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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for heartcombo/devise

Attack Surface: Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks on Login

  • Description: Attackers repeatedly try different username/password combinations to gain unauthorized access.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise provides the core authentication mechanism (DatabaseAuthenticatable), making it a direct target.
    • Example: An attacker uses a list of common passwords and attempts to log in to multiple user accounts.
    • Impact: Unauthorized account access, data theft, data modification, potential system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Implement strong password policies (minimum length, complexity requirements).
        • Use Devise's Lockable module to lock accounts after a certain number of failed login attempts.
        • Implement rate limiting to slow down login attempts from a single IP address.
        • Consider CAPTCHA or other bot detection mechanisms.
        • Use a strong pepper and sufficient stretches in Devise configuration.
      • Users:
        • Use strong, unique passwords.
        • Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) if available (requires integration with Devise).

Attack Surface: Password Reset Token Brute-Forcing/Prediction

  • Description: Attackers attempt to guess or predict password reset tokens to gain control of user accounts.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise's Recoverable module handles password reset functionality, generating and managing tokens.
    • Example: An attacker uses a script to generate and test thousands of potential reset tokens against a known user account.
    • Impact: Unauthorized account access, data theft, data modification.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Ensure Devise is configured to generate sufficiently long and cryptographically random reset tokens.
        • Set a short expiration time for reset tokens.
        • Implement rate limiting on password reset requests.
        • Use constant-time comparison methods when validating tokens.
      • Users:
        • Be cautious of suspicious emails and only click password reset links from trusted sources.

Attack Surface: Session Hijacking/Fixation (related to Rememberable)

  • Description: Attackers steal or manipulate session cookies to impersonate legitimate users.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise's Rememberable module uses cookies to maintain persistent login sessions.
    • Example: An attacker intercepts a user's "remember me" cookie over an insecure connection (HTTP) and uses it to access the user's account.
    • Impact: Unauthorized account access, data theft, data modification.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Ensure Devise is configured to use secure cookies (HTTPS only, HTTPOnly flag).
        • Properly regenerate session IDs after login to prevent session fixation.
        • Consider implementing session expiration and inactivity timeouts.
      • Users:
        • Avoid using public Wi-Fi networks without a VPN.
        • Log out of accounts when finished, especially on shared computers.

Attack Surface: OAuth-Related Attacks (via Omniauthable)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in OAuth providers or the application's OAuth integration.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise's Omniauthable module facilitates integration with third-party OAuth providers.
    • Example: An attacker uses a compromised OAuth provider account to gain access to the application. Or, an attacker manipulates the callback URL to redirect the user to a malicious site after authentication.
    • Impact: Unauthorized account access, data theft, data modification, potential for phishing.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Carefully choose reputable OAuth providers.
        • Validate the callback URL to prevent open redirects.
        • Implement CSRF protection in the OAuth flow.
        • Request only the necessary permissions (scopes) from the OAuth provider.
        • Store OAuth tokens securely.
        • Keep Omniauth and related gems updated.
      • Users:
        • Be cautious when granting permissions to applications via OAuth.
        • Review the permissions requested by applications.

Attack Surface: Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Attackers manipulate user data (e.g., elevate privileges) by submitting unexpected parameters during registration or account updates.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise interacts with the user model, making it susceptible if the model is not properly protected.
    • Example: An attacker adds admin=true to the registration form data, attempting to create an administrator account.
    • Impact: Unauthorized privilege escalation, data corruption, system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Use strong parameters (Rails >= 4) or attr_accessible (Rails < 4) to explicitly whitelist the attributes that can be modified through mass assignment. Never trust user-provided input without proper sanitization and whitelisting.
      • Users: No direct user mitigation.

Attack Surface: Open Redirect

  • Description: Attackers can redirect users to malicious websites after sign-in/sign-out.
    • Devise Contribution: Devise uses redirects after sign-in/sign-out.
    • Example: Attacker crafts a URL with a malicious redirect parameter: https://example.com/users/sign_in?redirect_to=https://evil.com.
    • Impact: Phishing attacks, malware distribution.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Validate and sanitize the redirect_to parameter.
        • Use a whitelist of allowed redirect URLs.
        • Avoid using user-supplied input directly in redirects.
      • Users:
        • Be cautious of suspicious URLs, especially those with unusual parameters.