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Attack Tree Analysis for ankane/pghero

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to PostgreSQL Database via pghero

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access to PostgreSQL Database via pghero
└───(OR)───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    ├─── 1. Exploit pghero Web Interface Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    └───(OR)───────────────────────────────────────────────────
    │        ├─── 1.1. Unauthenticated Access to pghero Interface [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │    └───(AND)──────────────────────────────────────
    │        │        ├─── 1.1.1. pghero Deployed without Authentication [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        └─── 1.1.2. Network Access to pghero Interface [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├─── 2. Exploit pghero Database Connection Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    └───(OR)───────────────────────────────────────────────────
    │        ├─── 2.1. Credential Theft for pghero Database User [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │    └───(OR)──────────────────────────────────────
    │        │        ├─── 2.1.1. Access to Configuration Files with Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        │    └───(AND)──────────────────────────
    │        │        │        ├─── 2.1.1.1. Misconfigured File Permissions [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        │        ├─── 2.1.1.2. Unencrypted Configuration Storage [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        ├─── 2.1.2. Access to Environment Variables with Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        │    └───(AND)──────────────────────────
    │        │        │        ├─── 2.1.2.1. Exposed Environment Variables [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │        │        ├─── 2.1.2.2. Insecure Container/Server Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├─── 4. Exploit pghero Configuration/Deployment Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    └───(OR)───────────────────────────────────────────────────
    │        ├─── 4.2. Vulnerabilities in pghero Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        │    └───(AND)──────────────────────────────────────
    │        │        ├─── 4.2.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
    │        └─── 4.3. Misconfiguration during pghero Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │             └───(AND)──────────────────────────────────────
    │                 ├─── 4.3.1. Exposing pghero Interface to Public Network Unnecessarily [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit pghero Web Interface Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses in the pghero web interface to gain unauthorized access. This is a high-risk path because it directly targets the entry point to monitoring data and potentially database access.
  • Critical Node Rationale: The web interface is the primary interaction point with pghero, making it a critical node for attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Unauthenticated Access to pghero Interface [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Accessing the pghero interface without any authentication. This is a direct and easily exploitable vulnerability if not properly configured.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Unauthenticated access is a fundamental security flaw, granting immediate access to potentially sensitive information.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. pghero Deployed without Authentication [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: The root cause of unauthenticated access. If pghero is deployed without enabling or configuring authentication, it's directly accessible.
  • Critical Node Rationale: This is the configuration flaw that directly enables the high-risk path.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Network Access to pghero Interface [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Making the pghero interface accessible over a network (especially a public network) without proper access controls. This is a prerequisite for exploiting unauthenticated access.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Network accessibility is a necessary condition for remote exploitation of web interface vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit pghero Database Connection Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Compromising the database connection used by pghero, primarily by stealing the database credentials. This is a high-risk path because it bypasses pghero and grants direct database access.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Database connection security is paramount, and vulnerabilities here directly lead to the attacker's goal.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Credential Theft for pghero Database User [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Stealing the database credentials used by pghero to connect to the PostgreSQL database. Successful credential theft allows direct database access.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Credential theft is a direct and high-impact attack vector.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Access to Configuration Files with Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Obtaining database credentials from configuration files where they are stored.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Configuration files are a common place to store credentials, making them a prime target.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1. Misconfigured File Permissions [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Configuration files containing credentials have overly permissive file permissions, allowing unauthorized users to read them.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Misconfigured permissions directly enable unauthorized access to sensitive files.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.2. Unencrypted Configuration Storage [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Storing database credentials in configuration files in plain text or easily reversible encryption, making them readily accessible if the files are compromised.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Unencrypted storage negates any file access controls if the files are accessed.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Access to Environment Variables with Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Obtaining database credentials from environment variables where they are stored.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Environment variables are another common place to store credentials, and can be vulnerable if exposed.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2.1. Exposed Environment Variables [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Environment variables containing credentials are exposed through logs, process lists, or other means, allowing attackers to retrieve them.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Exposure of environment variables directly leads to credential theft.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2.2. Insecure Container/Server Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Insecure configuration of containers or servers allows access to environment variables, such as through container breakouts or server-side vulnerabilities.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Insecure configurations enable the exposure of environment variables.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit pghero Configuration/Deployment Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting general misconfigurations and deployment issues related to pghero and its environment. This is a broader high-risk path encompassing various configuration weaknesses.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Configuration and deployment are fundamental to security, and issues here can create multiple attack vectors.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2. Vulnerabilities in pghero Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in pghero's dependencies (Rails, gems, etc.). Outdated and vulnerable dependencies are a common attack vector.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Dependency vulnerabilities are a well-known and frequently exploited attack surface.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Specifically targeting known vulnerabilities in outdated dependencies.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Outdated dependencies are the direct cause of dependency vulnerability risks.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3. Misconfiguration during pghero Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: General misconfigurations during the deployment process that introduce security vulnerabilities.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Deployment misconfigurations are a common source of security weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: 4.3.1. Exposing pghero Interface to Public Network Unnecessarily [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Making the pghero web interface accessible to the public internet when it's not necessary, increasing the attack surface and likelihood of exploitation.
  • Critical Node Rationale: Public exposure unnecessarily increases risk and is a common deployment misconfiguration.