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Attack Tree Analysis for basecamp/kamal

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise an application deployed using Kamal by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses introduced by Kamal itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Kamal
├───[OR]─ Exploit Kamal Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───[AND]─ Misconfigured deploy.yml [CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├───[OR]─ Exposed Secrets in deploy.yml [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   └─── Plaintext Secrets [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├─── Incorrect Network Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       │   └─── Allowing public access to internal services (e.g., database port exposed via Traefik misconfig) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Insecure Traefik Configuration (managed by Kamal) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│           ├─── Open Traefik Dashboard without strong authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│           └─── Misconfigured routing rules leading to unintended access [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ Exploit Kamal Server Access Vulnerabilities (SSH) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───[AND]─ Compromised SSH Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Stolen SSH Keys [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│           └─── Key stored insecurely on Kamal operator's machine [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Exploit Kamal Docker Image/Registry Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[AND]─ Malicious Base Docker Image [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[OR]─ Using outdated or vulnerable base image specified in Dockerfile [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └─── Base image with known CVEs in system libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND]─ Malicious Application Docker Image Build Process (via Kamal) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[OR]─ Supply Chain Attack during Docker build [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       ├─── Compromised dependencies pulled during `docker build` (e.g., malicious npm/gem package) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └─── Vulnerable dependencies pulled during `docker build` [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───[AND]─ Compromised Docker Registry [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───[OR]─ Using public Docker Registry with malicious images (if not carefully vetted) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Kamal Configuration Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Misconfigurations within the deploy.yml file and related Traefik configuration, which are central to Kamal's deployment process.
  • Exploitation: Attackers target common misconfigurations arising from user error or lack of security awareness during setup.
  • Potential Impact: Wide range of impacts from information disclosure to full application compromise, depending on the specific misconfiguration.
  • Mitigation:

    • Thoroughly review and understand Kamal and Traefik configuration best practices.

    • Implement automated configuration linting and validation tools.

    • Regularly audit configurations for security weaknesses.

    • Provide security training to deployment teams.

    • 1.1. Misconfigured deploy.yml [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: The deploy.yml file itself is the primary configuration for Kamal. Any misconfiguration here can have cascading security implications.

      • Exploitation: Attackers analyze deploy.yml (if accessible or leaked) or probe the deployed application to identify weaknesses stemming from configuration errors.

      • Potential Impact: Serves as the root cause for various configuration-related vulnerabilities.

      • Mitigation: Treat deploy.yml as a critical security component. Secure its storage, access, and review process.

      • 1.1.1. Exposed Secrets in deploy.yml [CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Accidental or intentional inclusion of sensitive secrets (API keys, database passwords, etc.) directly within the deploy.yml file.
        • Exploitation: Attackers find plaintext secrets in publicly accessible repositories, leaked files, or compromised systems.
        • Potential Impact: Full compromise of the application and potentially related systems if secrets grant access to critical resources.
        • Mitigation:

          • Never store secrets in plaintext in deploy.yml.

          • Utilize environment variables or dedicated secret management solutions.

          • Implement secret scanning tools to prevent accidental commits.

          • 1.1.1.1. Plaintext Secrets [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Storing secrets directly as plaintext strings in deploy.yml.
            • Exploitation: Trivial to exploit if deploy.yml is accessible to attackers.
            • Potential Impact: Immediate and severe compromise.
            • Mitigation: Strictly avoid plaintext secrets. Use environment variables or dedicated secret management.

      • 1.1.2. Incorrect Network Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]

        • Attack Vector: Misconfiguration of network settings, often within Traefik routing rules, leading to unintended exposure of internal services.
        • Exploitation: Attackers scan for open ports and accessible services that should be internal-only.
        • Potential Impact: Direct access to databases, internal APIs, or other sensitive components, leading to data breaches or further compromise.
        • Mitigation:

          • Carefully define Traefik routing rules, adhering to the principle of least privilege.

          • Use network segmentation and firewalls to restrict access to internal services.

          • Regularly audit network configurations.

          • 1.1.2.1. Allowing public access to internal services (e.g., database port exposed via Traefik misconfig) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Specifically, misconfiguring Traefik to route external traffic directly to internal services like databases, bypassing intended access controls.
            • Exploitation: Attackers directly connect to exposed internal services.
            • Potential Impact: Direct data breach, database compromise, and potential lateral movement.
            • Mitigation: Double-check Traefik routing rules to ensure internal services are not publicly accessible. Use network policies to enforce isolation.

