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Attack Tree Analysis for tornadoweb/tornado

Objective: Compromise a Tornado web application by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses inherent in the Tornado framework or its common usage patterns.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Tornado Application [CRITICAL NODE]
├───Exploit Tornado-Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───Exploit WebSocket Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───WebSocket Message Injection
│   │   ├───WebSocket Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├───Connection Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───Message Flood [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └───Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───Exploit Template Engine Vulnerabilities (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───Information Disclosure via Template Errors [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───Error Handling Flaws in Asynchronous Operations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───Asynchronous Task Starvation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───Path Traversal via Static File Handling (if enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───Exploit Default Configuration Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───Debug Mode Enabled in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
└───Exploit Application Logic Leveraging Tornado Features
    ├───Abuse of Asynchronous Features for DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    ├───Exploit WebSocket Application Logic Flaws [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └───Information Leakage through Asynchronous Error Handling in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Tornado Application [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This is the ultimate goal of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access, control, or causing significant damage to the Tornado application and potentially its underlying systems and data.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Tornado-Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This category focuses on vulnerabilities directly related to the Tornado framework itself, as opposed to general web application vulnerabilities. Exploiting these weaknesses allows attackers to bypass intended security mechanisms or leverage Tornado's features for malicious purposes.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit WebSocket Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Tornado's robust WebSocket support introduces specific attack vectors. This path is high-risk due to the potential for DoS, data manipulation, and session hijacking.
    • 3.1. WebSocket Message Injection:
      • Attack Vector: Crafting malicious WebSocket messages to exploit flaws in the application's message processing logic.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium-High Impact. Can lead to data manipulation, privilege escalation, or unexpected application behavior.
    • 3.2. WebSocket Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • 3.2.1. Connection Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Flooding the server with a large number of WebSocket connection requests to exhaust server resources (connection limits, memory, CPU).
        • Risk: High Likelihood, Medium Impact. Can cause service disruption and prevent legitimate users from accessing the application.
      • 3.2.2. Message Flood [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Sending a massive number of messages over established WebSocket connections to overwhelm the server's message processing capabilities.
        • Risk: High Likelihood, Medium Impact. Can cause service disruption, resource exhaustion, and slow down application performance.
    • 3.3. Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Initiating WebSocket connections from malicious websites if the application doesn't properly validate the Origin header during the WebSocket handshake.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium-High Impact. Can lead to session hijacking, allowing attackers to perform actions on behalf of legitimate users.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Template Engine Vulnerabilities (if used) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • If the application uses Tornado's template engine (or another template engine with Tornado), vulnerabilities in template processing become a high-risk path, especially Server-Side Template Injection.
    • 4.1. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious template code into user-controlled input that is then processed by the template engine without proper sanitization.
      • Risk: Low-Medium Likelihood, Critical Impact. Can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE), allowing attackers to completely compromise the server.
    • 4.2. Information Disclosure via Template Errors [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Triggering template errors that reveal server-side information such as file paths, configuration details, or even source code snippets.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Low-Medium Impact. Can aid in reconnaissance and provide attackers with valuable information for further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Error Handling Flaws in Asynchronous Operations [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting improper error handling in asynchronous tasks to cause application crashes or information leaks through error messages.
  • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium Impact. Can lead to service disruption and information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Asynchronous Task Starvation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Designing requests that monopolize asynchronous resources (e.g., event loop time, worker threads), starving other legitimate requests and causing Denial of Service for some users.
  • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium Impact. Can lead to service degradation and DoS for a subset of users.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Path Traversal via Static File Handling (if enabled) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Using path traversal techniques (e.g., ../) in URLs to access files outside the intended static file directory when the application uses Tornado's StaticFileHandler without proper path sanitization.
  • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium-High Impact. Can lead to information disclosure and access to sensitive files on the server.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Exploit Default Configuration Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Insecure default configurations or common misconfigurations can create easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities.
    • 8.1. Debug Mode Enabled in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Accessing debug endpoints or information exposed by Tornado's debug mode when it is mistakenly left enabled in a production environment.
      • Risk: Low-Medium Likelihood, Medium-High Impact. Can lead to information disclosure, access to debug tools, and potentially Remote Code Execution if debug tools are vulnerable.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Exploit Application Logic Leveraging Tornado Features:

  • This category focuses on vulnerabilities in the application's code that specifically arise from or are amplified by the use of Tornado's features.
    • 9.1. Abuse of Asynchronous Features for DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Crafting requests that intentionally trigger resource-intensive asynchronous operations in the application logic, leading to server overload and Denial of Service.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium Impact. Can cause service degradation and DoS.
    • 9.2. Exploit WebSocket Application Logic Flaws [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Targeting vulnerabilities in the application's specific WebSocket message handling logic and state management. This is application-specific but enabled by Tornado's WebSocket features.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Medium-High Impact. Can lead to data manipulation, privilege escalation, and information disclosure depending on the application logic.
    • 9.3. Information Leakage through Asynchronous Error Handling in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting the application's asynchronous error handling logic to reveal sensitive information in responses or logs.
      • Risk: Medium Likelihood, Low-Medium Impact. Can aid in reconnaissance and provide attackers with valuable information.