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Attack Tree Analysis for tornadoweb/tornado

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive data or achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server hosting the Tornado application by exploiting Tornado-specific vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Exfiltrate Data OR Achieve RCE via Tornado Exploit  |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                  /                      |
          -----------------------------------------                       |
          |                                       |                       |
          V                                       V                       V
+---------------------+       +---------------------+       +---------------------+
|  Exploit Request   |       | Exploit Asynchronous|       |  Exploit Template  |
|     Handling      |       |    Task Handling    |       |      Vulnerabilities|
+---------------------+       +---------------------+       +---------------------+
          |                       |                       |
          |                       |                       |
  --------+--------       --------+--------       --------+--------
  |               |       |               |       |               |
  V               V       V               V       V               V
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
|Improper| |DoS via| |Memory | |SSTI  |
|Input  | |Slow   | |Exhaust| |[CRITI|
|Valid. | |Async  | |       | |CAL]  |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
    |
    |
    V
+-------+
|Header |
|Manip. |
+-------+
    ^
    |
[CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Request Handling

  • Improper Input Validation (Tornado-Specific):

    • Description: Tornado's internal handling of user-supplied data (request parameters, cookies, headers, body) might have vulnerabilities if not used correctly. This is not general input validation (like SQLi), but how Tornado parses and uses this data before your application logic.

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium to High

    • Effort: Low to Medium

    • Skill Level: Intermediate

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • Mitigation:

      • Use Tornado's built-in input validation (e.g., get_argument with type checking).
      • Implement custom validation specifically for Tornado's parsing.
      • Review Tornado's documentation for input handling best practices.

    • Header Manipulation (via Improper Input Validation) [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: If Tornado uses unsanitized user input to construct HTTP headers, an attacker might manipulate those headers, potentially leading to critical security bypasses (e.g., session fixation, authentication bypass).
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Strictly sanitize any user input used in header construction.
        • Avoid using user input directly in headers whenever possible.
        • Implement robust header validation.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Asynchronous Task Handling

  • DoS via Slow Async Operations:

    • Description: An attacker triggers slow asynchronous operations (e.g., large inputs, complex calculations) to tie up worker threads, leading to a denial-of-service (DoS).
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement limits on the execution time of asynchronous tasks.
      • Use resource monitoring to detect slow operations.
      • Consider using a task queue (like Celery) for better task management.

  • Memory Exhaustion:

    • Description: An attacker triggers asynchronous tasks that consume excessive memory, leading to a denial-of-service (DoS).
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement limits on the memory usage of asynchronous tasks.
      • Use resource monitoring to detect excessive memory consumption.
      • Consider using a task queue (like Celery) for better task management.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Template Vulnerabilities

  • SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) [CRITICAL]:
    • Description: User-supplied input is directly embedded into a template without proper escaping, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the templating engine (leading to RCE).
    • Likelihood: Medium (Lower if using a secure templating engine with auto-escaping).
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Always escape user-supplied data before embedding it in templates.
      • Use Tornado's built-in escaping functions (or a templating engine like Jinja2 with auto-escaping enabled).
      • Regularly update the templating engine.
      • Avoid constructing templates directly from user input.