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Attack Tree Analysis for carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave

Objective: Compromise Application via CarrierWave Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via CarrierWave Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
├───[OR]─ 1. Exploit Malicious File Upload [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ 1.1. Upload Web Shell for Remote Code Execution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ 1.1.1. Bypass File Type Restrictions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├───[OR]─ 1.1.1.1. Client-Side Validation Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └───[Actionable Insight] Implement robust server-side file type validation.
│   │   │   └───[OR]─ 1.1.1.3. MIME Type Spoofing [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └───[Actionable Insight] Validate MIME type server-side using file content inspection (magic numbers) in addition to headers.
│   │   ├───[AND]─ 1.1.2. Upload Executable File to Publicly Accessible Location [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├───[OR]─ 1.1.2.1. Insecure Storage Path Configuration [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └───[Actionable Insight] Ensure storage paths are outside web root or protected by access controls.
│   │   ├───[AND]─ 1.1.3. Execute Uploaded Web Shell [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├───[OR]─ 1.1.3.1. Direct Access to Uploaded File via Web Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └───[Actionable Insight] Configure web server to prevent execution of uploaded files in public directories (e.g., `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, proper content-disposition, deny execution permissions).
├───[OR]─ 2. Exploit File Storage Location Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ 2.2. Access Control Issues on Storage Location [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─ 2.2.1. Publicly Accessible Storage Directory [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───[Actionable Insight] Ensure storage directories are properly secured and not directly accessible via the web server unless intended for public files. Configure appropriate access controls on cloud storage buckets.
├───[OR]─ 3. Exploit Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) to Access Uploaded Files
│   ├───[AND]─ 3.1.2. Lack of Authorization Checks Before File Access [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[Actionable Insight] Implement proper authorization checks in application code to ensure users can only access files they are authorized to view.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Malicious File Upload [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to upload malicious files to the application through CarrierWave's file upload functionality.
  • Breakdown: This is the primary entry point for many CarrierWave-related attacks. Successful exploitation can lead to Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, or data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Upload Web Shell for Remote Code Execution [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: The attacker aims to upload a web shell (e.g., PHP, JSP, ASPX script) that can be executed by the web server to gain control of the server.

  • Breakdown: Remote Code Execution (RCE) is the most critical impact. It allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to full system compromise, data theft, and application defacement.

    • 1.1.1. Bypass File Type Restrictions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Attack Vector: Attackers try to circumvent file type restrictions implemented by the application to upload web shells disguised as allowed file types.

      • Breakdown: Bypassing file type restrictions is a necessary step to upload malicious executables.

        *   **1.1.1.1. Client-Side Validation Bypass [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
    *   **Attack Vector:** Attackers bypass client-side JavaScript validation, which is easily manipulated.
    *   **Breakdown:** Relying solely on client-side validation is a major security flaw. Attackers can easily bypass these checks using browser developer tools or by crafting raw HTTP requests.

*   **1.1.1.3. MIME Type Spoofing [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
    *   **Attack Vector:** Attackers manipulate the MIME type in the HTTP header to trick server-side MIME type checks.
    *   **Breakdown:**  MIME type headers can be easily spoofed. Server-side validation must not rely solely on HTTP headers.

      • 1.1.2. Upload Executable File to Publicly Accessible Location [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

        • Attack Vector: Even after bypassing file type restrictions, the attacker needs to ensure the uploaded web shell is accessible via the web server to execute it.

        • Breakdown: Storing uploaded files in publicly accessible locations is a critical misconfiguration that directly enables web shell execution.

          • 1.1.2.1. Insecure Storage Path Configuration [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
            • Attack Vector: The application is configured to store uploaded files within the web root or a publicly accessible directory.
            • Breakdown: This is a common and severe misconfiguration. If the storage path is within the web root, the web server will directly serve the uploaded files, including web shells, making them executable.

      • 1.1.3. Execute Uploaded Web Shell [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

        • Attack Vector: Once the web shell is uploaded and accessible, the attacker needs to trigger its execution.

        • Breakdown: Executing the web shell grants the attacker remote code execution capabilities.

          • 1.1.3.1. Direct Access to Uploaded File via Web Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
            • Attack Vector: The attacker directly accesses the uploaded web shell file via its URL in the web browser.
            • Breakdown: If the web server is configured to execute scripts in the upload directory, accessing the web shell's URL will execute the script, granting the attacker control.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit File Storage Location Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities related to how and where files are stored by CarrierWave.

  • Breakdown: Misconfigurations or vulnerabilities in file storage can lead to unauthorized access to uploaded files, data breaches, or even system compromise.

    • 2.2. Access Control Issues on Storage Location [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit inadequate access controls on the storage location where CarrierWave stores files.

      • Breakdown: Improper access controls can expose sensitive uploaded files to unauthorized users or the public.

        • 2.2.1. Publicly Accessible Storage Directory [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
          • Attack Vector: The storage directory (e.g., a cloud storage bucket or a directory on the server) is misconfigured to be publicly accessible.
          • Breakdown: Making the storage directory publicly accessible is a severe misconfiguration leading to a direct data breach. Anyone can access and download all uploaded files.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) to Access Uploaded Files:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit IDOR vulnerabilities to access files they are not authorized to view.

  • Breakdown: IDOR vulnerabilities can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive files, potentially resulting in data breaches and privacy violations.

    • 3.1.2. Lack of Authorization Checks Before File Access [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: The application lacks proper authorization checks before serving uploaded files, allowing attackers to access files by directly manipulating file URLs.
      • Breakdown: If authorization checks are missing, attackers can potentially guess or enumerate file URLs and access files belonging to other users or sensitive application data.

This detailed breakdown of the high-risk paths and critical nodes provides a focused view of the most important security concerns related to CarrierWave file uploads. Addressing the actionable insights associated with these areas is crucial for securing applications using CarrierWave.