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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for activerecord-hackery/ransack

Attack Surface: Unrestricted Search Attribute Access

  • Description: Exposure of sensitive or internal model attributes through the search functionality provided by Ransack. Users might be able to search and potentially retrieve data based on attributes that are not intended for public access or search.
  • Ransack Contribution: By default, Ransack can make a wide range of model attributes searchable unless explicitly restricted. This default behavior can inadvertently expose sensitive data if developers are not careful in configuring searchable attributes.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a URL like /users?q[internal_user_id_eq]=12345 to check if a user with a specific internal ID exists, potentially revealing internal user identifiers that should not be public.
  • Impact: Information Disclosure. Attackers can gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, internal identifiers, or system details not meant to be public. This can be a stepping stone for further attacks.
  • Risk Severity: High. Severity is high due to the potential exposure of sensitive data and the direct link to Ransack's default behavior.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Whitelist Searchable Attributes: In each model, explicitly define the ransackable_attributes class method to specify only the attributes that are intended to be searchable. This is the most crucial mitigation.
    • Review Default ransackable_attributes: If not explicitly defined, understand the default behavior of ransackable_attributes and ensure it doesn't expose unintended attributes.
    • Utilize Namespaces and Scopes: Leverage Ransack's scoping features to further restrict the context of searches and limit attribute exposure based on the search context.

Attack Surface: Complex Query Construction and Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Description: Application performance degradation or unavailability due to resource exhaustion caused by excessively complex search queries crafted using Ransack's syntax.
  • Ransack Contribution: Ransack's flexible query syntax allows users to create very complex search conditions with multiple predicates, combinators (AND, OR), and nested conditions. Malicious users can exploit this to create queries that are computationally expensive for the database to process.
  • Example: An attacker sends repeated requests with extremely complex queries like: /products?q[name_cont]=a&q[description_cont]=b&q[category_name_cont]=c&q[price_gt]=1&q[price_lt]=1000&q[created_at_gte]=2023-01-01&q[updated_at_lte]=2023-12-31&q[or][0][name_start]=z&q[or][1][description_end]=y... This type of query, especially when repeated, can overload the database.
  • Impact: Denial of Service. The application becomes slow or unresponsive for legitimate users due to database overload. In severe cases, it can lead to application downtime.
  • Risk Severity: High. Severity is high due to the potential for significant service disruption and the direct exploitation of Ransack's query capabilities.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Query Complexity Limits:
      • Limit Predicate Count: Restrict the maximum number of predicates allowed in a single Ransack query.
      • Restrict Nesting Depth: Limit the depth of nested conditions (e.g., within OR groups).
      • Set Database Query Timeouts: Configure database connection timeouts to prevent excessively long-running queries from blocking resources indefinitely.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: While Ransack handles some sanitization, validate and potentially sanitize user-provided search parameters before they are processed by Ransack to prevent unexpected query structures and potential injection attempts.
    • Database Performance Monitoring: Monitor database performance and identify slow queries originating from Ransack. Analyze these queries to understand potential DoS vectors and refine query complexity limits.

Attack Surface: Custom Predicate Code Injection

  • Description: Potential for arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities if custom predicates are implemented insecurely, especially if they involve dynamic code execution based on user-provided input.
  • Ransack Contribution: Ransack allows developers to define custom predicates to extend its search capabilities. If these custom predicates are not carefully implemented and handle user input unsafely, they can become a vector for code injection.
  • Example: A poorly implemented custom predicate might directly execute user-provided input as code within the predicate logic. An attacker could then craft a malicious query that triggers this custom predicate with code designed to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
  • Impact: Code Execution. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server, potentially allowing attackers to gain full control of the application and underlying system.
  • Risk Severity: Critical. Code execution vulnerabilities are always considered critical due to their potential for complete system compromise and direct link to custom Ransack predicate implementation.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Custom Predicate Implementation: If using custom predicates, implement them with extreme caution. Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user input processed within custom predicates. Avoid dynamic code execution based on user input within custom predicates if at all possible.
    • Code Review for Custom Predicates: Subject custom predicate implementations to rigorous security code review to identify and eliminate potential vulnerabilities before deployment. Consider if custom predicates are truly necessary and if standard Ransack features can be used instead.