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Threat Model Analysis for alexreisner/geocoder

Threat: API Key Exposure via Logging (Geocoder Internals)

  • Description: Due to a bug or design flaw within the geocoder library itself, API keys used for accessing geocoding services are logged to standard output, error streams, or internal logging files. An attacker who gains access to these logs (through a separate vulnerability or misconfiguration) obtains the API key.
  • Impact: The attacker can use the stolen API key to make requests to the geocoding service, incurring costs, exceeding rate limits, or using the key maliciously. This leads to financial loss, service disruption, and reputational damage.
  • Affected Component: Any function within the geocoder library that handles API keys, especially within provider-specific modules (e.g., providers/google/google.go) and any internal logging functions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of geocoder): Thoroughly review the library's code to ensure API keys are never logged. Implement strict checks to prevent accidental logging.
    • Developer (using geocoder): While this is primarily a library issue, developers using the library should still avoid passing API keys directly in ways that might be logged by the application itself (e.g., avoid printing them to the console). Use environment variables or a secrets manager. This is a defense-in-depth measure.

Threat: Service Spoofing via Input Manipulation (Geocoder Internals)

  • Description: A vulnerability within the geocoder library's provider selection logic allows an attacker to craft malicious input (e.g., a specially formatted address string) that causes the library to use an attacker-controlled geocoding service, regardless of the application's intended configuration.
  • Impact: The attacker can return incorrect geocoding results, leading to incorrect application behavior, data corruption, or misdirection.
  • Affected Component: Functions within the geocoder library responsible for provider selection and configuration, likely within a central module (e.g., geocoder.go or a providers module). Specifically, any logic that parses user input to determine the provider or its settings.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of geocoder): Implement robust input validation and sanitization within the library itself to prevent any user-supplied data from influencing provider selection. The library should have a secure default provider and allow the application to explicitly override it, but never rely on user input for this decision.
    • Developer (using geocoder): While the core issue is within the library, developers using the library should still implement strict input validation at the application level as a defense-in-depth measure.

Threat: Response Tampering (Man-in-the-Middle) - Inadequate TLS Handling

  • Description: The geocoder library either fails to use HTTPS for communication with geocoding services or improperly validates TLS certificates. This allows an attacker performing a Man-in-the-Middle attack to intercept and modify the responses from the service.
  • Impact: The attacker can provide incorrect geocoding results, leading to incorrect application behavior, data corruption, and potential misdirection.
  • Affected Component: The network communication layer of the geocoder library, specifically the functions responsible for making HTTP requests and receiving responses. This likely relies on Go's net/http, but the geocoder library's configuration and handling of TLS are critical.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of geocoder): Enforce HTTPS by default for all communication with geocoding services. Ensure the library correctly validates TLS certificates, including hostname verification and checking for revocation. Do not allow insecure connections.
    • Developer (using geocoder): Verify that the library's configuration does use HTTPS and that there are no options to disable TLS verification. If such options exist and are insecure by default, report this as a security vulnerability.

Threat: Dependency Vulnerability (Leading to RCE)

  • Description: A critical vulnerability (e.g., Remote Code Execution - RCE) exists in one of the geocoder library's direct or transitive dependencies. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to gain control of the application using the geocoder library.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the application, potentially leading to data breaches, system takeover, and further attacks.
  • Affected Component: Any part of the geocoder library that relies on the vulnerable dependency.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of geocoder): Regularly update dependencies using go mod tidy and go get -u. Use a vulnerability scanner (e.g., govulncheck, Snyk, Dependabot) to proactively identify and address known vulnerabilities in dependencies. Consider using a minimal set of dependencies to reduce the attack surface.
    • Developer (using geocoder): Regularly update the geocoder library to the latest version. Also, use vulnerability scanners on your application's dependencies, which will include the geocoder library and its transitive dependencies.