mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for collectiveidea/delayed_job

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization for Job Arguments

• Description:
  1. Identify Job Argument Sources: Determine where job arguments originate from (e.g., user input, API calls, database queries).
  2. Define Expected Argument Schema: For each delayed job, define a strict schema for expected argument types, formats, and allowed values.
  3. Implement Validation in Job Enqueueing Code: Before enqueuing a job using Delayed::Job.enqueue, validate all arguments against the defined schema. Reject jobs with invalid arguments and log the rejection.
  4. Sanitize Arguments within Job Code: Inside the delayed job's perform method, sanitize arguments before using them in any potentially unsafe operations (though direct unsafe operations in jobs should be minimized).
  5. Use Parameterized Queries/ORM: If jobs interact with databases, always use parameterized queries or your ORM's (like ActiveRecord) built-in sanitization to prevent SQL injection, even with validated arguments.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Code Injection (High Severity): Prevents malicious code injected as job arguments from being executed within the delayed job context.
    • Command Injection (High Severity): Reduces risk if job arguments are mistakenly used to construct shell commands within jobs.
    • SQL Injection (High Severity): Mitigates risk if job arguments are improperly used in database queries within jobs.
    • Data Corruption (Medium Severity): Prevents jobs from processing invalid data, leading to application errors and data inconsistencies.
  • Impact:
    • Code Injection (High Risk Reduction): Significantly reduces risk by ensuring only validated data is passed to job execution.
    • Command Injection (High Risk Reduction): Significantly reduces risk by preventing malicious commands from being executed.
    • SQL Injection (High Risk Reduction): Significantly reduces risk when combined with secure database interaction practices in jobs.
    • Data Corruption (High Risk Reduction): Effectively prevents data corruption due to invalid job arguments.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic type checking exists for some job arguments in app/jobs/user_report_job.rb before enqueueing.
  • Missing Implementation: Comprehensive schema definition and validation are missing for most jobs across app/jobs. Sanitization within job perform methods is not systematically implemented. Validation needs to be enforced before job enqueueing.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Job Serialization and Deserialization

• Description:
  1. Understand Delayed_Job Serialization: Recognize that delayed_job uses YAML by default for serializing job arguments. Be aware of YAML deserialization vulnerabilities.
  2. Consider JSON Serialization: Evaluate switching to JSON serialization for delayed_job as it is generally considered safer against deserialization attacks than YAML. Configure delayed_job to use JSON by setting Delayed::Worker.default_params = { :marshal_format => :json } in an initializer.
  3. Minimize Complex Object Serialization: Avoid serializing and deserializing complex Ruby objects as job arguments if possible. Prefer passing simple data types (strings, integers, hashes) and reconstruct objects within the job's perform method.
  4. Keep Serialization Gems Updated: Regularly update the psych gem (for YAML) or json gem (for JSON) to patch any discovered deserialization vulnerabilities.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Deserialization Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Prevents exploitation of vulnerabilities in YAML deserialization that could lead to remote code execution when delayed_job processes jobs.
  • Impact:
    • Deserialization Vulnerabilities (High Risk Reduction): Significantly reduces risk by using a safer serialization format and keeping libraries updated.
  • Currently Implemented: Default YAML serialization is used. Dependency updates are generally managed.
  • Missing Implementation: Switching to JSON serialization for delayed_job is not implemented. A formal security assessment of YAML serialization risks in the context of job arguments is needed.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Queue Access Control

• Description:
  1. Database Permissions for Delayed Jobs Table: If using a database-backed queue, restrict database user permissions. Worker processes should only have the minimum necessary permissions (e.g., SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE, INSERT on the delayed_jobs table). Application code enqueuing jobs needs INSERT and SELECT permissions.
  2. Message Queue ACLs (if applicable): If using a message queue like Redis or RabbitMQ with delayed_job, configure Access Control Lists (ACLs) to restrict access to the specific queues used by delayed_job. Only worker processes and job enqueuing components should have access.
  3. Prevent External Queue Manipulation: Ensure no external or unauthorized processes can directly interact with the delayed_job queue (database table or message queue) to insert, modify, or delete jobs.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Job Injection (High Severity): Prevents attackers from directly adding malicious jobs to the delayed_job queue to be executed.
    • Job Tampering (Medium Severity): Prevents unauthorized modification of jobs already in the queue, potentially altering their intended behavior.
    • Data Breach (Medium Severity): Prevents unauthorized access to job data stored in the queue.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Job Injection (High Risk Reduction): Significantly reduces the risk of malicious job injection into the delayed_job system.
    • Job Tampering (Medium Risk Reduction): Reduces the risk of unauthorized manipulation of queued jobs.
    • Data Breach (Medium Risk Reduction): Reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive job data in the queue.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic database access control is in place, but database user permissions for the delayed_jobs table might be overly broad.
  • Missing Implementation: Database user permissions for worker processes need to be specifically reviewed and restricted to the minimum necessary for interacting with the delayed_jobs table. If using a message queue in the future, ACLs need to be configured.

