mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for ankane/searchkick

Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User Search Input

• Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User Search Input (Searchkick Context)
• Description:
  1. Identify Searchkick Input Points: Pinpoint where user search queries are passed to Searchkick methods (e.g., Model.search("user input"), custom search logic using Searchkick).
  2. Choose Searchkick-Aware Sanitization: Select sanitization methods that are effective against Elasticsearch injection within the context of how Searchkick constructs queries. Focus on escaping characters that could be interpreted by Elasticsearch query parser through Searchkick.
  3. Implement Sanitization Before Searchkick: Apply sanitization to user input immediately before passing it to Searchkick's search methods. This ensures that Searchkick receives sanitized input.
  4. Test with Searchkick Queries: Test sanitization by crafting search queries that mimic potential injection attempts through Searchkick's API, verifying that sanitization prevents malicious interpretation by Elasticsearch.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Elasticsearch Injection via Searchkick (High Severity): Malicious users could inject Elasticsearch query syntax through user input that is processed by Searchkick, leading to unauthorized data access or manipulation within Elasticsearch.
• Impact:
  • Elasticsearch Injection via Searchkick: High risk reduction. Effective sanitization before Searchkick processing significantly reduces the risk of injection attacks originating from Searchkick usage.
• Currently Implemented: Partially implemented in the frontend search bar using basic JavaScript escaping which might offer some indirect protection, but is not robust and not directly related to Searchkick processing.
• Missing Implementation: Server-side sanitization specifically targeting Searchkick input points is missing in the backend API. No sanitization is applied just before Searchkick's search() method is called.

Mitigation Strategy: Validate Search Parameters

• Mitigation Strategy: Validate Search Parameters (Searchkick Context)
• Description:
  1. Define Allowed Searchkick Parameters: Determine the valid search parameters that your application intends to use with Searchkick (e.g., fields, where, filters, order).
  2. Validate Searchkick Options: Implement validation logic to check if the parameters passed to Searchkick's search() method (or related methods) are within the defined allowed parameters.
     • Verify allowed field names against a whitelist of indexable fields defined for Searchkick models.
     • Validate the structure and content of where and filters clauses to prevent unexpected or malicious filtering logic.
     • Ensure order parameters are limited to allowed sortable fields.
  3. Reject Invalid Searchkick Calls: If validation of Searchkick parameters fails, prevent the Searchkick search from executing and return an error to the user or application.
  4. Centralize Searchkick Parameter Validation: Create a dedicated validation function or module specifically for validating parameters used with Searchkick to ensure consistency.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Data Exposure via Searchkick Parameter Manipulation (Medium Severity): Users might manipulate Searchkick parameters to query fields or apply filters in ways not intended by the application, potentially exposing sensitive data indexed by Searchkick.
  • Unexpected Searchkick Behavior (Medium Severity): Invalid parameters passed to Searchkick could lead to errors, inefficient queries, or unexpected search results.
• Impact:
  • Data Exposure via Searchkick Parameter Manipulation: Medium risk reduction. Validating Searchkick parameters limits the ability of users to misuse Searchkick's features for unintended data access.
  • Unexpected Searchkick Behavior: Medium risk reduction. Validation helps prevent errors and ensures more predictable and reliable search functionality through Searchkick.
• Currently Implemented: Basic validation of allowed search fields might be implicitly present due to Searchkick's model configuration, but explicit validation of parameters passed to search() is not implemented.
• Missing Implementation: Explicit validation of fields, where, filters, order and other Searchkick parameters is missing. No dedicated validation logic exists specifically for Searchkick parameter handling.

