Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
63 lines (45 loc) · 6.3 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

63 lines (45 loc) · 6.3 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for bettererrors/better_errors

Objective: Compromise Application by Exploiting Better Errors Features Exposed in a Non-Development Environment.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application via Better Errors
    • 1. Exploit Exposed Better Errors in Non-Development Environment
      • 1.1. Direct Code Execution via Interactive Console (REPL) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 1.1.1. Access REPL via Default Routes
          • 1.1.1.1. Application deployed with Better Errors enabled and default routes accessible
        • 1.1.3. Execute Arbitrary Code in REPL
          • 1.1.3.1. Utilize REPL to execute system commands, access files, or manipulate application state
      • 1.2. Information Disclosure via Error Pages [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 1.2.1. Expose Sensitive Configuration Details
          • 1.2.1.1. Error pages reveal database credentials, API keys, or internal paths in stack traces or environment variables

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Application via Better Errors (Critical Node - Root Goal):

This is the attacker's ultimate objective. Success means gaining unauthorized access, control, or causing significant damage to the application and potentially the underlying system.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Exposed Better Errors in Non-Development Environment (Critical Node):

This is the primary attack vector. It relies on the fundamental misconfiguration of having better_errors active and accessible in an environment where it should not be (e.g., production, staging).

Attack Tree Path: 3. 1.1. Direct Code Execution via Interactive Console (REPL) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

This path represents the most direct and impactful attack. If successful, it grants the attacker immediate code execution capabilities on the server.

  • 3.1. 1.1.1. Access REPL via Default Routes (Critical Node):

    • Attack Vector: better_errors by default exposes routes (like /__better_errors) that, if not explicitly disabled or protected, are directly accessible via a web browser.

    • Impact: Provides immediate access to the interactive Ruby console (REPL).

    • Mitigation: Ensure better_errors is disabled in non-development environments. Verify configuration and deployment processes.

    • 3.1.1. 1.1.1.1. Application deployed with Better Errors enabled and default routes accessible (Critical Node - Root Cause):

      • Attack Vector: Developers fail to properly configure the application for non-development environments, leaving better_errors active and its default routes exposed.
      • Impact: This is the root cause that enables the entire high-risk path of direct code execution.
      • Mitigation: Use environment-specific gem groups in Bundler, environment variables, or configuration files to strictly disable better_errors outside of development and testing.

    • 3.2. 1.1.3. Execute Arbitrary Code in REPL (Critical Node - Critical Impact):

      • Attack Vector: Once the REPL is accessible (via path 1.1.1), the attacker can type and execute arbitrary Ruby code directly in the web browser.

      • Impact: Full system compromise. Attackers can execute system commands, read/write files, access databases, manipulate application state, install backdoors, and completely take over the server.

      • Mitigation: Prevent access to the REPL by disabling better_errors in non-development environments.

      • 3.2.1. 1.1.3.1. Utilize REPL to execute system commands, access files, or manipulate application state (Critical Node - Critical Impact):

        • Attack Vector: Specific actions taken within the REPL to achieve malicious goals, such as using system() calls, file I/O operations, or interacting with application objects.
        • Impact: Realization of the critical impact – system compromise, data breach, service disruption, etc.
        • Mitigation: Prevent access to the REPL (primary mitigation). Implement strong system-level security measures to limit the impact of code execution even if it occurs (defense in depth).

Attack Tree Path: 4. 1.2. Information Disclosure via Error Pages [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

This path represents a significant risk of exposing sensitive information through detailed error pages generated by better_errors.

*   **4.1. 1.2.1. Expose Sensitive Configuration Details (Critical Node):**
    *   Attack Vector: `better_errors` error pages display extensive debugging information, including stack traces, environment variables, and local variables at the point of error. This can inadvertently reveal sensitive configuration details.
    *   Impact:  Exposure of database credentials, API keys, internal paths, and other sensitive configuration data. This information can be directly used to compromise other systems or gain deeper access to the application.
    *   Mitigation:  Disable `better_errors` in non-development environments. Implement robust error handling in production to prevent detailed error pages from being displayed. Sanitize error logs and responses to remove sensitive information.

    *   **4.1.1. 1.2.1.1. Error pages reveal database credentials, API keys, or internal paths in stack traces or environment variables (Critical Node - Critical Information Leak):**
        *   Attack Vector:  Specific types of sensitive information leaked through error pages, including database connection strings, API keys for external services, and internal file system paths.
        *   Impact:  Direct compromise of databases or external services via leaked credentials. Exposure of internal paths can aid in further reconnaissance and targeted attacks.
        *   Mitigation:  Prevent information leakage by disabling `better_errors` and implementing secure error handling.  Review environment variable usage and ensure sensitive credentials are not inadvertently exposed in error contexts.