Mitigation Strategy: Strict Job Argument Whitelisting and Secure Serialization
-
Description:
- Define Allowed Data Types: Create a whitelist of permissible data types and structures for job arguments passed to
delayed_job
. This might include integers, strings (with length limits), booleans, and specific, well-defined data transfer objects (DTOs) or parameter classes. - Create Parameter Classes (DTOs): For complex arguments, define dedicated classes (like the
SafeJobParams
example) that encapsulate the allowed data and perform validation upon initialization. These classes should have clearto_json
(orto_protobuf
, etc.) andfrom_json
methods for serialization and deserialization to be used withdelayed_job
. - Validate Input: Within the parameter classes' initializers and
from_json
methods, rigorously validate all input data against the whitelist. Check data types, lengths, ranges, and any other relevant constraints. Raise exceptions for invalid data. - Choose a Secure Serializer: Configure
delayed_job
to use a more secure serializer than the default YAML. Use theDelayed::Worker.serializer = :json
(or:msgpack
,:protobuf
) setting. If YAML must be used, configuredelayed_job
to useYAML.safe_load
with a strict whitelist of allowed classes. This is a directdelayed_job
configuration. - Serialize/Deserialize Consistently: Ensure that all job enqueuing uses the secure serialization method (e.g., calling
.to_json
on your parameter object and passing the result todelay(serializer: 'json')
). Ensure all jobperform
methods deserialize using the corresponding method (e.g.,SafeJobParams.from_json
). - Avoid
handle_asynchronously
with Untrusted Data: Prefer defining explicit job classes and passing only validated, serialized data todelay()
. If usinghandle_asynchronously
, restrict its use to trusted internal methods and objects with immutable, well-defined states. This directly impacts how you usedelayed_job
.
- Define Allowed Data Types: Create a whitelist of permissible data types and structures for job arguments passed to
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Code Injection / Arbitrary Code Execution (Severity: Critical): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious code into job arguments, which
delayed_job
would then execute. - Data Leakage / Information Disclosure (Severity: High/Medium): By controlling the data serialized by
delayed_job
, you reduce the risk. - Job Manipulation (Severity: Medium): Makes it harder to manipulate
delayed_job
's queue.
- Code Injection / Arbitrary Code Execution (Severity: Critical): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious code into job arguments, which
-
Impact:
- Code Injection: Risk significantly reduced (near elimination if implemented correctly).
- Data Leakage: Risk reduced.
- Job Manipulation: Risk reduced.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented: JSON serialization used in some jobs, but not consistently, and parameter validation is insufficient.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Need to create dedicated parameter classes for all jobs.
- Need to enforce strict validation in all parameter classes.
- Need to audit all uses of
handle_asynchronously
and replace them. - Need to globally configure
delayed_job
to use JSON (or another secure serializer) and ensure all jobs use it.
Mitigation Strategy: Queue Management and Job Timeouts (using delayed_job
features)
-
Description:
- Configure Queue Limits: Set maximum lengths for your
delayed_job
queues usingDelayed::Worker.max_queue_size = N
. When a queue reaches its limit,delayed_job
will raise an error, preventing further enqueuing. - Set Job Timeouts: Configure
Delayed::Worker.max_attempts = N
andDelayed::Worker.max_run_time = N
(in seconds) globally, or set them on individual jobs using themax_attempts
andmax_run_time
methods when enqueuing. This directly usesdelayed_job
's built-in features. - Use Separate Queues: Create different queues for different job types (e.g.,
Delayed::Worker.queue_attributes = { email: { priority: 10 }, data_processing: { priority: 0 } }
). Start workers with the--queue
or-q
option to assign them to specific queues (e.g.,bin/delayed_job start -q email
). This is a directdelayed_job
configuration. - Prioritize Jobs: Use
delayed_job
's priority system (thepriority
attribute, set viadelay(priority: N)
) to ensure critical jobs are processed first. This is a direct feature ofdelayed_job
.
- Configure Queue Limits: Set maximum lengths for your
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: High/Medium): Prevents attackers from overwhelming
delayed_job
with jobs.
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: High/Medium): Prevents attackers from overwhelming
-
Impact:
- DoS: Risk significantly reduced.
-
Currently Implemented:
max_attempts
is set globally.- Default queue is used.
-
Missing Implementation:
Delayed::Worker.max_queue_size
needs to be configured.Delayed::Worker.max_run_time
needs to be set appropriately.- Separate queues need to be created and workers configured.
- Job prioritization needs to be implemented using
delay(priority: N)
.
Mitigation Strategy: Job Idempotency and Expiration (using delayed_job
in conjunction with application logic)
-
Description:
- Identify Non-Idempotent Jobs: Determine which jobs have side effects that should not be repeated.
- Implement Idempotency Checks: Within your job's
perform
method (which is executed bydelayed_job
), add checks to prevent duplicate execution. This often involves database checks or using unique constraints. This is application logic within thedelayed_job
context. - Add Expiration Time (Optional): Add a custom
expires_at
column to thedelayed_jobs
table. When enqueuing a job, set this value. Within your job'sperform
method, check if the current time is pastexpires_at
before proceeding. This usesdelayed_job
's table but requires custom logic within the job. - Unique Job Identifiers (Optional): Generate a unique identifier (UUID) before enqueuing the job. Store this identifier. Within your job's
perform
method, check if the identifier has already been processed before executing. This usesdelayed_job
's execution context but requires custom logic.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Job Manipulation / Replay Attacks (Severity: Medium/Low): Prevents replaying jobs processed by
delayed_job
.
- Job Manipulation / Replay Attacks (Severity: Medium/Low): Prevents replaying jobs processed by
-
Impact:
- Job Manipulation: Risk significantly reduced.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Idempotency check in
SendWelcomeEmailJob
.
- Idempotency check in
-
Missing Implementation:
- Audit all jobs and implement idempotency checks.
- Consider adding expiration times and unique identifiers.
Mitigation Strategy: Keep delayed_job
Updated
-
Description:
- Use a Dependency Manager: Use Bundler (or another dependency manager) to manage
delayed_job
's version. - Regularly Update: Run
bundle update delayed_job
regularly. - Monitor Security Advisories: Use tools like
bundler-audit
to check for vulnerabilities indelayed_job
. - Test After Updates: Thoroughly test after updating
delayed_job
.
- Use a Dependency Manager: Use Bundler (or another dependency manager) to manage
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Vulnerabilities in
delayed_job
(Severity: Variable, potentially Critical): Addresses vulnerabilities in thedelayed_job
gem itself.
- Vulnerabilities in
-
Impact:
delayed_job
Vulnerabilities: Risk reduced.
-
Currently Implemented:
delayed_job
is managed by Bundler.
-
Missing Implementation:
- Establish a regular update schedule.
- Set up automated vulnerability scanning.
- Improve testing after updates.