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Attack Tree Analysis for saltstack/salt

Objective: Compromise Application via SaltStack Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application (OR) **[CRITICAL NODE]**
├── Compromise Salt Master (OR) **[CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Exploit Salt Master Vulnerabilities (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Exploit Known CVEs in Salt Master Software (e.g., RCE, Auth Bypass) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Research and exploit public CVE databases for Salt Master vulnerabilities. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └── Exploit Salt API Vulnerabilities (if enabled and exposed) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       ├── Exploit Authentication/Authorization flaws in Salt API **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       │   └── Bypass authentication or exploit weak authorization mechanisms in Salt API. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       ├── Exploit API endpoint vulnerabilities (e.g., injection, path traversal) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       │   └── Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Salt API endpoints. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Credential Theft - Salt Master (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Phishing/Social Engineering Master Administrator Credentials **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Target administrators to obtain master credentials. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Compromise Administrator Workstation and Steal Credentials **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Compromise admin's machine to extract stored credentials or session tokens. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Insider Threat - Malicious Administrator Actions **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └── A compromised or malicious administrator directly compromises the master. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
├── Compromise Salt Minion (OR) **[CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Exploit Salt Minion Vulnerabilities (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Exploit Known CVEs in Salt Minion Software (e.g., RCE, Auth Bypass) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Research and exploit public CVE databases for Salt Minion vulnerabilities. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Rogue Salt Master Attack **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └── Set up a rogue Salt Master to impersonate the legitimate master and control minions. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├── Compromise Application Running on Minion Directly (Leveraging Salt) (OR) **[CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Malicious State/Module Injection (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── Compromise State/Module Repository and Inject Malicious Code **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └── Compromise the source of Salt states and modules (e.g., Git repository, file server). **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── Exploit Insecure State/Module Download/Update Mechanisms **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └── Intercept or manipulate the download/update process of states and modules. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── Inject Malicious Code via Salt API (if compromised) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └── Use a compromised Salt API to push malicious states or modules. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Exploit Lack of Input Validation in States/Modules **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └── Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in custom states/modules due to lack of input validation. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Command Injection via Salt Execution Modules (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── Exploit Vulnerable Salt Modules (e.g., cmd.run, shell) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └── Leverage modules that execute arbitrary commands if input is not properly sanitized in states. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├── Craft Malicious States to Execute Arbitrary Commands **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   │   └── Design states that, when applied, execute commands to compromise the application or system. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Exploit Template Injection in Salt States (e.g., Jinja) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │       └── Inject malicious code into Jinja templates within states to achieve code execution. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├── Exploit Misconfigured sudo/privilege settings in Salt States **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └── Misconfigurations in sudo or privilege management within states leading to escalation. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └── Data Exfiltration via Salt Execution Modules (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       ├── Use Salt Modules to Exfiltrate Sensitive Application Data **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       │   └── Leverage modules to access and exfiltrate application data (e.g., database credentials, application secrets). **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │       └── Use Salt Modules to Establish Backdoor for Persistent Access **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │           └── Create backdoors using Salt modules for persistent access to the compromised system. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
└── Misconfiguration of SaltStack (OR) **[CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    ├── Insecure Master Configuration (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   ├── Unnecessary Services Exposed on Master (e.g., Salt API without proper security) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   │   └── Exposing services like Salt API without proper authentication and authorization. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   ├── Insecure File Permissions on Master Configuration and Key Files **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   │   └── Overly permissive file permissions allowing unauthorized access to sensitive files. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   └── Disabled or Weak Security Features (e.g., missing encryption, weak authentication) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │       └── Disabling or weakening security features like encryption or authentication mechanisms. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    ├── Insecure State/Module Management (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   ├── Unsecured State/Module Repository (e.g., public, unauthenticated access) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   │   └── Using an unsecured repository for storing and retrieving states and modules. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   ├── Lack of Integrity Checks for States/Modules (e.g., no signing or checksums) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   │   └── Not verifying the integrity of states and modules before deployment. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │   └── Overly Broad Permissions for State/Module Execution **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    │       └── Granting overly broad permissions for state and module execution, allowing unintended actions. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    └── Network Security Misconfigurations (OR) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
        ├── Open Salt Ports to Public Networks (e.g., 4505, 4506) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
        │   └── Exposing Salt ports to public networks without proper access control. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
        └── Lack of Network Segmentation between Salt Infrastructure and Application Environment **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
            └── Insufficient network segmentation allowing lateral movement from compromised Salt components to the application environment. **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Salt Master Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploit Known CVEs in Salt Master Software (e.g., RCE, Auth Bypass)
      • Research and exploit public CVE databases for Salt Master vulnerabilities.
    • Exploit Salt API Vulnerabilities (if enabled and exposed)
      • Exploit Authentication/Authorization flaws in Salt API
        • Bypass authentication or exploit weak authorization mechanisms in Salt API.
      • Exploit API endpoint vulnerabilities (e.g., injection, path traversal)
        • Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Salt API endpoints.

