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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for imathis/octopress

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities (Gems)

  • Description: Exploitable weaknesses in Ruby Gems used by Octopress.
  • Octopress Contribution: Octopress's reliance on a defined set of Gems (Jekyll, plugins, etc.) in its Gemfile creates this vulnerability. The specific versions and interdependencies are crucial.
  • Example: A known CVE in an older version of a Gem like kramdown (Markdown parser) allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code during the build by crafting a malicious Markdown document.
  • Impact: Compromise of the build environment, injection of malicious code into the generated site, potential data exfiltration.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific Gem vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Regularly run bundle update. Use bundler-audit (or similar) to scan for vulnerabilities. Pin Gem versions to known-good releases in Gemfile (balance security with updates). Consider a Gem dependency proxy. Review Gemfile and Gemfile.lock.
    • Users (if building locally): Follow the same practices as developers. Keep your Ruby and Gem environment updated.

Attack Surface: Plugin Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws in Octopress/Jekyll plugins, especially third-party ones.
  • Octopress Contribution: Octopress's plugin architecture allows for extensibility, directly introducing the risk of using vulnerable or malicious plugins.
  • Example: A poorly written plugin processing user data (even for static comments) without proper sanitization could be vulnerable to XSS, injecting malicious JavaScript during the build.
  • Impact: Code injection, data breaches, potential compromise of the build environment.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the plugin and vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Thoroughly vet all third-party plugins (code review, reputation, updates). Minimize plugin usage. Regularly update plugins. Consider sandboxing the build environment (e.g., Docker).
    • Users: If installing plugins, follow the same precautions as developers.

Attack Surface: Configuration File Exposure (_config.yml)

  • Description: Accidental exposure of sensitive information in Octopress configuration files.
  • Octopress Contribution: Octopress uses _config.yml and similar files for site settings. Direct web access to these files leaks sensitive data.
  • Example: A misconfigured web server allows direct access to /_config.yml, revealing API keys or other secrets.
  • Impact: Leakage of API keys, deployment credentials, leading to unauthorized access to services or the deployment environment.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Configure the web server to deny access to files starting with _ and specific directories (_includes, _layouts, _plugins). Store sensitive data in environment variables, not in _config.yml. Use a .env file and dotenv for local development.
    • Users: Ensure your web server is properly configured. Verify security settings with your hosting provider.

Attack Surface: Build Process Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker gaining control of the Octopress build process to inject malicious code.
  • Octopress Contribution: The Octopress build process (using rake and Ruby) is the direct target. Compromising this process allows complete control over the output.
  • Example: An attacker compromises a developer's workstation and modifies the Rakefile to include a malicious payload in the generated HTML.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the generated static site; the attacker can inject arbitrary code.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Secure the build environment (strong passwords, MFA, updated software). Use a dedicated, isolated build server (CI/CD). Implement code signing. Monitor build logs.
    • Users: If building locally, follow the same security practices as developers for your workstation.