attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for activerecord-hackery/ransack

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or disrupt application availability by exploiting vulnerabilities in Ransack's handling of user-supplied search parameters.

Attack Tree Visualization

• Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Ransack Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Gain Unauthorized Data Access [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • SQL Injection via Ransack Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Direct SQL Injection (Bypass Sanitization) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Craft malicious Ransack parameters to inject SQL commands
          • Example: Using complex predicates or nested conditions to bypass filters
    • Parameter Manipulation for Data Exposure [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Exploit Ransack's parameter parsing to access unintended data
        • Example: Manipulating association parameters to access related data without proper authorization checks
    • Information Disclosure via Unintended Data Exposure [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Access Control Bypass via Ransack Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Craft search queries that bypass intended access control rules
          • Example: Using specific predicates or combinations to circumvent authorization logic in search results
      • Sensitive Data in Search Results (Default Behavior) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Ransack exposes more data than intended in search results by default
          • Example: Including sensitive columns in default search result sets without explicit filtering
      • Association Traversal Exploitation [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Leverage Ransack's association features to access related data without proper authorization
          • Example: Using nested attributes to access data through associations that should be restricted
  • Cause Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Resource Exhaustion via Complex Queries [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Database Connection Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Rapidly send many complex search requests to exhaust database connections
        • Example: Automated scripts sending numerous resource-intensive Ransack queries

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Ransack Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]

This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. Success here means the attacker has achieved their goal by exploiting Ransack vulnerabilities. It's a critical node because all subsequent attacks aim to reach this goal.

Attack Tree Path: Gain Unauthorized Data Access [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

This path represents the attacker's attempt to access sensitive information they are not authorized to view. It's a high-risk path because data breaches can have severe consequences, including financial loss, reputational damage, and legal repercussions. It's also a critical node as it's a primary branch leading to the overall attack goal.

Attack Tree Path: SQL Injection via Ransack Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

This is a critical node and high-risk path because successful SQL injection can lead to complete database compromise, allowing attackers to read, modify, or delete any data.

Attack Tree Path: Direct SQL Injection (Bypass Sanitization) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to craft malicious Ransack parameters that, despite Ransack's sanitization efforts, are interpreted as SQL commands by the database. This could involve exploiting edge cases in Ransack's parsing logic, using complex or unusual predicates, or finding vulnerabilities in custom predicates. Impact: Critical - Full database compromise, data exfiltration, data manipulation, data destruction.

Attack Tree Path: Parameter Manipulation for Data Exposure [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

This is a critical node and high-risk path because it exploits Ransack's parameter handling to bypass intended access controls and expose data.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Ransack's parameter parsing to access unintended data

Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate Ransack parameters, particularly those related to associations or nested attributes, to access data that should be restricted based on authorization rules. This could involve crafting parameters that bypass authorization checks or access related data without proper validation. Impact: Medium-High - Exposure of sensitive data, potential for further exploitation based on exposed information.

Attack Tree Path: Information Disclosure via Unintended Data Exposure [HIGH RISK PATH]

This path focuses on unintentional data leaks through Ransack's search functionality due to misconfiguration or oversight. It's a high-risk path because it can expose sensitive information without requiring active exploitation in some cases.

Attack Tree Path: Access Control Bypass via Ransack Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers craft search queries that, due to flaws in the application's access control logic when integrated with Ransack, bypass intended authorization rules. This could involve using specific predicates or combinations of parameters to circumvent access restrictions during search operations. Impact: Medium-High - Access to data intended to be restricted, potential for privilege escalation or further data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Sensitive Data in Search Results (Default Behavior) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Developers unintentionally include sensitive data in the default search results returned by Ransack. This occurs when attribute whitelisting is not properly implemented, and sensitive columns are exposed in the search response without explicit filtering. This is a critical node because it's often a result of developer oversight and can be easily exploited. Impact: Medium - Exposure of sensitive data, depending on the nature of the exposed information (e.g., PII, internal system details).

Attack Tree Path: Association Traversal Exploitation [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers leverage Ransack's association features to traverse relationships between models and access data in related models without proper authorization checks at each level of the association. This involves using nested attributes to access data through associations that should be restricted. Impact: Medium-High - Access to related sensitive data, potential for broader data exposure depending on the depth and nature of associations.

Attack Tree Path: Cause Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH RISK PATH]

This path represents the attacker's attempt to disrupt application availability, making it unusable for legitimate users. It's a high-risk path because DoS attacks can lead to business disruption, financial losses, and reputational damage.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion via Complex Queries [HIGH RISK PATH]

This path focuses on overwhelming the application server or database with resource-intensive search queries.

Attack Tree Path: Database Connection Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

This is a critical node and high-risk path because it directly targets the database's ability to handle requests, leading to application-wide unavailability.

Attack Tree Path: Rapidly send many complex search requests to exhaust database connections

Attack Vector: Attackers rapidly send a large volume of complex Ransack search requests to exhaust the database connection pool. This prevents legitimate requests from being processed, leading to a denial of service. Automated scripts are typically used to amplify this attack. Impact: Medium-High - Application unavailability, database overload, potential for cascading failures.