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Attack Tree Analysis for drapergem/draper

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Access Unauthorized Data (via Draper)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     Attacker's Goal:
                      Execute Arbitrary Code OR Access Unauthorized Data
                                     (via Draper)
                                            |
                      -----------------------------------------------------
                      |                                                   |
        1.  Exploit Decorator Logic Flaws                    2.  Bypass Decorator Authorization/Access Control
                      |  [HIGH RISK]                                     |
        -----------------------------                       ---------------------------------
        |                                                                 |
1.1  Input                                                       2.3  Misconfigured
Validation                                                      `allows` or `denies` [HIGH RISK]
Bypass in                                                                 |
Decorator*                                                                |
        |  [HIGH RISK]                                                       |
1.1.1  Craft                                                       2.3.1 Incorrectly*
Malicious*                                                          Delegating Sensitive
Input to                                                            Methods
Trigger
Logic Error*

Attack Tree Path: Path 1: Exploit Decorator Logic Flaws [HIGH RISK]

  • 1. Exploit Decorator Logic Flaws:

    • Description: The attacker aims to find and exploit vulnerabilities within the Ruby code of the Draper decorators. This is the root of the high-risk path related to logic errors.
    • Criticality: This is a critical node because it's the entry point for a major class of attacks.

  • 1.1 Input Validation Bypass in Decorator:

    • Description: The attacker attempts to bypass input validation checks within the decorator itself. This is crucial because even if the model has validations, the decorator might introduce new vulnerabilities if it processes user input without its own checks.
    • Criticality: This is a critical node because successful exploitation often directly leads to the attacker's goal. It's the most direct and common path to compromise.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 1.1.1 Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Logic Error:

    • Description: The attacker crafts specific, malicious input designed to cause unexpected behavior in the decorator's methods. This could involve:
      • Injecting special characters.
      • Providing excessively long strings.
      • Using unexpected data types.
      • Supplying values outside expected ranges.
      • Exploiting type confusion vulnerabilities.
    • Criticality: This is a critical sub-node as it represents the method of achieving the input validation bypass.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Example: If a decorator has a method that concatenates user-supplied strings without checking for length, an attacker could provide an extremely long string, potentially causing a denial-of-service or buffer overflow.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement strict input validation within the decorator for all data received from views or potentially influenced by user input.
      • Use whitelisting (allowing only known-good input) instead of blacklisting (blocking known-bad input) whenever possible.
      • Sanitize all user input before using it in any operation, especially string manipulation or database queries.
      • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements to prevent SQL injection.
      • Escape output properly to prevent XSS (Cross-Site Scripting).

  • 1.1.2 Leverage Unintended Decorator Helpers:

    • Description: If a decorator uses helper methods (Rails helpers or custom helpers) in an insecure way, an attacker might be able to exploit this.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
    • Example: If a decorator uses raw or html_safe on user-supplied data without proper sanitization, it could lead to XSS.
    • Mitigation:
      • Carefully review the use of any helper methods within decorators.
      • Avoid raw and html_safe unless absolutely necessary, and always sanitize user input before using them.
      • Use secure-by-default helpers whenever possible.

Attack Tree Path: Path 2: Bypass Decorator Authorization/Access Control [HIGH RISK]

  • 2. Bypass Decorator Authorization/Access Control:

    • Description: The attacker attempts to circumvent the authorization mechanisms provided by Draper (e.g., allows, denies, decorates_finders) to gain access to data or functionality they shouldn't have.

  • 2.3 Misconfigured allows or denies:

    • Description: The attacker exploits incorrect configurations of the allows and denies methods, which control access to decorator methods.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 2.3.1 Incorrectly Delegating Sensitive Methods:

    • Description: This is a specific, high-impact instance of misconfiguration. A method that should be protected (e.g., one that modifies data or exposes sensitive information) is accidentally exposed via allows or a missing denies rule.
    • Criticality: This is a critical sub-node because it directly exposes a sensitive operation.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Example: A decorator for a User model might have a method called update_admin_status. If this method is accidentally included in the allows list or not explicitly denied, an attacker could potentially elevate their privileges.
    • Mitigation:
      • Prefer using denies to explicitly block access to sensitive methods. This is a more secure approach than relying on allows to implicitly deny access.
      • Regularly review the allows and denies configurations in your decorators.
      • Write tests specifically to verify that the allows and denies rules are working as expected.
      • Follow the principle of least privilege: only expose the minimum necessary functionality.