray cluster)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Encryption and Authentication: Encryption and strong authentication help mitigate replay attacks.
  • Timestamps and Nonces: Use timestamps and nonces in communication protocols.
  • Session Management: Implement secure session management.

Threat: Unencrypted Sensitive Data in Transit

• Description: Sensitive data is transmitted unencrypted between Ray nodes within the Ray cluster. If network traffic is intercepted, this data is exposed to eavesdropping.
• Impact: High. Data breach, loss of confidential information, compliance violations.
• Affected Ray Component: Inter-node Communication (Data transmission channels within Ray cluster)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Encryption in Transit (TLS/SSL) for Inter-node Communication: Encrypt sensitive data in transit.
  • Data Minimization: Minimize sensitive data transmitted.
  • Data Transformation: Anonymize or transform sensitive data before transmission.

Threat: API Misuse

• Description: Developers use the Ray API incorrectly or insecurely, leading to vulnerabilities in the Ray application. Examples include insecure deserialization (e.g., in Java API), improper input handling, or bypassing Ray security features.
• Impact: High. Vulnerabilities in application code, potential for code execution, data breach, or cluster disruption.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray API (API usage in application code)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Coding Training for Developers: Train developers on secure Ray API usage.
  • Code Review and Security Analysis: Review and analyze API usage in code.
  • API Usage Guidelines and Best Practices: Develop and enforce API usage guidelines.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize inputs to API calls.

Threat: Ray API Vulnerabilities

• Description: Vulnerabilities exist in the Ray API itself (core or extensions). Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise the Ray cluster or application.
• Impact: Critical to High. Cluster compromise, arbitrary code execution, data breach, denial of service.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray API (Ray core API, extensions, integrations)
• Risk Severity: Critical to High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Regular Security Updates for Ray: Keep Ray updated with security patches.
  • Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Participate in/encourage security audits of Ray.
  • Vulnerability Disclosure and Response Process: Establish a vulnerability response process.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Ray Dependencies

• Description: Ray relies on third-party dependencies (Python packages, system libraries) that may contain known vulnerabilities. Exploiting these vulnerabilities in dependencies can compromise the Ray application.
• Impact: High. Application vulnerabilities, potential for code execution, data breach, or denial of service.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Dependencies (Third-party libraries, packages)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Dependency Scanning and Management: Use dependency scanning tools.
  • Regular Dependency Updates: Keep dependencies updated.
  • Vulnerability Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor for dependency vulnerabilities.
  • Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Maintain SBOM for dependency tracking.

Threat: Compromised Ray Packages/Supply Chain

• Description: Ray packages or components are compromised in the software supply chain (e.g., malicious code injected into packages). This introduces malicious code or vulnerabilities directly into the Ray environment.
• Impact: Critical. Full cluster compromise, arbitrary code execution, data breach, complete application disruption.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Packages (Distribution packages, installation process)
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Package Management: Use trusted repositories, verify package signatures.
  • Supply Chain Security Audits: Audit supply chain security.
  • Code Signing and Verification: Verify package signatures.
  • Vendor Security Assessments: Assess Ray vendor security.

Threat: Default/Weak Configurations

• Description: Using default or weak configurations for Ray components (head node, worker nodes, dashboard) leaves the system vulnerable. Examples include default passwords, open ports, or disabled security features in Ray components.
• Impact: High. Increased attack surface, easier exploitation of vulnerabilities, unauthorized access.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Components (Head node, worker nodes, dashboard, configuration files)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Configuration Hardening: Implement secure configuration hardening for Ray components.
  • Configuration Management Automation: Automate secure configuration management.
  • Regular Security Configuration Reviews: Review configurations regularly.
  • Principle of Least Privilege Configuration: Configure with minimal privileges.

Threat: Network Misconfiguration

• Description: Incorrect network settings expose Ray services to unintended networks. For example, the dashboard or head node ports are publicly accessible when they should be restricted to internal networks, increasing the attack surface for Ray services.
• Impact: High. Increased attack surface, unauthorized access to services, potential for exploitation.
• Affected Ray Component: Ray Network Configuration (Network settings, firewall rules related to Ray services)
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Network Segmentation and Firewalls: Implement network segmentation and firewalls to protect Ray services.
  • Network Configuration Audits: Audit network configurations related to Ray.
  • Principle of Least Exposure: Expose Ray services only to necessary networks.
  • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Deploy IDPS for network monitoring of Ray services.