Mitigation Strategy: Limit Query Complexity

• Mitigation Strategy: Limit Query Complexity (Searchkick Query Generation)
• Description:
  1. Review Searchkick Query Generation: Understand how Searchkick generates Elasticsearch queries based on user input and application logic. Identify areas where complex queries might be generated.
  2. Restrict Searchkick Features Leading to Complexity: Limit the use of Searchkick features that can easily lead to complex queries if abused or used excessively.
     • Limit the number of or conditions in where clauses.
     • Restrict the depth of nested queries if used with Searchkick.
     • Control the number of facets or aggregations used in Searchkick searches.
  3. Implement Application-Level Complexity Limits for Searchkick: Enforce limits within your application code on the complexity of search requests processed by Searchkick.
     • Count the number of clauses or filters in a search request before passing it to Searchkick.
     • Implement timeouts specifically for Searchkick search operations.
  4. Monitor Searchkick Query Performance: Monitor the performance of Searchkick queries in your application and Elasticsearch logs to identify and optimize or restrict overly complex queries.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Denial of Service (DoS) via Searchkick (Medium Severity): Malicious users or poorly designed application logic could generate complex queries through Searchkick that overload Elasticsearch, leading to performance degradation or denial of service.
• Impact:
  • Denial of Service (DoS) via Searchkick: Medium risk reduction. Limiting query complexity generated by Searchkick reduces the potential for DoS attacks originating from search functionality.
• Currently Implemented: No specific limits are implemented to control the complexity of queries generated by Searchkick. General Elasticsearch limits are in place, but not tailored to Searchkick usage.
• Missing Implementation: Application-level limits on Searchkick query complexity (e.g., clause count, filter limits) are missing. No specific monitoring or alerting is set up to detect performance issues related to Searchkick queries.

Mitigation Strategy: Control Data Indexed in Elasticsearch

• Mitigation Strategy: Control Data Indexed in Elasticsearch (Searchkick Configuration)
• Description:
  1. Review Searchkick Model Configuration: Examine your Searchkick model definitions and configurations. Identify which attributes are being indexed and how.
  2. Minimize Sensitive Data Indexed by Searchkick: Within your Searchkick model configurations, explicitly control which attributes are indexed.
     • Use search_data method in Searchkick models to precisely define what data is indexed and how it's structured for search.
     • Avoid automatically indexing all model attributes if they are not all needed for search.
     • Exclude sensitive attributes from being indexed by Searchkick unless absolutely necessary and properly secured.
  3. Regularly Review Searchkick Indexing: Periodically review your Searchkick model configurations and indexing logic to ensure that only necessary and appropriate data is being indexed for search.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Data Breach/Exposure via Searchkick Index (High Severity): If Searchkick is configured to index sensitive data unnecessarily, it increases the risk of data breaches if Elasticsearch is compromised or if search functionality is misused to expose indexed data.
  • Privacy Violations via Searchkick Index (High Severity): Indexing and making searchable PII or other sensitive data via Searchkick without proper justification can lead to privacy violations.
• Impact:
  • Data Breach/Exposure via Searchkick Index: High risk reduction. Carefully controlling data indexed by Searchkick directly reduces the potential impact of data breaches related to search functionality.
  • Privacy Violations via Searchkick Index: High risk reduction. Minimizing the indexing of PII through Searchkick helps mitigate privacy risks associated with search.
• Currently Implemented: Initial Searchkick model configurations were designed to avoid indexing highly sensitive fields directly, but this is not rigorously enforced or regularly reviewed.
• Missing Implementation: Formal review process for Searchkick model configurations and indexing logic is not in place. More granular control within search_data to selectively index and transform data for Searchkick is not fully utilized.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Searchkick

• Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Searchkick (Dependency Management)
• Description:
  1. Monitor Searchkick Releases: Actively monitor for new releases and security advisories related to the searchkick gem. Check GitHub repository, gem release notes, and security mailing lists.
  2. Include Searchkick in Update Cycles: Incorporate Searchkick updates into your regular dependency update cycles. Prioritize security updates.
  3. Test Searchkick Updates: Thoroughly test Searchkick updates in a staging environment before deploying to production. Ensure compatibility with your application and Elasticsearch version. Verify that updates do not introduce regressions in search functionality.
  4. Automate Searchkick Dependency Updates (If Possible): Utilize dependency management tools (like Dependabot, Renovate) to automate the process of detecting and proposing updates for the searchkick gem.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exploitation of Known Searchkick Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated versions of Searchkick might contain known security vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Regularly updating Searchkick patches these vulnerabilities.
• Impact:
  • Exploitation of Known Searchkick Vulnerabilities: High risk reduction. Keeping Searchkick up-to-date is crucial for mitigating the risk of exploiting known vulnerabilities within the Searchkick gem itself.
• Currently Implemented: Manual updates of gems, including Searchkick, are performed periodically, but not on a regular, scheduled basis.
• Missing Implementation: Automated dependency updates for Searchkick are not implemented. A formal schedule for regular Searchkick updates is missing. Proactive monitoring of Searchkick releases and security advisories is not consistently performed.