Mitigation Strategy: Rate Limiting Job Creation

• Description:
  1. Identify Job Enqueueing Points: Locate all code locations where Delayed::Job.enqueue is called in your application.
  2. Implement Rate Limiting Before Enqueueing: Before calling Delayed::Job.enqueue, implement rate limiting logic. This can be based on user, IP address, or globally, depending on the context of job creation.
  3. Use Rate Limiting Mechanisms: Utilize libraries or custom logic to track job creation rates and enforce limits. For example, use a Redis-based rate limiter to count enqueued jobs within a time window.
  4. Handle Rate Limit Exceeded: When rate limits are exceeded, prevent Delayed::Job.enqueue from being called. Return an error to the user or application component attempting to enqueue the job and log the rate limiting event.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Denial of Service (Medium to High Severity): Prevents malicious actors from flooding the delayed_job queue with a massive number of jobs, overwhelming worker resources and causing DoS.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Medium Severity): Prevents excessive job creation from consuming all available resources (queue capacity, worker processing power).
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (Medium to High Risk Reduction): Reduces the effectiveness of DoS attacks targeting the delayed_job queue.
    • Resource Exhaustion (Medium Risk Reduction): Reduces the risk of resource exhaustion due to uncontrolled job creation.
  • Currently Implemented: No rate limiting is currently implemented specifically for delayed_job enqueueing.
  • Missing Implementation: Rate limiting needs to be implemented at all relevant points in the application where Delayed::Job.enqueue is called, especially for user-facing features that trigger job creation.

Mitigation Strategy: Dependency Management and Updates for Delayed_Job

• Description:
  1. Regularly Update Delayed_Job Gem: Keep the delayed_job gem updated to the latest stable version. This ensures you have the latest security patches and bug fixes provided by the maintainers.
  2. Update Delayed_Job Dependencies: Ensure all dependencies of delayed_job (including serialization gems like psych or json, and database adapter gems) are also kept up-to-date.
  3. Automated Dependency Scanning: Integrate automated dependency vulnerability scanning tools into your development pipeline to detect known vulnerabilities in delayed_job and its dependencies.
  4. Promptly Address Vulnerabilities: When vulnerabilities are identified, prioritize updating the affected gems to patched versions as quickly as possible.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Known Vulnerabilities in Delayed_Job or Dependencies (Severity Varies): Mitigates risks associated with publicly disclosed security vulnerabilities in delayed_job itself or its dependencies.
  • Impact:
    • Known Vulnerabilities (Medium to High Risk Reduction): Reduces the risk of exploitation of known vulnerabilities by keeping the delayed_job stack up-to-date.
  • Currently Implemented: Dependency updates are generally managed using automated tools, but specific vulnerability scanning for delayed_job dependencies is not explicitly configured.
  • Missing Implementation: Integration of automated dependency vulnerability scanning for delayed_job and its dependencies into the CI/CD pipeline is needed. A process for promptly addressing identified vulnerabilities needs to be formalized.

Mitigation Strategy: Job Auditing and Logging (Delayed_Job Specific)

• Description:
  1. Log Job Enqueueing: Log details when jobs are enqueued, including job class, arguments (excluding sensitive data), enqueueing user or process, and timestamp.
  2. Log Job Execution Start and End: Log when a worker starts processing a job and when it completes (successfully or with failure). Include job ID and worker ID in logs.
  3. Log Job Failures and Retries: Log job failures, including error messages and stack traces. Log when jobs are retried.
  4. Audit Sensitive Job Actions: For jobs performing sensitive actions (e.g., data modification, external API calls), log specific details of these actions (without logging sensitive data itself).
  5. Centralized and Secure Job Logs: Send delayed_job logs to a centralized and secure logging system for monitoring, analysis, and security incident investigation.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Security Incident Investigation (Medium Severity): Provides audit trails for investigating security incidents related to delayed job execution.
    • Unauthorized Activity Detection (Low to Medium Severity): Helps detect unusual or unauthorized job activity through log analysis.
    • Operational Monitoring and Debugging (Low Severity): Improves operational visibility into delayed job processing and aids in debugging job-related issues.
  • Impact:
    • Security Incident Investigation (Medium Risk Reduction): Improves incident response capabilities by providing necessary audit logs.
    • Unauthorized Activity Detection (Low to Medium Risk Reduction): Enhances security monitoring and anomaly detection.
    • Operational Monitoring and Debugging (Medium Risk Reduction): Improves overall system observability and maintainability.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic logging of job execution is likely present through default delayed_job logging and application-level logging.
  • Missing Implementation: Comprehensive and structured logging specifically for delayed_job events (enqueueing, start, end, failures, retries) is not fully implemented. Centralized logging of delayed_job activity needs to be ensured. Audit logging for sensitive job actions is missing.