Attack Surface: Compromised Cask Formula Repository
- Description: The official or third-party repositories hosting Homebrew Cask formulas are compromised, allowing attackers to inject malicious formulas.
- Homebrew Cask Contribution: Cask directly relies on these repositories to fetch and utilize formula definitions for application installation. A compromised repository directly leads to Cask using malicious data.
- Example: Attackers compromise the
homebrew/cask
GitHub repository and modify the formula for a widely used application like "Slack" to download a trojanized version. Users runningbrew install slack
will unknowingly install malware through Cask. - Impact: Large-scale malware distribution, supply chain attacks targeting developers, potential data breaches and widespread system compromise across development environments.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Formula Source Auditing: Regularly monitor official and any used third-party repositories for unexpected or suspicious changes in formulas.
- Repository Integrity Checks: If utilizing custom or third-party repositories, implement integrity checks and strict access controls to minimize the risk of compromise.
- Formula Review Process: Implement a mandatory review process for cask formulas, especially for critical development tools, before allowing their use within the development environment. Focus on verifying formula legitimacy and source.
- Prioritize Official Repositories: Primarily rely on the official
homebrew/cask
repository and exercise extreme caution and thorough vetting before using any third-party repositories.
Attack Surface: Malicious Cask Formula Injection/Manipulation (Local)
- Description: An attacker gains unauthorized write access to the local Homebrew Cask formula directory on a developer's machine, enabling them to modify existing formulas or introduce new malicious ones.
- Homebrew Cask Contribution: Homebrew Cask directly reads and executes formula files from the local file system. Local write access allows attackers to directly manipulate the instructions Cask will follow.
- Example: After gaining access to a developer's workstation, an attacker modifies the locally stored formula for "google-chrome" to include a
postflight
script that installs a persistent backdoor. Subsequently, when the developer upgrades or reinstalls Chrome via Cask, the backdoor is silently installed. - Impact: Local system compromise, potential privilege escalation if malicious scripts are crafted to exploit installation processes, persistent malware installation allowing long-term access, and potential data theft from the compromised development machine.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Secure User Accounts: Enforce strong passwords, implement multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct regular security audits of developer accounts to prevent unauthorized access.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict user privileges to limit unauthorized write access to sensitive system directories, including the Homebrew Cask formula storage locations.
- File System Monitoring and Integrity Checks: Implement file integrity monitoring systems to detect and alert on unauthorized modifications to Homebrew Cask formula files.
- Regular Security Scans: Conduct routine malware scans on development machines to proactively detect any injected malicious formulas or payloads that might have been introduced locally.
Attack Surface: Malicious Post-Installation Scripts in Cask Formulas
- Description: Cask formulas can contain embedded scripts, such as
postflight
hooks, that are executed after the application download and installation. Attackers can inject malicious code into these scripts within compromised formulas.- Homebrew Cask Contribution: Homebrew Cask is designed to execute scripts defined within formulas as part of the installation process. This functionality, while intended for legitimate setup tasks, can be abused to execute arbitrary code.
- Example: A compromised Cask formula for a seemingly benign developer utility includes a malicious
postflight
script. This script, upon execution by Cask during installation, downloads and runs a second-stage payload from a remote server, establishing a reverse shell and granting the attacker persistent access to the developer's machine. - Impact: Privilege escalation if scripts are run with elevated permissions, persistent malware installation allowing long-term control, full system compromise, and potential data exfiltration from the development environment.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Formula Review and Script Auditing: Thoroughly review the contents of Cask formulas, paying particular attention to
postflight
,preflight
, and other script sections. Scrutinize for any suspicious, obfuscated, or unexpected code. - Script Execution Monitoring and Logging: Implement monitoring and logging of script executions during Cask installations to detect and investigate any unusual or unauthorized activities.
- Principle of Least Privilege (for
brew cask install
): Avoid runningbrew cask install
withsudo
unless absolutely necessary. Understand that usingsudo
will cause scripts within the formula to execute with elevated privileges, increasing the potential damage from malicious scripts. - Security Sandboxing or Containerization (Advanced): For enhanced security, explore using security sandboxing or containerization technologies to isolate Cask installations. This can limit the potential impact of malicious scripts by restricting their access to the host system.
- Formula Review and Script Auditing: Thoroughly review the contents of Cask formulas, paying particular attention to