Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
99 lines (77 loc) · 8.37 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

99 lines (77 loc) · 8.37 KB

Threat Model Analysis for ray-project/ray

Threat: Unauthorized Node Joining

  • Threat: Unauthorized Node Joining

    • Description: An attacker connects a malicious worker node to the Ray cluster. The attacker crafts a rogue Raylet process that mimics a legitimate worker, bypassing weak or non-existent authentication.
    • Impact: The attacker can intercept tasks, steal data, inject malicious code, or use node resources. This can lead to data breaches, incorrect results, and system compromise.
    • Affected Ray Component: Raylet, GCS (Global Control Service), Cluster Autoscaler (if used).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strong authentication for node joining (currently a significant gap in Ray). Explore options like shared secrets, TLS certificates, or integration with existing authentication systems.
      • Use network segmentation to restrict which machines can connect to the Ray head node and worker nodes.
      • Monitor the cluster for unexpected node joins and implement alerting.
      • Consider using a virtual private cloud (VPC) or similar network isolation.

Threat: Task Code Injection (Specifically within Ray's task submission mechanism)

  • Threat: Task Code Injection (Specifically within Ray's task submission mechanism)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability within Ray's task submission or serialization process to inject malicious code, even if the application itself has some input validation. This differs from general application-level code injection; it targets flaws in how Ray handles task definitions.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on worker nodes, leading to data theft, system modification, malware installation, or further attacks. Essentially, full compromise of worker nodes.
    • Affected Ray Component: Raylet, Worker Processes, Object Store (if serialized code is stored), potentially the task submission API.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Ray-Level Sandboxing: Ray itself needs to provide robust sandboxing for task execution, independent of the application's efforts. This should include strong isolation between tasks and the host system.
      • Secure Serialization/Deserialization: Ray must use secure serialization and deserialization mechanisms to prevent attackers from injecting malicious objects. Avoid using pickle or other unsafe serialization formats.
      • Code Signing (Future): Ray should ideally support code signing and verification for submitted tasks, ensuring that only trusted code is executed.
      • Input Validation within Ray: Ray's internal code should rigorously validate task definitions and any associated data before execution.

Threat: GCS Spoofing/Compromise

  • Threat: GCS Spoofing/Compromise

    • Description: An attacker compromises the Global Control Service (GCS) or successfully impersonates it. This could be through exploiting a vulnerability in the GCS, stealing credentials, or manipulating network traffic.
    • Impact: Complete control over the Ray cluster. The attacker can redirect tasks, modify cluster state, steal data, and disrupt or take over the entire system.
    • Affected Ray Component: GCS (Global Control Service).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure GCS Deployment: Run the GCS in a highly secure, isolated environment. Minimize its attack surface.
      • Strong Authentication: Use strong authentication and authorization for all communication with the GCS.
      • TLS Encryption: Use TLS for all GCS communication.
      • Regular Security Audits: Perform regular security audits of the GCS deployment.
      • Intrusion Detection: Implement intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for suspicious activity.

Threat: Unencrypted Network Communication (Internal to Ray)

  • Threat: Unencrypted Network Communication (Internal to Ray)

    • Description: Ray nodes communicate with each other (and the GCS) without encryption. An attacker uses network sniffing tools to intercept traffic between Ray components.
    • Impact: Eavesdropping on sensitive data passed between Ray nodes, including task inputs, outputs, and potentially credentials. This can lead to data breaches.
    • Affected Ray Component: Raylet, GCS, Worker Processes, Object Store (if network-based).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory TLS: Enforce TLS for all Ray internal communication. Configure Ray to use secure channels and reject unencrypted connections.
      • Certificate Management: Implement a robust certificate management system.

Threat: Resource Exhaustion (DoS) Targeting Ray's Internal Mechanisms

  • Threat: Resource Exhaustion (DoS) Targeting Ray's Internal Mechanisms

    • Description: An attacker overwhelms Ray's internal mechanisms (e.g., GCS, object store, scheduler) with a flood of requests or data, specifically exploiting weaknesses in Ray's resource management. This goes beyond simply submitting many user tasks; it targets Ray's core components.
    • Impact: Denial of service, preventing legitimate tasks from running and causing the application to become unresponsive.
    • Affected Ray Component: Raylet, GCS, Worker Processes, Object Store, Scheduler.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Ray-Level Rate Limiting: Ray itself should implement robust rate limiting for internal operations (e.g., GCS requests, object store operations).
      • Resource Quotas (Internal to Ray): Ray should have internal resource quotas to prevent any single component or operation from consuming excessive resources.
      • Robust Object Store: Use a highly resilient and scalable object store implementation (e.g., a properly configured Redis cluster).
      • GCS Protection: Implement specific DoS protection mechanisms for the GCS (e.g., connection limits, request throttling).

Threat: Ray Client Spoofing

  • Threat: Ray Client Spoofing

    • Description: An attacker impersonates a legitimate Ray client, gaining unauthorized access to submit tasks or retrieve results. This could involve forging client requests or stealing client credentials.
    • Impact: The attacker can submit malicious tasks, steal data, or disrupt the system.
    • Affected Ray Component: Ray Client, Raylet, GCS.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Client Authentication: Implement strong client authentication. This could involve API keys, TLS client certificates, or integration with an identity provider.
      • Authorization: Implement authorization checks to ensure that clients are only allowed to perform actions they are authorized to do.
      • TLS Encryption: Use TLS for all client-cluster communication to prevent eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
      • Audit Logging: Log all client requests and responses for auditing and security analysis.

Threat: Exploiting Ray Vulnerabilities

  • Threat: Exploiting Ray Vulnerabilities

    • Description: A vulnerability is discovered in the Ray framework itself. An attacker exploits this vulnerability.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, but could range from DoS to complete system compromise.
    • Affected Ray Component: Potentially any Ray component.
    • Risk Severity: Variable (depends on the vulnerability), but potentially Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Stay Up-to-Date: Keep Ray updated with the latest security patches.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Perform regular vulnerability scans.
      • Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits.
      • Rapid Patching: Have a process for rapid deployment of security patches.