Attack Tree Path: Credential Theft - Salt Master

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Phishing/Social Engineering Master Administrator Credentials
      • Target administrators to obtain master credentials.
    • Compromise Administrator Workstation and Steal Credentials
      • Compromise admin's machine to extract stored credentials or session tokens.

Attack Tree Path: Insider Threat - Malicious Administrator Actions

  • Attack Vectors:
    • A compromised or malicious administrator directly compromises the master.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Salt Minion Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploit Known CVEs in Salt Minion Software (e.g., RCE, Auth Bypass)
      • Research and exploit public CVE databases for Salt Minion vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Rogue Salt Master Attack

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Set up a rogue Salt Master to impersonate the legitimate master and control minions.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application Running on Minion Directly (Leveraging Salt)

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Malicious State/Module Injection
      • Compromise State/Module Repository and Inject Malicious Code
        • Compromise the source of Salt states and modules (e.g., Git repository, file server).
      • Exploit Insecure State/Module Download/Update Mechanisms
        • Intercept or manipulate the download/update process of states and modules.
      • Inject Malicious Code via Salt API (if compromised)
        • Use a compromised Salt API to push malicious states or modules.
      • Exploit Lack of Input Validation in States/Modules
        • Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in custom states/modules due to lack of input validation.
    • Command Injection via Salt Execution Modules
      • Exploit Vulnerable Salt Modules (e.g., cmd.run, shell)
        • Leverage modules that execute arbitrary commands if input is not properly sanitized in states.
      • Craft Malicious States to Execute Arbitrary Commands
        • Design states that, when applied, execute commands to compromise the application or system.
      • Exploit Template Injection in Salt States (e.g., Jinja)
        • Inject malicious code into Jinja templates within states to achieve code execution.
    • Exploit Misconfigured sudo/privilege settings in Salt States
      • Misconfigurations in sudo or privilege management within states leading to escalation.
    • Data Exfiltration via Salt Execution Modules
      • Use Salt Modules to Exfiltrate Sensitive Application Data
        • Leverage modules to access and exfiltrate application data (e.g., database credentials, application secrets).
      • Use Salt Modules to Establish Backdoor for Persistent Access
        • Create backdoors using Salt modules for persistent access to the compromised system.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Master Configuration

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Unnecessary Services Exposed on Master (e.g., Salt API without proper security)
      • Exposing services like Salt API without proper authentication and authorization.
    • Insecure File Permissions on Master Configuration and Key Files
      • Overly permissive file permissions allowing unauthorized access to sensitive files.
    • Disabled or Weak Security Features (e.g., missing encryption, weak authentication)
      • Disabling or weakening security features like encryption or authentication mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure State/Module Management

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Unsecured State/Module Repository (e.g., public, unauthenticated access)
      • Using an unsecured repository for storing and retrieving states and modules.
    • Lack of Integrity Checks for States/Modules (e.g., no signing or checksums)
      • Not verifying the integrity of states and modules before deployment.
    • Overly Broad Permissions for State/Module Execution
      • Granting overly broad permissions for state and module execution, allowing unintended actions.

Attack Tree Path: Network Security Misconfigurations

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Open Salt Ports to Public Networks (e.g., 4505, 4506)
      • Exposing Salt ports to public networks without proper access control.
    • Lack of Network Segmentation between Salt Infrastructure and Application Environment
      • Insufficient network segmentation allowing lateral movement from compromised Salt components to the application environment.

Attack Tree Path: Unencrypted Master-Minion Communication (if configured or downgraded)

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Configuring or allowing unencrypted communication between master and minions.