Attack Surface: 1. Unrestricted File Upload
- Description: Attackers upload malicious files (e.g., web shells, executables) to gain control of the server.
- CarrierWave Contribution: CarrierWave provides the file upload mechanism; without proper configuration, it accepts any file type.
- Example: An attacker uploads a PHP web shell (
shell.php
) disguised as a JPG (shell.php.jpg
or by manipulating theContent-Type
header). The server executes the PHP code, granting the attacker control. - Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), complete server compromise, data theft, data destruction.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strict
extension_allowlist
: Define a very restrictive list of allowed file extensions (e.g.,['jpg', 'jpeg', 'png', 'gif']
). Never rely on blacklisting. - Content Type Validation (Secondary): Use a gem like
Marcel
orMimeMagic
to validate the content of the file, not just the extension or client-provided header. - Randomized Filenames: Store files with randomly generated names (e.g., using
SecureRandom.uuid
). - No Default Uploaders: Avoid using a default uploader without any configuration. Always explicitly configure each uploader.
- Sanitize Filenames: Ensure that filenames are properly sanitized.
- Strict
Attack Surface: 2. Directory Traversal
- Description: Attackers manipulate filenames to write files outside the intended upload directory, potentially overwriting system files.
- CarrierWave Contribution: CarrierWave handles file storage; improper
store_dir
configuration can allow attackers to specify arbitrary paths. - Example: An attacker uploads a file named
../../../etc/passwd
. Ifstore_dir
is not properly secured, this could overwrite the system's password file. - Impact: System file corruption, privilege escalation, denial of service.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Secure
store_dir
: Configurestore_dir
to return a path relative to a safe, non-web-accessible root directory. Never allow user input to directly influencestore_dir
. - Filename Sanitization: Ensure CarrierWave's filename sanitization is effective in removing directory traversal sequences (e.g.,
../
). - OS Permissions: Limit the web server's write permissions to only the designated upload directory.
- Secure
Attack Surface: 3. Image Processing Exploits (ImageTragick and similar)
- Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in image processing libraries (e.g., ImageMagick) to achieve RCE.
- CarrierWave Contribution: CarrierWave often integrates with image processing libraries (MiniMagick, RMagick) which are wrappers around ImageMagick. This makes CarrierWave a direct pathway to these vulnerabilities if image processing is enabled.
- Example: An attacker uploads a specially crafted image file that triggers a known ImageMagick vulnerability (like ImageTragick), leading to RCE.
- Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), complete server compromise.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Update Dependencies: Crucially, keep ImageMagick, MiniMagick, RMagick, and all related gems up-to-date.
policy.xml
(ImageMagick): Configure ImageMagick'spolicy.xml
to disable vulnerable coders (e.g.,MVG
,MSL
,EPHEMERAL
).- Sandboxing: Run image processing in a sandboxed environment (e.g., Docker).
- Avoid
image/svg+xml
: Be extremely cautious with SVG files.
Attack Surface: 4. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Remote URLs
- Description: Attackers provide URLs to internal services, exploiting CarrierWave's remote file download feature.
- CarrierWave Contribution: CarrierWave's
remote_<attribute>_url
feature allows downloading files from user-provided URLs. This is a direct feature of CarrierWave. - Example: An attacker provides a URL like
http://localhost:22
(SSH) orhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
(AWS metadata) to access internal services or sensitive data. - Impact: Exposure of internal services, data breaches, potential for further attacks.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- URL Allowlist: Strictly limit the domains allowed for remote downloads.
- IP Address Restrictions: Restrict downloads to specific IP ranges, if possible.
- Network Segmentation: Limit the application server's access to internal resources.
- Block Internal IPs: Explicitly block URLs pointing to
localhost
,127.0.0.1
, or internal IPs. - Set Timeout: Implement short timeout for remote file downloads.
Attack Surface: 5. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards (Remote URLs)
- Description: If the remote server responds with a redirect, CarrierWave might follow it. An attacker could use this to redirect the request to a malicious server.
- CarrierWave Contribution: CarrierWave's
remote_<attribute>_url
feature allows downloading files from user-provided URLs and follows redirects by default. - Example: An attacker provides URL that redirects to malicious server that serves malicious file.
- Impact: Download of malicious file, potential RCE.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Limit Redirects: Configure CarrierWave (or the underlying HTTP client) to limit the number of redirects it follows.
- Validate Redirect URLs: If you must follow redirects, validate the target URL against your allowlist after each redirect.