Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
56 lines (43 loc) · 5.75 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

56 lines (43 loc) · 5.75 KB

Threat Model Analysis for activerecord-hackery/ransack

Threat: Unvalidated Predicates and Attributes

  • Threat: Unvalidated Predicates and Attributes

    • Description: An attacker crafts malicious URL parameters or form inputs using unexpected Ransack predicates (e.g., _sql, complex _matches, or deeply nested _or) or attempts to query non-whitelisted attributes. They might try to guess attribute names or use fuzzing techniques. This leverages Ransack's core functionality of dynamically building queries.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Database overload due to computationally expensive queries generated by Ransack.
      • Information Disclosure: Exposure of sensitive data or database schema details through error messages or query results returned by Ransack.
      • Potential (rare) Code Execution: In specific, poorly configured scenarios, and depending on how custom predicates interact with the database, SQL injection might be possible through Ransack's ransacker feature if it's used insecurely.
    • Affected Ransack Component: Ransack::Search object creation and query building, ransackable_attributes, ransackable_predicates, custom ransacker definitions. This directly involves Ransack's core mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if code execution is possible) or High (for DoS and information disclosure).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Whitelisting: Use ransackable_attributes and ransackable_associations to explicitly define allowed attributes and associations. Never return true or nil from these methods without understanding the implications. This directly controls Ransack's behavior.
      • Predicate Whitelisting: Use ransackable_predicates to control allowed predicates. Avoid overly permissive predicates. This is a Ransack-specific control.
      • Custom Predicate Sanitization: Thoroughly sanitize and validate user input within custom ransacker definitions. This addresses vulnerabilities within Ransack's custom predicate feature.
      • Input Validation: Validate the values of search parameters (e.g., ensure an ID is an integer), even with whitelisting.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on search endpoints to mitigate DoS attacks exploiting Ransack's query generation.

Threat: Unauthorized Attribute Access

  • Threat: Unauthorized Attribute Access

    • Description: An attacker attempts to query attributes that exist in the database but are not included in the ransackable_attributes whitelist. They are directly interacting with Ransack's query-building capabilities to try and bypass restrictions.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure: Exposure of sensitive data that should not be accessible through search, facilitated by Ransack.
    • Affected Ransack Component: Ransack::Search object, query building based on ransackable_attributes. This is a direct misuse of Ransack's intended functionality.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Comprehensive Whitelisting: Ensure ransackable_attributes is complete and covers all searchable attributes. Regularly review. This is the primary Ransack-specific defense.
      • Generic Error Handling: Configure Ransack and Rails to return generic error messages, not revealing database details that could aid further attacks against Ransack.
      • Authorization Checks: Combine Ransack with an authorization framework (e.g., Pundit) to enforce access control in addition to Ransack's whitelisting.

Threat: Unauthorized Association Access

  • Threat: Unauthorized Association Access

    • Description: An attacker tries to search through associations that are not explicitly allowed via ransackable_associations, directly exploiting Ransack's ability to traverse relationships.
    • Impact: Information Disclosure: Access to data from related models that should be restricted, made possible by Ransack's association handling.
    • Affected Ransack Component: Ransack::Search object, query building based on ransackable_associations. This is a direct attack on Ransack's association features.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Association Whitelisting: Use ransackable_associations to explicitly list allowed associations. Be very restrictive. This is the key Ransack-specific mitigation.
      • Authorization Checks: Use an authorization framework to ensure users can only search through permitted associations, complementing Ransack's controls.

Threat: Reliance on Default Behavior

  • Threat: Reliance on Default Behavior

    • Description: Using Ransack without explicitly configuring whitelisting methods (ransackable_attributes, ransackable_associations, etc.) relies on potentially overly permissive defaults, making the application vulnerable to various Ransack-specific attacks.
    • Impact: Increased risk of all other Ransack-related vulnerabilities (Unvalidated Predicates, Unauthorized Access).
    • Affected Ransack Component: All Ransack components related to attribute and association access, predicate handling, and sorting. This is a fundamental issue with how Ransack is (not) configured.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Explicit Configuration: Always explicitly configure Ransack's whitelisting methods. Never rely on defaults without understanding them. This is the most crucial preventative measure for Ransack.