Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
78 lines (62 loc) · 5.88 KB

File metadata and controls

78 lines (62 loc) · 5.88 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for ray-project/ray

Objective: Compromise Ray-Based Application [CN]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Compromise Ray-Based Application [CN]
                                              |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |																										|
  1. Data Exfiltration [CN] 3. Arbitrary Code Execution [CN] | |

| | 1.1 3.2 Intercept Gain Data in Initial Transit Access [CN] | |


| | 1.1.1 3.2.1 Sniff Weak/ Network Default Traffic Credentials [HR] [HR]

  • Description: This is the overarching attacker goal. All attack paths ultimately aim to achieve some form of compromise, whether it's data theft, service disruption, or gaining control of the system.
  • Impact: Very High - Complete system compromise, data loss, reputational damage, financial loss.
  • Description: The attacker aims to steal sensitive data processed by or stored within the Ray cluster.
  • Impact: Very High - Loss of confidential data, potential regulatory violations (GDPR, HIPAA, etc.), reputational damage.
  • Description: If Ray communication (between nodes or between client and cluster) is not secured with TLS, an attacker on the same network segment can use packet sniffing tools (e.g., Wireshark) to capture data in transit.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Highly dependent on network configuration and whether TLS is enforced.
  • Impact: High - Direct access to potentially sensitive data transmitted over the network.
  • Effort: Low - Readily available tools and techniques.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate - Requires understanding of network protocols and sniffing tools.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) might detect unusual traffic, but it's not guaranteed. Requires network monitoring.
  • Mitigation:
    • Enforce TLS encryption for all Ray communication.
    • Verify TLS configuration and certificate validity.
    • Consider using mutual TLS (mTLS).
    • Implement network segmentation to limit the attacker's reach.
  • Description: The attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary code on the Ray cluster, giving them a high degree of control.
  • Impact: Very High - Complete system compromise, potential for lateral movement, data exfiltration, and further attacks.
  • Description: This is a crucial prerequisite for many other attacks. The attacker needs to gain some level of access to the Ray cluster before they can exploit vulnerabilities or launch further attacks.
  • Impact: High - Enables further attacks, including arbitrary code execution and data exfiltration.
  • Description: If the Ray dashboard or other Ray services are exposed with weak or default credentials, an attacker can easily gain access. This is a very common vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Unfortunately, weak and default credentials are still prevalent.
  • Impact: High - Provides direct access to the Ray dashboard and potentially the entire cluster.
  • Effort: Low - Trivial to attempt default credentials or use common password lists.
  • Skill Level: Novice - Requires minimal technical skill.
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Failed login attempts should be logged and monitored.
  • Mitigation:
    • Enforce strong password policies (length, complexity, uniqueness).
    • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Implement account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts.
    • Regularly audit user accounts and permissions.
    • Never use default credentials in production.
    • Consider using a password manager.
    • Restrict access to the Ray dashboard (e.g., using a VPN or firewall rules).