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Attack Tree Analysis for basecamp/kamal

Objective: Gain Unauthorized RCE on Application Servers via Kamal

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized RCE on Application Servers via Kamal

└── 1. Exploit Kamal Configuration/Deployment Process [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 1.1. Compromise Kamal Configuration Files (config/deploy.yml, .env) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.1.1. Weak Access Controls on Source Repository [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Stolen/Leaked Developer Credentials (e.g., Git credentials) │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Insufficient Branch Protection Rules (e.g., no required reviews) │ │ └── 1.1.1.3. Insider Threat (malicious or compromised developer) │ └── 1.1.3. Inject Malicious Configuration [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.1.3.1. Modify image to point to a malicious Docker image. [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── 1.1.3.2. Add malicious commands (pre/post hooks, healthchecks). [HIGH-RISK PATH] └── 1.2. Exploit Weaknesses in Kamal's Interaction with Docker └── 1.2.1. Docker Registry Poisoning └── 1.2.1.2. Push a malicious image with the same name as the legitimate image. [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Kamal Configuration/Deployment Process [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is the overarching critical node. Kamal's core function is managing deployments through configuration. If this process is compromised, the entire application is at risk.
  • Why Critical: All other attack paths within the Kamal-specific context stem from this point. Controlling the deployment process gives the attacker the highest level of control.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Compromise Kamal Configuration Files (config/deploy.yml, .env) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This involves gaining unauthorized access to and modifying the configuration files that Kamal uses. These files dictate how the application is deployed, including the Docker image, commands to run, and server details.
  • Why High-Risk: Configuration files are often a weak point due to inadequate access controls, insecure storage, or human error.
  • Why Critical: These files are the blueprint for the deployment. Modifying them allows the attacker to directly control the deployed application.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Weak Access Controls on Source Repository [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This refers to insufficient security measures protecting the repository where the Kamal configuration files are stored (e.g., GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket).
  • Why Critical: This is a common entry point for attackers. If the repository is compromised, the attacker can modify the configuration files at will.
    • 1.1.1.1. Stolen/Leaked Developer Credentials (e.g., Git credentials)
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice/Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if audit logs are monitored)
    • 1.1.1.2. Insufficient Branch Protection Rules (e.g., no required reviews)
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Very Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if change monitoring is in place)
    • 1.1.1.3. Insider Threat (malicious or compromised developer)
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Very Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate/Advanced (depending on sophistication)
      • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Inject Malicious Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is the act of modifying the configuration files to introduce malicious code or settings.
  • Why Critical: This is the direct action that leads to RCE. It's the culmination of the previous steps.
    • 1.1.3.1. Modify image to point to a malicious Docker image. [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Description: Changing the image directive in the config/deploy.yml file to point to a Docker image controlled by the attacker.
      • Why High-Risk: This is a straightforward and highly effective way to gain RCE. The attacker can craft a Docker image containing any malicious payload.
      • Likelihood: Medium (if 1.1.1 or 1.1.2 succeeds)
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (with image scanning and deployment monitoring)
    • 1.1.3.2. Add malicious commands (pre/post hooks, healthchecks). [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Description: Adding malicious commands to the pre-deploy, post-deploy, builder, or healthcheck sections of the config/deploy.yml file. These commands are executed during the deployment process.
      • Why High-Risk: These hooks are often overlooked and provide a convenient way to inject arbitrary code that will be executed with the privileges of the deployment process.
      • Likelihood: Medium (if 1.1.1 or 1.1.2 succeeds)
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (with command execution monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Exploit Weaknesses in Kamal's Interaction with Docker

  • Description: This branch focuses on attacks that leverage Kamal's reliance on Docker.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Docker Registry Poisoning

  • Description: This involves compromising the Docker registry used by Kamal.
*   **1.2.1.2. Push a malicious image with the same name as the legitimate image. [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    *   **Description:**  Uploading a malicious Docker image to the registry, using the same name (and potentially tag, if tags are not immutable) as the legitimate application image.  Kamal will then pull and run the malicious image.
    *   **Why High-Risk:** If the registry is not properly secured (e.g., weak credentials, no image signing), this attack can be very effective. It bypasses the need to modify configuration files directly *if* immutable tags are not used.
    *   Likelihood: Low (if registry is secured and image tags are immutable)
    *   Impact: Very High
    *   Effort: Low (if credentials are compromised)
    *   Skill Level: Intermediate
    *   Detection Difficulty: Medium (with image scanning and deployment monitoring)