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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for saltstack/salt

Attack Surface: Unencrypted Master-Minion Communication

Description: SaltStack, by default, transmits data between the Master and Minions without encryption, exposing sensitive information to network eavesdropping.

  • Salt Contribution: SaltStack's default configuration does not enforce encryption, making unencrypted communication the out-of-the-box behavior.
  • Example: Credentials, configuration data, and command outputs are transmitted in plaintext over the network. An attacker monitoring network traffic intercepts these communications and gains access to sensitive information.
  • Impact: Data breach, credential theft, exposure of sensitive system configurations, potential for further attacks using intercepted information.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable TLS/SSL Encryption: Configure SaltStack Master and Minions to use TLS/SSL encryption for all communication by setting ssl: True in the Master configuration and ensuring Minions are configured to connect over SSL.
    • Implement Certificate Management: Use properly generated and managed TLS/SSL certificates for both Master and Minions to ensure secure and authenticated communication.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the SaltStack infrastructure on a dedicated, secured network segment to limit the potential for network-based attacks.

Attack Surface: Remote Code Execution (RCE) via SaltStack Vulnerabilities

Description: Critical vulnerabilities within SaltStack code can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code on Salt Master or Minion systems.

  • Salt Contribution: SaltStack, being a complex software system, is susceptible to software vulnerabilities that can lead to RCE if not promptly patched.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in the Salt Master's API (e.g., CVE-2020-11651, CVE-2020-16846) to execute malicious code on the Master server, gaining complete control over the Salt infrastructure and potentially all managed Minions.
  • Impact: Full system compromise of Salt Master and potentially all managed Minions, complete control over infrastructure, data breach, denial of service, and significant business disruption.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Maintain Up-to-Date SaltStack Version: Immediately apply security patches and upgrade SaltStack Master and Minion components to the latest stable versions to remediate known vulnerabilities.
    • Implement Vulnerability Management: Establish a robust vulnerability management process to regularly scan SaltStack infrastructure for known vulnerabilities and prioritize patching.
    • Security Monitoring and Intrusion Detection: Implement security monitoring and intrusion detection systems to detect and alert on potential exploitation attempts targeting SaltStack vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Minion Key Acceptance Process Vulnerabilities

Description: Weaknesses or misconfigurations in the Salt Minion key acceptance process can allow unauthorized Minions, potentially controlled by attackers, to connect to and be managed by the Salt Master.

  • Salt Contribution: SaltStack's initial Minion key exchange and acceptance mechanism, if not properly secured, can be bypassed or exploited to introduce rogue Minions.
  • Example: An attacker sets up a malicious Minion and intercepts the initial communication with the Salt Master. If the key acceptance process is automated without proper verification or if the Master is compromised, the attacker's Minion could be accepted, granting them unauthorized management capabilities over systems.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to managed systems, potential for malicious actions executed on Minions by the attacker, compromised infrastructure integrity, and potential data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce Manual Key Acceptance: Disable automated key acceptance and require manual verification and acceptance of each Minion key on the Salt Master.
    • Secure Key Verification Process: Implement a secure out-of-band verification process to confirm the identity of each Minion before accepting its key.
    • Restrict Minion Auto-Acceptance: If auto-acceptance is necessary for specific use cases, carefully restrict its scope and implement additional security measures to prevent unauthorized Minion registration.
    • Regularly Audit Accepted Minion Keys: Periodically review the list of accepted Minion keys on the Salt Master and revoke any unauthorized or suspicious keys.

Attack Surface: Command Injection via Salt States/Pillar

Description: Improperly constructed Salt states or pillar data that dynamically incorporate untrusted input can be vulnerable to command injection attacks, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands on Minions.

  • Salt Contribution: SaltStack's state and pillar templating features, while powerful, can introduce command injection vulnerabilities if user-provided or external data is not properly sanitized and handled within states and pillar.
  • Example: A Salt state uses user-provided input to construct a shell command using Jinja templating without proper sanitization. An attacker injects malicious commands within the user input, which are then executed by the Salt Minion when the state is applied.
  • Impact: Remote code execution on Salt Minions, system compromise, data manipulation, privilege escalation, and potential for lateral movement within the managed infrastructure.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Sanitization and Validation: Thoroughly sanitize and validate all external input used within Salt states and pillar data to prevent command injection vulnerabilities.
    • Parameterized States and Jinja Templating Best Practices: Utilize parameterized states and follow secure Jinja templating practices to avoid direct string concatenation and minimize injection risks.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Minion Execution: Run Salt Minions with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of potential command injection vulnerabilities. Avoid running Minions as root if possible, and use capabilities or other privilege separation techniques.

Attack Surface: Salt API Security Weaknesses (If Enabled)

Description: Security vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the Salt API, when enabled, can allow unauthorized access and control over SaltStack functionality through HTTP-based requests.

  • Salt Contribution: Enabling the Salt API exposes SaltStack functionality through a network-accessible interface, which, if not properly secured, becomes a high-risk attack vector.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Salt API's authentication mechanism or authorization controls to bypass security and execute arbitrary Salt commands remotely via API calls, gaining unauthorized control over the Salt infrastructure.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to SaltStack Master, remote command execution on managed Minions, system compromise, data manipulation, and potential for denial-of-service attacks against the Salt API.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong API Authentication and Authorization: Enforce robust authentication and authorization mechanisms for the Salt API, such as using eauth with strong authentication backends (PAM, LDAP, etc.) or external authentication providers.
    • Restrict API Access: Limit API access to only authorized users, systems, and IP addresses through network firewalls and API access control lists.
    • Enforce HTTPS for API Communication: Mandate HTTPS for all Salt API communication to encrypt traffic and protect against eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
    • Implement API Rate Limiting and Throttling: Implement rate limiting and throttling on API endpoints to mitigate denial-of-service attacks and brute-force attempts against API authentication.
    • Regular API Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing specifically targeting the Salt API to identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.