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Attack Tree Analysis for ddollar/foreman

Objective: Gain unauthorized control over the application's processes or the underlying host system by exploiting Foreman's process management capabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Gain Unauthorized Control (via Foreman)
                                                |
      -------------------------------------------------------------------------
      |																											 |
  1. Manipulate Procfile/Environment 1.4 Supply Malicious Input | to Application... ------------------------ | | | | | 1.1 1.2 1.3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inject Malicious | | Commands via .env [!] | | | Modify Procfile to | Run Arbitrary Commands [!] | Gain Access to Procfile/Environment [!] (e.g., via Git, CI/CD, Shared Config)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Manipulate Procfile/Environment

  • 1.1 Gain Access to Procfile/Environment [!] (Critical Node):

    • Description: The attacker obtains unauthorized access to the Procfile and/or .env files, which define the processes and environment variables managed by Foreman. This is the prerequisite for the most dangerous attacks.
    • Methods:
      • Compromised Git Repository: Gaining access to the application's source code repository (e.g., through stolen credentials, misconfigured access controls, or a compromised developer workstation).
      • Insecure CI/CD Pipeline: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the CI/CD pipeline (e.g., weak service account credentials, exposed secrets, or insecure pipeline configurations) to access or modify these files.
      • Shared Configuration Files: Accessing improperly secured shared configuration files (e.g., on a network share or in a shared development environment) that contain the Procfile or .env contents.
      • Server Compromise: Gaining direct access to the server where the application is running (e.g., through a web application vulnerability, SSH brute-forcing, or other means) and accessing the files directly.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

  • 1.2 Modify Procfile to Run Arbitrary Commands [!] (Critical Node):

    • Description: After gaining access to the Procfile, the attacker modifies it to execute arbitrary commands when Foreman starts or restarts the associated process. This gives the attacker direct control over the application and potentially the host.
    • Methods:
      • Replacing legitimate commands with malicious ones (e.g., changing web: bundle exec rails server to web: /bin/bash -c "malicious_command").
      • Adding new processes to the Procfile that execute malicious commands.
    • Likelihood: High (Once 1.1 is achieved)
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

  • 1.3 Inject Malicious Commands via .env [!] (Critical Node):

    • Description: The attacker modifies the .env file to inject malicious commands or manipulate environment variables in a way that leads to command injection or other vulnerabilities within the application.
    • Methods:
      • Adding new environment variables that are used insecurely by the application (e.g., constructing shell commands without proper sanitization).
      • Modifying existing environment variables to contain malicious values.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Supply Malicious Input to Application (Leading to 1.2 or 1.3)

  • Description: The attacker provides malicious input to the web application. This input, due to a vulnerability in the application, is then used to modify the Procfile or .env file. This is an indirect attack, relying on a pre-existing application vulnerability.
    • Methods:
      • Exploiting a command injection vulnerability in the application where user input is used to construct shell commands that modify the Procfile or .env.
      • Exploiting a file inclusion vulnerability where user input can specify a file path, allowing the attacker to include a malicious Procfile or .env.
      • Exploiting any other application vulnerability that allows the attacker to influence the content of these configuration files.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium
    • Impact: High to Very High
    • Effort: Medium to High
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium