Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
72 lines (55 loc) · 4.45 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

72 lines (55 loc) · 4.45 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for textualize/rich

Objective: To cause a Denial of Service (DoS) in an application utilizing the textualize/rich library by manipulating its input or exploiting vulnerabilities in its rendering or parsing logic.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                      |  Attacker Goal: DoS via Rich Library            |
                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
          +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |
+-------------------------+                                         +-------------------------+
|  1. Denial of Service (DoS)  |                                         |                         |
+-------------------------+                                         +-------------------------+
          |
+---------------------+                                         +---------------------+
| 1.1 Resource Exhaustion |                                         | 1.3 Crash via Input  |
|    [CRITICAL]         |                                         |    [CRITICAL]         |
+---------------------+                                         +---------------------+
          |                                                                 |
+---------+---------+                                         +---------+
|1.1.1    |1.1.2    |                                         |1.3.1    |
|Excessive|Excessive|                                         |Fuzzing  |
|Console  |Memory   |                                         |Rich     |
|Output   |Usage    |                                         |Objects  |
+---------+---------+                                         +---------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS)

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Resource Exhaustion [CRITICAL]

This is a critical area because it represents a common and easily exploitable class of vulnerabilities. Applications using rich must have robust defenses against resource exhaustion.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Excessive Console Output

  • Description: The attacker provides input that causes rich to generate a very large amount of output to the console. This overwhelms the terminal, the application's output handling, or logging mechanisms, leading to a denial of service.
  • Example: A very long string, deeply nested rich objects (e.g., a Table with thousands of rows and columns), or repeated calls to rich printing functions with large amounts of data.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium to High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Excessive Memory Usage

  • Description: The attacker crafts input that causes rich to consume a large amount of memory. This can lead to an out-of-memory (OOM) error, crashing the application. This might involve deeply nested rich objects or very long strings with complex formatting.
  • Example: A deeply nested structure of rich objects (e.g., Panels within Panels within Tables, etc., with many levels of nesting), or a very long string with many style changes.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Crash via Input [CRITICAL]

This category is critical because crashes can lead to DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Fuzzing Rich Objects

  • Description: The attacker uses fuzzing techniques to send a large number of randomly generated or mutated rich objects (e.g., Table, Panel, Text, Console) to the application. The goal is to find inputs that cause rich to crash due to unexpected internal states or unhandled exceptions.
  • Example: Using a fuzzer to generate random combinations of rich object properties, including invalid or out-of-range values.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy