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Threat Model Analysis for bkeepers/dotenv

  • Threat: Unauthorized .env File Modification

    • Description: An attacker gains write access to the server file system (through compromised accounts, application vulnerabilities, or misconfigured shares) and modifies the .env file. They change sensitive values like database credentials, API keys, or application secrets, potentially pointing them to attacker-controlled resources or services.
    • Impact:
      • Complete application compromise.
      • Data breaches (reading, modifying, deleting data).
      • Unauthorized access to external services.
      • Application downtime/malfunction.
      • Reputational damage.
    • Affected Dotenv Component: The .env file itself (the core data store). The dotenv module's loading function (config() or similar) is indirectly affected as it reads the compromised data.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict file system permissions: .env should be readable only by the application's user, with no write permissions for anyone.
      • Store .env outside the web root: Never place .env in a publicly accessible directory.
      • Use a secrets management solution: Replace .env files with a secrets manager (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) in production.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Detect unauthorized changes to the .env file.
      • Regular security audits: Audit server configurations and access controls.
  • Threat: Accidental .env File Exposure (Commit to Repository)

    • Description: A developer accidentally commits the .env file, containing sensitive credentials, to a public or private source code repository (e.g., GitHub, GitLab). This happens if .env is not properly excluded via .gitignore (or equivalent). Attackers or automated scanners can discover these exposed secrets.
    • Impact:
      • Compromise of production or development environments.
      • Data breaches.
      • Unauthorized access to connected services.
      • Reputational damage.
      • Potential legal/financial consequences.
    • Affected Dotenv Component: The .env file itself. The dotenv module is indirectly affected as it would load the exposed data.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory: Add .env (and variations like .env.local, .env.production) to the project's .gitignore file before the first commit.
      • Use a .env.example file: Provide a template (.env.example) listing required variables without sensitive values. Commit this file.
      • Educate developers: Train developers on never committing secrets.
      • Use pre-commit hooks: Automatically check for potential secrets before commits.
      • Use secret scanning tools: Employ tools like git-secrets, trufflehog, or GitHub's secret scanning.
  • Threat: Environment Variable Leakage via Debugging/Error Messages

    • Description: The application inadvertently exposes environment variables (loaded from .env via dotenv) in error messages, debugging output, or log files due to misconfiguration or vulnerabilities. Attackers could trigger errors or exploit vulnerabilities to view these.
    • Impact:
      • Exposure of sensitive credentials.
      • Potential for attackers to gain access to the application or services.
      • Increased attack surface.
    • Affected Dotenv Component: The environment variables loaded by the dotenv module (accessed via process.env or similar). The module itself isn't at fault, but it's the source of the leaked data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable debugging in production: Ensure debugging modes, verbose logging, and stack traces are disabled in production.
      • Robust error handling: Prevent sensitive information in error messages/logs. Log generic messages; store details separately with restricted access.
      • Sanitize logs: Review and remove sensitive information from logs.
      • Use a logging framework: Employ a structured logging framework with appropriate log levels for each environment.
  • Threat: Overly Permissive Credentials in .env

    • Description: The credentials stored within the .env file (and loaded by dotenv) possess more permissions than the application strictly requires. This amplifies the impact of a compromise, allowing an attacker broader access than necessary.
    • Impact:
      • Increased damage from a successful attack.
      • Potential for privilege escalation or access to unintended data.
    • Affected Dotenv Component: The .env file and the values it contains. The dotenv module simply loads these overly permissive credentials.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the minimum necessary permissions to credentials used by the application.
      • Regularly review and audit permissions: Periodically check and ensure permissions remain appropriate.
      • Use separate credentials for different environments: Avoid using the same credentials across development, testing, and production.