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Attack Tree Analysis for ankane/searchkick

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive data or disrupt service availability via vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the Searchkick integration.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Compromise Application via Searchkick
                                                  |
        -------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |						|
  1. Data Exfiltration					  2. Denial of Service (DoS)
        |						|
  -------------|------------- 		 ------------- 
  |		    |                                |
**1.1**		**1.2**							**2.1**
**Unsafe**	  **Search**					   **Resource**
**Search**	  **Term**						 **Exhaustion**
**Options**	 **Injection**

[HIGH-RISK PATH]	[HIGH-RISK PATH]		[HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Exfiltration

  • 1.1 Unsafe Search Options (Critical Node):

    • Description: Searchkick allows developers to pass options directly to Elasticsearch. If these options are constructed using unsanitized user input, an attacker can manipulate the query to bypass intended restrictions and access data they shouldn't. This is analogous to SQL injection, but for Elasticsearch.
    • Example: An attacker might inject a _source filter to retrieve fields that are normally hidden, or use a script_fields option with malicious code (if scripting is enabled). They could also manipulate pagination features like search_after to retrieve all data.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Strictly validate and sanitize all user input used in any Searchkick option. Use a whitelist approach.
      • Use Searchkick's built-in sanitization features, but supplement them with your own validation.
      • Minimize the use of complex Elasticsearch features (like scripting) through Searchkick.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure the Elasticsearch user has only necessary permissions.
      • Regularly review Searchkick and Elasticsearch documentation for security updates.

  • 1.2 Search Term Injection (Critical Node):

    • Description: Even with sanitized search options, an attacker might inject Elasticsearch query DSL syntax into the search term itself. This allows crafting queries that bypass filters or access hidden data.
    • Example: Injecting {"match_all": {}} (if not escaped) to retrieve all documents, or using excessive wildcards (*, ?) to broaden the search.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Use Searchkick's query method with appropriate escaping. Avoid raw query strings.
      • Consider using the match query type instead of query_string or simple_query_string.
      • Implement input validation to restrict special characters and query DSL syntax. Whitelist approach is preferred.
      • Monitor search logs for suspicious query patterns.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • 2.1 Resource Exhaustion (Critical Node):
    • Description: An attacker sends many search requests or requests designed to consume excessive resources, leading to a denial of service.
    • Example: Sending numerous concurrent searches, using broad search terms, or requesting large result sets.
    • Likelihood: High
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement rate limiting on search requests.
      • Set reasonable limits on the size of result sets. Use pagination.
      • Monitor Elasticsearch cluster health and resource usage. Set up alerts.
      • Use Elasticsearch's circuit breakers.