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Attack Tree Analysis for ddollar/foreman

Objective: Compromise Application by Exploiting Foreman Weaknesses (Focused on High-Risk Vectors)

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Foreman (High-Risk Focus) ├───[OR]─ Procfile Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ Direct Procfile Modification [CRITICAL NODE: Procfile Modification] │ └───[AND]─ Modify Procfile to Execute Malicious Commands [CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Command Injection in Procfile] │ └───[AND]─ Inject Malicious Commands into Process Definitions │ └───[AND]─ Leverage Shell Interpretation in Process Execution ├───[OR]─ Process Control Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ Command Injection via Procfile [CRITICAL NODE: Command Injection Vulnerability in Procfile] │ └───[AND]─ Procfile Allows Unsafe Input [CRITICAL NODE: Unsafe Input in Procfile] │ └───[AND]─ Inject Malicious Commands into Process Definitions (e.g., using $(...), `...`, ;, &, etc.) │ └───[AND]─ Foreman Executes Injected Commands with Application Privileges ├───[OR]─ Environment Variable Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ Environment Variable Leakage (Information Disclosure) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[AND]─ Foreman Logs or Outputs Environment Variables [CRITICAL NODE: Logging Sensitive Environment Variables] │ └───[AND]─ Sensitive Information Stored in Environment Variables (e.g., API Keys, Passwords) [CRITICAL NODE: Secrets in Environment Variables] └───[OR]─ Configuration and Deployment Weaknesses Related to Foreman └───[OR]─ Running Foreman with Elevated Privileges [CRITICAL NODE: Foreman Running with Elevated Privileges] └───[AND]─ Exploited Process Escapes Confinement (e.g., via command injection) └───[AND]─ Attacker Gains Elevated Privileges on the System [CRITICAL NODE: System Privilege Escalation] └───[OR]─ Lack of Input Validation in Procfile Generation/Management └───[AND]─ Input Validation is Insufficient [CRITICAL NODE: Insufficient Input Validation in Procfile Generation] └───[AND]─ Resulting Procfile Contains Vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection)

Attack Tree Path: Procfile Manipulation

1. Procfile Manipulation [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the system where the Procfile is stored. This could be through:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the web application itself (e.g., file upload, remote code execution).
    • Compromising the server infrastructure (e.g., SSH brute-force, OS vulnerabilities).
    • Social engineering or insider threats.
  • Critical Node: Procfile Modification: Once access is gained, the attacker directly modifies the Procfile.
  • Critical Node: Malicious Command Injection in Procfile: The attacker injects malicious commands into process definitions within the Procfile. This is achieved by:
    • Adding new process definitions that execute malicious code.
    • Modifying existing process definitions to include malicious commands, often leveraging shell features.
  • Impact: Critical. Successful Procfile manipulation allows the attacker to:
    • Execute arbitrary code on the server with the privileges of the application processes.
    • Gain persistent access to the application and potentially the underlying system.
    • Steal sensitive data, modify application behavior, or cause complete system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Process Control Exploitation

2. Process Control Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The Procfile is designed or constructed in a way that allows for command injection vulnerabilities. This happens when:
    • The Procfile uses dynamic input (e.g., environment variables, user-provided data) in process definitions without proper sanitization or validation.
    • Shell interpretation features (backticks, $(...), etc.) are used in process definitions with untrusted input.
  • Critical Node: Command Injection Vulnerability in Procfile: A vulnerability exists in how the Procfile is constructed, allowing for command injection.
  • Critical Node: Unsafe Input in Procfile: The Procfile accepts and uses input that is not properly validated or sanitized, creating an injection point.
  • Impact: Critical. Command injection via Procfile allows the attacker to:
    • Execute arbitrary commands on the server with the privileges of the application processes.
    • Bypass application security controls.
    • Potentially escalate privileges if the application processes run with elevated permissions.
    • Steal data, modify application behavior, or disrupt services.

Attack Tree Path: Environment Variable Leakage (Information Disclosure)

3. Environment Variable Exploitation - Leakage [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Sensitive information, such as API keys, database passwords, or other credentials, is stored in environment variables.
  • Critical Node: Secrets in Environment Variables: The application relies on environment variables to store sensitive secrets.
  • Critical Node: Logging Sensitive Environment Variables: Foreman or the application logging mechanisms inadvertently log or output these environment variables. This can occur in:
    • Application logs (e.g., during startup, error messages).
    • Foreman logs or output (e.g., during process start, debugging).
    • Error reporting systems that capture environment variables.
  • Impact: Medium to High. Environment variable leakage leads to:
    • Information disclosure of sensitive credentials.
    • Potential unauthorized access to external services or internal systems if leaked credentials are compromised.
    • Damage to reputation and trust if sensitive data is exposed.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration and Deployment Weaknesses - Elevated Privileges

4. Configuration and Deployment Weaknesses - Elevated Privileges [CRITICAL NODE: Foreman Running with Elevated Privileges]

  • Attack Vector: Foreman is mistakenly configured to run with elevated privileges (e.g., as root user).
  • Critical Node: Foreman Running with Elevated Privileges: The Foreman process itself runs with root or highly privileged user permissions.
  • Critical Node: System Privilege Escalation: If any process managed by Foreman is then exploited (e.g., through command injection), the attacker can leverage Foreman's elevated privileges to escalate their own privileges to root or system level.
  • Impact: Critical. Running Foreman with elevated privileges significantly amplifies the impact of other vulnerabilities, leading to:
    • Full system compromise if a process managed by Foreman is exploited.
    • Unrestricted access to all system resources and data.
    • Complete control over the server.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration and Deployment Weaknesses - Insufficient Input Validation in Procfile Generation

5. Configuration and Deployment Weaknesses - Insufficient Input Validation in Procfile Generation [CRITICAL NODE: Insufficient Input Validation in Procfile Generation]

  • Attack Vector: In complex deployment pipelines, the Procfile might be generated dynamically based on user input or configuration data.
  • Critical Node: Insufficient Input Validation in Procfile Generation: The system responsible for generating the Procfile lacks proper input validation and sanitization.
  • Impact: High. Insufficient input validation in Procfile generation can lead to:
    • Introduction of vulnerabilities (like command injection) directly into the generated Procfile.
    • Automated creation of insecure configurations.
    • Widespread vulnerability across deployments if the flawed generation process is used repeatedly.