attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for ankane/pghero

Attack Surface: Weak Authentication and Authorization

• Description: Insufficient or easily bypassed mechanisms to verify user identity and control access to pghero's web interface.
• pghero contribution: pghero might rely on basic authentication or have default, weak credentials if not properly configured by the user. Lack of robust role-based access control could also lead to unauthorized access to sensitive monitoring data.
• Example: Default pghero installation uses a predictable username/password combination, or relies solely on HTTP Basic Auth without enforced strong passwords or multi-factor authentication.
• Impact: Unauthorized access to pghero's web interface, allowing attackers to view sensitive database performance data and potentially manipulate monitoring settings.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement strong authentication: Enforce strong passwords, consider multi-factor authentication (MFA) if possible, and avoid default credentials.
  • Utilize HTTPS: Encrypt communication between the user's browser and pghero to protect credentials in transit.
  • Implement robust authorization: If pghero offers user roles or permissions, configure them to follow the principle of least privilege, granting users only necessary access.
  • Regularly audit user accounts: Review and remove unnecessary or inactive user accounts.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Description: Vulnerabilities that allow attackers to inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by other users.
• pghero contribution: If pghero's web interface doesn't properly sanitize data retrieved from the database (e.g., query results, database names) or user inputs before displaying it, it can become vulnerable to XSS.
• Example: pghero displays a database name that an attacker has maliciously modified to include JavaScript code. When a user views the pghero dashboard, the script executes in their browser.
• Impact: Session hijacking, account takeover, defacement of the pghero interface, redirection to malicious sites, information theft from the user's browser.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input sanitization and output encoding: Implement robust input sanitization and output encoding for all user-supplied data and data retrieved from the database before displaying it in the web interface.
  • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP to limit the sources from which the browser is allowed to load resources, reducing the impact of XSS.
  • Regular security scanning: Use automated tools to scan pghero's web interface for potential XSS vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure via Web Interface

• Description: Unintentional exposure of sensitive information through the web interface, error messages, or debug logs.
• pghero contribution: pghero's web interface might inadvertently reveal database connection strings, internal paths, software versions, or configuration details in error messages, debug pages, or even in the HTML source code.
• Example: An error message in pghero's web interface displays the full database connection string, including the password. Or, debug mode is left enabled in production, exposing internal application details.
• Impact: Reconnaissance for attackers, potential exposure of database credentials, aiding in further attacks by revealing system architecture and vulnerabilities.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Disable debug mode in production: Ensure debug mode is disabled in production environments to prevent verbose error messages and information leaks.
  • Implement custom error pages: Use generic error pages that do not reveal sensitive technical details.
  • Secure logging practices: Avoid logging sensitive information like database credentials in application logs.
  • Regular security audits: Review the web interface and application logs for potential information disclosure vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Insecure Database Credentials Management

• Description: Storing database credentials used by pghero in an insecure manner, making them easily accessible to attackers.
• pghero contribution: pghero needs to store credentials to connect to PostgreSQL databases. If these are stored in plain text configuration files, easily accessible locations, or with weak encryption, it creates a significant vulnerability.
• Example: Database credentials for pghero are stored in plain text in a configuration file readable by the web server user, or are hardcoded in the application code.
• Impact: Full compromise of the monitored PostgreSQL databases, allowing attackers to steal, modify, or delete data, and disrupt database operations.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Environment variables: Store database credentials as environment variables, which are generally more secure than configuration files.
  • Secrets management systems: Utilize dedicated secrets management systems (like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) to securely store and retrieve database credentials.
  • File system permissions: Restrict file system permissions on configuration files containing credentials to only the necessary users and processes.
  • Encryption at rest: If storing credentials in files, encrypt them at rest using strong encryption algorithms.

Attack Surface: Excessive Database Permissions for pghero User

• Description: Granting the PostgreSQL user used by pghero more privileges than necessary for its monitoring functions.
• pghero contribution: If the pghero setup guide or default configurations recommend or lead to granting overly permissive database roles to the pghero user, it increases the potential damage from a pghero compromise.
• Example: The pghero user is granted SUPERUSER or pg_read_all_data roles, allowing it to access and modify any data in the database.
• Impact: If pghero is compromised, attackers can leverage the database connection to perform actions beyond monitoring, including data modification, deletion, or even database takeover, depending on the excessive privileges.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Principle of least privilege: Grant the pghero database user only the minimum necessary privileges required for monitoring (e.g., pg_monitor role in newer PostgreSQL versions, or specific SELECT permissions on relevant system tables and views in older versions).
  • Regularly review database user permissions: Periodically audit the permissions granted to the pghero database user and ensure they are still appropriate and minimal.
  • Database firewalling: Implement database firewall rules to restrict connections to the PostgreSQL server to only the pghero application server and authorized administrators.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Dependencies

• Description: Using third-party libraries (gems in Ruby context for pghero) with known security vulnerabilities.
• pghero contribution: As a Ruby on Rails application, pghero relies on numerous gems. Outdated or unpatched gems can contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited to compromise pghero.
• Example: pghero uses an outdated version of a gem with a known remote code execution vulnerability. Attackers exploit this vulnerability to gain control of the pghero server.
• Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, information disclosure, depending on the specific vulnerability in the dependency.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Dependency scanning: Regularly scan pghero's dependencies for known vulnerabilities using tools like bundler-audit or other dependency vulnerability scanners.
  • Keep dependencies updated: Keep pghero's dependencies up-to-date with the latest security patches and versions. Implement a regular dependency update process.
  • Software Composition Analysis (SCA): Integrate SCA tools into the development and deployment pipeline to continuously monitor and manage dependencies.