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Attack Tree Analysis for ankane/pghero

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Database Information or Disrupt Database Operations via PgHero

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access to Database Information or Disrupt Database Operations via PgHero

├── 1. Gain Access to PgHero Dashboard [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1. Bypass Authentication │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Exploit Weak/Default Credentials [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Brute-force PgHero login (if custom auth is used). │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Use default credentials (if not changed). │ │ ├── 1.1.3. Session Hijacking │ │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1. Steal session cookie (if HttpOnly/Secure flags are missing). [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.4. Exploit Misconfigured Authentication Integration │ │ │ ├── 1.1.4.1. If using Basic Auth, exploit weak password policies. [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.2. Network Eavesdropping │ │ ├── 1.2.1. Intercept unencrypted traffic (if PgHero is not served over HTTPS). [HIGH RISK] ├── 2. Exploit PgHero Functionality After Gaining Access [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.1. Run Arbitrary SQL Queries (If PgHero allows this and permissions are misconfigured) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Data Exfiltration (SELECT sensitive data). │ │ ├── 2.1.2. Data Modification (UPDATE, DELETE data). │ │ ├── 2.1.3. Database Disruption (DROP tables, shutdown database).

Attack Tree Path: 1. Gain Access to PgHero Dashboard [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the foundational step for most attacks. Without access to the PgHero dashboard, an attacker cannot directly leverage PgHero's functionalities.
  • Why Critical: It's the gateway to all other PgHero-specific attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Bypass Authentication

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Exploit Weak/Default Credentials [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.1.1.1. Brute-force PgHero login (if custom auth is used).

    • Description: The attacker attempts to guess the username and password by trying many combinations.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on password policy and rate limiting)
    • Impact: High (Full access to PgHero)
    • Effort: Low (Automated tools are readily available)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts can be logged and monitored)
    • Mitigation: Strong password policies, rate limiting, account lockout, multi-factor authentication (MFA).

  • 1.1.1.2. Use default credentials (if not changed).

    • Description: The attacker uses known default credentials for the application or authentication system protecting PgHero.
    • Likelihood: Low (Should be changed during initial setup)
    • Impact: High (Full access to PgHero)
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Successful login with default credentials should trigger alerts)
    • Mitigation: Mandatory password change on first login, configuration reviews.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Session Hijacking

  • 1.1.3.1. Steal session cookie (if HttpOnly/Secure flags are missing). [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: The attacker obtains a valid session cookie, allowing them to impersonate a legitimate user. This often happens if HttpOnly and Secure flags are not set on the cookie.
    • Likelihood: Medium (If misconfigured)
    • Impact: High (Full access to PgHero)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires access to network traffic or successful XSS)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual session activity or IP address changes might be detected)
    • Mitigation: Set HttpOnly and Secure flags on session cookies, use HTTPS, implement robust session management (short timeouts, strong session ID generation).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4. Exploit Misconfigured Authentication Integration

  • 1.1.4.1. If using Basic Auth, exploit weak password policies. [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: Similar to brute-forcing, but specifically targets weak password policies when Basic Authentication is used.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the application's password policy)
    • Impact: High (Full access to PgHero)
    • Effort: Low (Automated tools available)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts can be logged)
    • Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies (minimum length, complexity requirements), avoid Basic Auth if possible, use more secure authentication methods.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Network Eavesdropping

  • 1.2.1. Intercept unencrypted traffic (if PgHero is not served over HTTPS). [HIGH RISK]
    • Description: The attacker passively captures network traffic between the user and PgHero, obtaining credentials and other sensitive data.
    • Likelihood: High (If misconfigured - i.e., not using HTTPS)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete compromise of credentials and any data transmitted)
    • Effort: Low (Passive sniffing requires minimal effort)
    • Skill Level: Beginner
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Network monitoring can detect unencrypted traffic)
    • Mitigation: Always serve PgHero over HTTPS. Use a valid TLS certificate. Enable HSTS.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit PgHero Functionality After Gaining Access [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Once an attacker has access to the PgHero dashboard, they can use its features for malicious purposes.
  • Why Critical: This represents the potential damage after a successful login.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Run Arbitrary SQL Queries (If PgHero allows this and permissions are misconfigured) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker uses PgHero's interface (if it allows query execution) to run arbitrary SQL commands against the database.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on PgHero's configuration and the database user's privileges)
    • Impact: Very High (Potential for data exfiltration, modification, or destruction)
    • Effort: Low (If the interface allows it)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual queries can be logged and monitored)
    • Mitigation:

      • Principle of Least Privilege: The database user PgHero uses must have the absolute minimum necessary privileges. Ideally, read-only access to specific system views and tables. Never use a superuser account.

      • Disable Query Execution: If PgHero allows arbitrary query execution and it's not strictly necessary, disable this feature.

      • Input Validation: If query execution is allowed, implement strict input validation and sanitization to prevent SQL injection.

      • Database Firewall: Consider using a database firewall to restrict the types of queries that can be executed.

      • 2.1.1. Data Exfiltration (SELECT sensitive data).

        • Description: Use SELECT statements to retrieve sensitive information from the database.

      • 2.1.2. Data Modification (UPDATE, DELETE data).

        • Description: Use UPDATE or DELETE statements to alter or remove data from the database.

      • 2.1.3. Database Disruption (DROP tables, shutdown database).

        • Description: Use DROP or other destructive commands to damage the database or make it unavailable.