      • 1.1.3. Insecure Traefik Configuration (managed by Kamal) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Weaknesses in the configuration of Traefik, the reverse proxy and load balancer integrated with Kamal.
        • Exploitation: Attackers exploit misconfigurations in Traefik to bypass security controls, gain unauthorized access, or even achieve remote code execution via Traefik vulnerabilities (less likely due to Kamal managing Traefik version, but misconfiguration is still a risk).
        • Potential Impact: Bypass of security controls, potential for RCE via Traefik API (if exposed and vulnerable), disruption of service.
        • Mitigation:

          • Follow Traefik security best practices.

          • Enable strong authentication for the Traefik dashboard if exposed.

          • Use strong TLS configurations.

          • Carefully review and test routing rules.

          • 1.1.3.1. Open Traefik Dashboard without strong authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Exposing the Traefik dashboard publicly without strong authentication (or with default/weak credentials).
            • Exploitation: Attackers access the dashboard, gaining full control over Traefik routing and configuration, potentially leading to RCE via the Traefik API.
            • Potential Impact: Full control over application routing, potential for RCE, service disruption.
            • Mitigation: Always secure the Traefik dashboard with strong authentication. Restrict access to authorized personnel only. Consider disabling the dashboard in production environments if not strictly necessary.

          • 1.1.3.2. Misconfigured routing rules leading to unintended access [HIGH-RISK PATH]

            • Attack Vector: Errors in defining Traefik routing rules that inadvertently grant access to resources that should be protected or restricted.
            • Exploitation: Attackers exploit flawed routing logic to access unintended parts of the application or backend services.
            • Potential Impact: Unintended access to sensitive data or functionality, potential data exposure, or privilege escalation.
            • Mitigation: Thoroughly test and review Traefik routing rules. Use a principle of least privilege when defining access paths.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Kamal Server Access Vulnerabilities (SSH) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Compromising SSH access to the servers managed by Kamal, which is the primary method Kamal uses for deployment and management.
  • Exploitation: Attackers target weaknesses in SSH credentials or SSH server configurations to gain unauthorized access.
  • Potential Impact: Full server compromise, application compromise, data breach, and potential lateral movement within the infrastructure.
  • Mitigation:

    • Enforce strong SSH key usage and disable password authentication.

    • Securely manage and store SSH private keys.

    • Regularly rotate SSH keys.

    • Harden SSH server configurations.

    • Monitor SSH access logs for suspicious activity.

    • 2.1. Compromised SSH Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to SSH credentials used by Kamal.

      • Exploitation: Various methods, including stealing keys, social engineering, or exploiting weak keys (less likely with key-based auth).

      • Potential Impact: Direct server access, full compromise.

      • Mitigation: Focus on robust SSH credential management and security practices.

      • 2.1.1. Stolen SSH Keys [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Theft of SSH private keys used by Kamal for server access.
        • Exploitation: Attackers steal keys from insecure storage locations (e.g., developer machines, unprotected file systems).
        • Potential Impact: Immediate server access and full compromise.
        • Mitigation:

          • Securely store SSH private keys, protected by strong passwords or passphrases.

          • Avoid storing keys in version control or easily accessible locations.

          • Implement endpoint security measures on machines storing private keys.

          • 2.1.1.1. Key stored insecurely on Kamal operator's machine [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Storing SSH private keys without adequate protection on the machine used to run the Kamal CLI.
            • Exploitation: If the operator's machine is compromised, attackers can easily steal the unprotected SSH keys.
            • Potential Impact: Direct server access and full compromise.
            • Mitigation: Encrypt SSH private keys with strong passphrases. Secure the operator's machine with strong passwords, firewalls, and up-to-date security software.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Kamal Docker Image/Registry Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Introducing vulnerabilities or malicious code through compromised Docker images or registries used in the Kamal deployment process.
  • Exploitation: Attackers target weaknesses in the Docker image supply chain, including base images, dependencies, and registries.
  • Potential Impact: Deployment of vulnerable or malicious applications, backdoors, data theft, and supply chain compromise.
  • Mitigation:

    • Use vetted and regularly scanned base Docker images from trusted sources.

    • Implement robust Docker image scanning and vulnerability management.

    • Secure the Docker image build process and dependencies.

