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Attack Tree Analysis for imathis/octopress

Objective: Compromise application using Octopress by exploiting weaknesses within Octopress itself (Focus on High-Risk Paths).

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Octopress Application [CRITICAL NODE]

└─── 1. Exploit Octopress-Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├─── 1.1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Octopress Core/Jekyll
    │    └─── 1.1.1.2. Exploit Outdated Octopress/Jekyll Versions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │
    ├─── 1.2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Octopress Plugins/Themes [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    ├─── 1.2.1.2. Check for Known Vulnerabilities in Used Plugins/Themes [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    │    └─── 1.2.1.2.2. Version Tracking and Known Vulnerability Lookups [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │    └─── 1.2.2. Exploit Identified Plugin/Theme Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │         └─── 1.2.2.1. Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Vulnerability (e.g., XSS payload in comment plugin) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │
    ├─── 1.3. Exploit Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    ├─── 1.3.1. Misconfigured Octopress Setup [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    │    └─── 1.3.1.1. Exposed `.git` directory [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │    │         ├─── 1.3.1.1.1. Access Configuration Files (e.g., `_config.yml`, deployment scripts) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │    │         └─── 1.3.1.1.2. Extract Sensitive Information (API keys, credentials) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │    │    └─── 1.3.1.2. Insecure Deployment Configuration
    │    │         └─── 1.3.1.2.1. Weak Deployment Credentials (SSH keys, API tokens) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │    └─── 1.3.2. Default/Weak Credentials (Less applicable to Octopress itself, but consider related services)
    │         └─── 1.3.2.1. Default credentials for hosting platform or related services [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │
    └─── 1.5. Supply Chain Attacks [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2. Exploit Outdated Octopress/Jekyll Versions

Attack Vector: Attackers identify the Octopress/Jekyll version used by the application. If it's outdated, they research publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs, security advisories) for that version. They then use readily available exploit code to compromise the application.

  • Risk Factors: High likelihood due to common neglect of software updates. Medium to High impact as vulnerabilities can range from defacement to data exfiltration. Low effort and skill required as exploits are often publicly available.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2.2. Version Tracking and Known Vulnerability Lookups -> 1.2.2. Exploit Identified Plugin/Theme Vulnerabilities -> 1.2.2.1. Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Vulnerability (e.g., XSS payload in comment plugin)

Attack Vector: Attackers identify the plugins and themes used by the Octopress application and their versions. They then check for known vulnerabilities associated with these versions in security databases or advisories. If vulnerabilities are found (e.g., XSS in a comment plugin), they craft malicious input (e.g., an XSS payload in a comment) to trigger the vulnerability and compromise website visitors' browsers.

  • Risk Factors: Medium likelihood as plugin/theme vulnerabilities are common. Medium impact, typically XSS leading to defacement, session hijacking, or malware distribution. Low to Medium effort and skill required to find and exploit known plugin/theme vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.1. Exposed .git directory -> 1.3.1.1.1. Access Configuration Files -> 1.3.1.1.2. Extract Sensitive Information

Attack Vector: Attackers discover that the .git directory is publicly accessible on the deployed Octopress application (e.g., by trying to access .git/config in a browser). They then access configuration files within the .git directory (like _config.yml, deployment scripts) to extract sensitive information such as API keys, database credentials, or deployment credentials.

  • Risk Factors: Medium likelihood as this is a common misconfiguration, especially for beginners. High impact as exposed credentials can lead to full compromise of the application and related infrastructure. Very low effort and skill required, simply accessing files through a web browser.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1.2.1. Weak Deployment Credentials (SSH keys, API tokens)

Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to compromise deployment credentials (SSH keys, API tokens) used to update the Octopress application. This could be through brute-force attacks on weak passwords, social engineering, or by exploiting vulnerabilities in related systems where credentials are stored. Once compromised, attackers can replace the entire website with malicious content.

  • Risk Factors: Low to Medium likelihood depending on the organization's security practices for credential management. Critical impact as successful compromise grants full control over website deployment. Low to Medium effort and skill, depending on the strength of the credentials and attack method.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2.1. Default credentials for hosting platform or related services

Attack Vector: Attackers try default or common credentials for hosting platforms, databases, or other services related to the Octopress application. If default credentials are still in use, attackers gain unauthorized access to these services, potentially leading to full compromise of the hosting environment and the Octopress application.

  • Risk Factors: Low to Medium likelihood depending on user security awareness and hosting provider security. High to Critical impact as access to hosting accounts can lead to complete compromise. Very low effort and skill required, simply trying default usernames and passwords.