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Threat Model Analysis for ddollar/foreman

Threat: Procfile Injection

  • Threat: Procfile Injection

    • Description: An attacker with write access to the Procfile modifies it to execute arbitrary commands. The attacker adds a new process type or alters an existing one, specifying a malicious script or binary to be run by Foreman. This leverages Foreman's core functionality of executing commands defined in the Procfile.
    • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker gains code execution with the privileges of the user running Foreman. This can lead to data theft, data destruction, malware installation, or further network attacks.
    • Foreman Component Affected: Foreman's Procfile parsing and process execution logic. Specifically, the functions responsible for reading the Procfile, interpreting its contents, and spawning child processes.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Filesystem Permissions: Enforce strict filesystem permissions on the Procfile. Only the application user (and never root) should have write access.
      • Version Control & Code Review: Use version control (e.g., Git) and require code reviews for all changes to the Procfile.
      • Read-Only Filesystem: If feasible, mount the application directory (including the Procfile) as read-only in production.
      • Regular Audits: Periodically review the Procfile for unexpected changes.

Threat: Environment Variable Manipulation (Leading to Indirect Code Execution via Foreman)

  • Threat: Environment Variable Manipulation (Leading to Indirect Code Execution via Foreman)

    • Description: While environment variable manipulation itself isn't solely a Foreman issue, if an application uses environment variables unsafely within commands executed by Foreman, this becomes a Foreman-specific threat. An attacker modifies environment variables loaded by Foreman (from .env files or command-line arguments) to inject malicious values that are then used within a command defined in the Procfile. For example, if the Procfile contains web: bundle exec rails server -p $PORT, and the attacker can control $PORT to be something like 3000; malicious_command, this becomes a Foreman-specific injection vulnerability.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running Foreman, potentially leading to complete system compromise. The impact is similar to Procfile injection, but the attack vector is through environment variables used within the Procfile commands.
    • Foreman Component Affected: Foreman's environment loading mechanism in conjunction with its process execution logic. The vulnerability arises from how Foreman combines environment variables with the commands defined in the Procfile.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on how environment variables are used in Procfile commands)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secrets Management: Never store secrets in .env files or command-line arguments. Use a dedicated secrets management solution.
      • .env File Protection: If using .env files, ensure they are not committed to version control and have strict filesystem permissions.
      • Application-Level Sanitization: Crucially, within the application code and especially within the Procfile commands, never directly use environment variables in shell commands or other potentially unsafe contexts without rigorous sanitization and validation. Treat environment variables as untrusted input. Use parameterized commands or shell escaping functions to prevent injection. This is the most important mitigation.
      • Regular Audits: Review both environment variables and Procfile commands for potential injection vulnerabilities.