Objective: Compromise Application using Homebrew Cask
Compromise Application via Homebrew Cask
├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Cask Repository Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK] Compromise Homebrew Cask Repository Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Gain Access to Repository Servers [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Server Vulnerabilities (e.g., outdated software, misconfigurations)
│ │ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Social Engineering/Phishing Repository Admins
│ │ └───[OR] Compromise Repository Git Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Compromise Maintainer Accounts (e.g., stolen credentials, social engineering)
│ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Introduce Malicious Cask Definition
│ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK] Successfully Merge Malicious Cask PR
│ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Create Malicious Cask Definition (backdoor, malware, etc.)
│ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Bypass Code Review Process (e.g., social engineering reviewers, subtle malicious code)
│ └───[AND] Compromise Existing Cask Definition
│ └─── Modify Existing Cask Definition to point to malicious resources (Implicitly High-Risk due to Repository Compromise)
├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Cask Download Source Vulnerabilities
│ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK] Compromise Upstream Download Server
│ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Vulnerabilities on Upstream Server (hosting application/dependency downloads)
│ │ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Replace legitimate download file with malicious file
│ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Cask Definition already points to a malicious URL (due to previous repository compromise or malicious cask creation)
│ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] User unknowingly installs a cask from an untrusted/malicious source (less likely with official repo, more relevant for custom taps)
├───[OR] Exploit Local Cask Installation Process Vulnerabilities
│ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Privilege Escalation during Installation [CRITICAL NODE]
│ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Exploit vulnerabilities in scripts or processes run with elevated privileges during installation (e.g., insecure scripts in `.pkg`, `.dmg`, post-install scripts) [CRITICAL NODE]
│ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Gain root access or elevated privileges on the user's system [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Social Engineering User to Install Malicious Cask
│ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK] Create a Malicious Cask (or modify an existing one in a custom tap)
│ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Develop a cask that appears legitimate but contains malicious components
│ └───[AND] [HIGH-RISK] Trick User into Installing the Malicious Cask
│ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Phishing emails or messages with instructions to install the malicious cask
│ ├─── [HIGH-RISK] Misleading website or documentation suggesting installation of the malicious cask
│ └─── [HIGH-RISK] Social engineering to convince user to add a malicious tap and install from it
└───[OR] Supply Chain Attacks via Cask Dependencies
└───[OR] [HIGH-RISK] Compromise Upstream Dependency Repository (if dependencies are fetched from external repositories via Cask) [CRITICAL NODE]
├─── [HIGH-RISK] Compromise these upstream dependency repositories (similar to compromising Cask repository) [CRITICAL NODE]
└─── [HIGH-RISK] Inject malicious code into dependencies that are then installed by Cask
Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Cask Repository Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vectors: * Compromise Homebrew Cask Repository Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]: * Gain Access to Repository Servers [CRITICAL NODE]: * Exploit Server Vulnerabilities: Target vulnerabilities in servers hosting the repository (e.g., outdated software, misconfigurations). * Social Engineering/Phishing Repository Admins: Trick repository administrators into revealing credentials or granting unauthorized access. * Compromise Repository Git Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]: * Compromise Maintainer Accounts: Steal maintainer credentials (e.g., via credential stuffing, phishing, malware) to gain write access to the repository. * Introduce Malicious Cask Definition: * Successfully Merge Malicious Cask PR: * Create Malicious Cask Definition: Develop a cask definition containing malicious code (backdoor, malware, etc.). * Bypass Code Review Process: Subvert or evade the code review process to get the malicious cask merged into the repository (e.g., social engineering reviewers, subtle malicious code). * Compromise Existing Cask Definition: * Modify Existing Cask Definition: After gaining write access to the repository (via infrastructure or account compromise), modify an existing cask definition to point to malicious download resources.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Cask Download Source Vulnerabilities
Attack Vectors: * Compromise Upstream Download Server: * Exploit Vulnerabilities on Upstream Server: Identify and exploit vulnerabilities on the server hosting the application or dependency downloads specified in the cask definition. * Replace legitimate download file: Once the upstream server is compromised, replace the legitimate application/dependency download file with a malicious file. * Cask Definition already points to a malicious URL: * Exploit a cask definition that, due to previous repository compromise or malicious cask creation, already points to a malicious download URL. * User unknowingly installs a cask from an untrusted/malicious source: * Trick users into adding and using a malicious or compromised custom tap, and then installing a cask from that untrusted source.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Privilege Escalation during Installation [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vectors:
* Exploit vulnerabilities in scripts or processes run with elevated privileges during installation [CRITICAL NODE]:
* Identify and exploit vulnerabilities within installer scripts (e.g., in .pkg, .dmg, post-install scripts) that are executed with elevated privileges (often via sudo) during cask installation. This could include command injection, path traversal, or insecure file handling within these scripts.
* Gain root access or elevated privileges on the user's system [CRITICAL NODE]:
* Successfully leverage vulnerabilities in installer scripts to escalate privileges to root or administrator level on the user's system.
Attack Tree Path: 4. Social Engineering User to Install Malicious Cask
Attack Vectors: * Create a Malicious Cask (or modify an existing one in a custom tap): * Develop a cask definition that appears legitimate but contains malicious components (backdoor, malware, spyware, etc.). * Trick User into Installing the Malicious Cask: * Phishing emails or messages: Send phishing emails or messages containing instructions to install the malicious cask, often disguised as a legitimate application or update. * Misleading website or documentation: Create fake websites or documentation that promote the installation of the malicious cask, mimicking legitimate sources. * Social engineering to convince user to add a malicious tap and install from it: Persuade users through social engineering tactics to add a malicious custom tap to their Homebrew Cask setup and then install a cask from that tap.
Attack Tree Path: 5. Supply Chain Attacks via Cask Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]
Attack Vectors: * Compromise Upstream Dependency Repository [CRITICAL NODE]: * Identify external repositories from which casks fetch dependencies. * Compromise these upstream dependency repositories using methods similar to compromising the main Homebrew Cask repository (e.g., server vulnerabilities, maintainer account compromise). * Inject malicious code into dependencies that are then installed by Cask: * Once an upstream dependency repository is compromised, inject malicious code into dependencies hosted there. This malicious code will then be installed on users' systems when they install casks that rely on these compromised dependencies.