    • Use private Docker registries with strong access controls.

    • Implement image signing and verification.

    • 3.1. Malicious Base Docker Image [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Using a base Docker image that is either outdated and vulnerable or intentionally malicious.

      • Exploitation: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated base images or leverage backdoors in malicious images.

      • Potential Impact: Introduction of vulnerabilities or backdoors into the application runtime environment.

      • Mitigation:

        • Always use official and well-maintained base Docker images.
        • Regularly update base images and scan them for vulnerabilities.
        • Vet base images from public registries carefully.

      • 3.1.1. Using outdated or vulnerable base image specified in Dockerfile [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Specifying an outdated or vulnerable base image in the Dockerfile used by Kamal.

        • Exploitation: Attackers exploit known CVEs present in the outdated base image's system libraries or components.

        • Potential Impact: Vulnerabilities in the application's runtime environment, making it easier to compromise.

        • Mitigation: Regularly update base images in Dockerfiles. Implement automated checks to ensure base images are up-to-date and scanned for vulnerabilities.

        • 3.1.1.1. Base image with known CVEs in system libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

          • Attack Vector: Specifically, using a base image that contains system libraries with publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs).
          • Exploitation: Attackers exploit these known CVEs to compromise the application container.
          • Potential Impact: Application compromise via known vulnerabilities.
          • Mitigation: Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify CVEs in base images. Update base images to patched versions.

    • 3.2. Malicious Application Docker Image Build Process (via Kamal) [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Compromising the Docker image build process used by Kamal to inject malicious code or vulnerabilities.

      • Exploitation: Attackers target the software supply chain during the build process, such as dependency management.

      • Potential Impact: Deployment of applications containing backdoors or vulnerabilities.

      • Mitigation:

        • Secure the Docker build environment.
        • Implement dependency scanning and software composition analysis.
        • Use trusted dependency sources and registries.

      • 3.2.1. Supply Chain Attack during Docker build [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Introducing malicious or vulnerable components into the application during the Docker build process through supply chain attacks.
        • Exploitation: Attackers compromise dependency registries or inject malicious packages that are pulled during docker build.
        • Potential Impact: Deployment of applications with backdoors or vulnerabilities introduced through compromised dependencies.
        • Mitigation:

          • Use dependency scanning tools to detect vulnerable dependencies.

          • Implement software composition analysis to track dependencies.

          • Use private package registries or mirror trusted public registries.

          • Verify package integrity using checksums or signatures.

          • 3.2.1.1. Compromised dependencies pulled during docker build (e.g., malicious npm/gem package) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Specifically, malicious packages from dependency registries (like npm, gem, pip) are pulled during the docker build process.
            • Exploitation: Attackers upload malicious packages to public registries or compromise existing packages.
            • Potential Impact: Backdoors, data theft, or application malfunction due to malicious dependencies.
            • Mitigation: Use dependency scanning tools. Pin dependency versions. Use private package registries or mirrors.

          • 3.2.1.2. Vulnerable dependencies pulled during docker build [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

            • Attack Vector: Pulling vulnerable versions of dependencies during the docker build process.
            • Exploitation: Attackers exploit known CVEs in vulnerable dependencies included in the application image.
            • Potential Impact: Application compromise via known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
            • Mitigation: Use dependency scanning tools to identify vulnerable dependencies. Regularly update dependencies to patched versions.

    • 3.3. Compromised Docker Registry [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Compromise of the Docker registry used to store and distribute application images.

      • Exploitation: Attackers gain unauthorized access to the registry, allowing them to push malicious images or modify existing ones.

      • Potential Impact: Deployment of malicious application versions, widespread compromise if the registry is widely used.

      • Mitigation:

        • Secure the Docker registry with strong authentication and access controls.
        • Regularly audit registry access logs.
        • Use private registries to control image distribution.

      • 3.3.1. Using public Docker Registry with malicious images (if not carefully vetted) [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]

        • Attack Vector: Pulling Docker images from public registries without proper vetting or verification, potentially using malicious images.
        • Exploitation: Attackers upload malicious images to public registries, hoping users will unknowingly use them.
        • Potential Impact: Deployment of malicious software, backdoors, or vulnerable applications.
        • Mitigation:
          • Only use images from trusted and verified publishers on public registries.
          • Scan images pulled from public registries for vulnerabilities and malware before deployment.
          • Prefer private registries for production deployments.