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Attack Tree Analysis for imathis/octopress

Objective: Compromise Octopress-powered Website

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Octopress-powered Website ├── 1. Exploit Octopress Core Vulnerabilities │ ├── 1.1. Vulnerable Ruby Gems (Dependencies) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Identify outdated/vulnerable gems in Gemfile/Gemfile.lock │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Exploit known vulnerabilities in identified gems │ │ └── 1.1.3. Achieve RCE/Data Exfiltration/Content Manipulation via gem exploit [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3. Vulnerabilities in Octopress Plugins/Themes [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.3.1. Identify installed plugins/themes │ ├── 1.3.2. Analyze plugin/theme code for vulnerabilities │ └── 1.3.3. Exploit vulnerabilities in plugins/themes [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Exploit Octopress Configuration Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 2.1. Default/Weak Credentials │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Check for default deployment keys/secrets in _config.yml │ │ ├── 2.1.2. Attempt to use default credentials to access deployment targets │ │ └── 2.1.3. Gain unauthorized access to deployment infrastructure [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.2. Sensitive Information Exposure [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 2.2.1. Check _config.yml for exposed API keys, passwords, or other secrets │ │ ├── 2.2.2. Search source code and generated output for accidentally committed secrets │ │ └── 2.2.3. Use exposed secrets to access external services or escalate privileges [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.3. Misconfigured Deployment Settings │ │ ├── 2.3.1. Analyze _config.yml for insecure deployment methods (e.g., unencrypted Rsync) │ │ ├── 2.3.2. Intercept deployment traffic to steal credentials or inject malicious code │ │ └── 2.3.3. Compromise the server via insecure deployment [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Exploit Octopress Usage Patterns [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 3.1. Unpatched Octopress Installations │ │ ├── 3.1.1. Identify outdated Octopress versions (e.g., by analyzing generated HTML/CSS) │ │ ├── 3.1.2. Exploit known vulnerabilities in older Octopress versions │ │ └── 3.1.3. Achieve RCE/Data Exfiltration/Content Manipulation [CRITICAL] │ ├── 3.2. Lack of Source Code Management Best Practices [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 3.2.1. Check for publicly accessible .git repositories │ │ ├── 3.2.2. Download the .git repository to access the entire source code history │ │ ├── 3.2.3. Find sensitive information or vulnerabilities in past commits │ │ └── 3.2.4. Use information from .git to craft targeted attacks [CRITICAL] │ ├── 3.3. Inclusion of Sensitive Data in Source │ ├── 3.3.1. Search source files for hardcoded credentials, API keys, or other secrets │ └── 3.3.2. Use exposed secrets to access external services or escalate privileges [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Octopress Core Vulnerabilities

1.1. Vulnerable Ruby Gems (Dependencies) [HIGH-RISK] * Description: Octopress relies on various Ruby gems (libraries). If these gems have known vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit them to compromise the website. * Steps: 1. 1.1.1. Identify outdated/vulnerable gems: The attacker uses tools like bundler-audit or manually inspects the Gemfile and Gemfile.lock to find outdated or vulnerable gems. 2. 1.1.2. Exploit known vulnerabilities: The attacker searches for public exploits (e.g., on Exploit-DB or Metasploit) or crafts custom exploits based on the vulnerability details. 3. 1.1.3. Achieve RCE/Data Exfiltration/Content Manipulation [CRITICAL]: Successful exploitation leads to remote code execution (RCE), data theft, or content modification. * Mitigation: Regularly update gems (bundle update), use dependency checking tools (bundler-audit), and monitor security advisories.

1.3. Vulnerabilities in Octopress Plugins/Themes [HIGH-RISK] * Description: Third-party plugins and themes can contain vulnerabilities similar to those found in the core Octopress code. * Steps: 1. 1.3.1. Identify installed plugins/themes: The attacker examines the website's source or configuration to determine which plugins and themes are used. 2. 1.3.2. Analyze plugin/theme code: The attacker analyzes the code of the identified plugins and themes for vulnerabilities (e.g., using static analysis or manual review). 3. 1.3.3. Exploit vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]: The attacker exploits any discovered vulnerabilities to gain control, steal data, or modify content. * Mitigation: Carefully vet plugins/themes before installation, keep them updated, and review their code for security issues.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Octopress Configuration Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK]

  • 2.1. Default/Weak Credentials

    • Description: Octopress might be deployed with default or easily guessable credentials for deployment mechanisms (e.g., Rsync, GitHub Pages).
    • Steps:
      1. 2.1.1. Check for default credentials: The attacker looks for default deployment keys or secrets in the _config.yml file.
      2. 2.1.2. Attempt to use default credentials: The attacker tries to use these default credentials to access the deployment targets.
      3. 2.1.3. Gain unauthorized access [CRITICAL]: Successful login grants the attacker control over the deployment process, allowing them to upload malicious files or modify the website.
    • Mitigation: Never use default credentials. Use strong, unique passwords and key-based authentication for deployments.

  • 2.2. Sensitive Information Exposure [HIGH-RISK]

    • Description: API keys, passwords, or other secrets might be accidentally exposed in the _config.yml file, source code, or generated output.
    • Steps:
      1. 2.2.1. Check _config.yml: The attacker examines the _config.yml file for exposed secrets.
      2. 2.2.2. Search source code: The attacker searches the source code and generated website files for accidentally committed secrets.
      3. 2.2.3. Use exposed secrets [CRITICAL]: The attacker uses the discovered secrets to access external services (e.g., databases, APIs) or escalate privileges on the server.
    • Mitigation: Never store secrets in the repository. Use environment variables or a secure secrets management solution.

  • 2.3. Misconfigured Deployment Settings

    • Description: The deployment process might be configured insecurely (e.g., using unencrypted Rsync), allowing attackers to intercept traffic or inject malicious code.
    • Steps:
      1. 2.3.1. Analyze _config.yml: The attacker examines the _config.yml file for insecure deployment methods.
      2. 2.3.2. Intercept deployment traffic: The attacker intercepts the network traffic during deployment to steal credentials or inject malicious code (e.g., using a man-in-the-middle attack).
      3. 2.3.3. Compromise the server [CRITICAL]: Successful interception allows the attacker to compromise the server hosting the website.
    • Mitigation: Use secure deployment methods (e.g., SSH with key-based authentication). Avoid unencrypted protocols.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Octopress Usage Patterns [HIGH-RISK]

  • 3.1. Unpatched Octopress Installations

    • Description: Websites running outdated versions of Octopress are vulnerable to known exploits.
    • Steps:
      1. 3.1.1. Identify outdated versions: The attacker analyzes the generated HTML/CSS or uses other techniques to identify the Octopress version.
      2. 3.1.2. Exploit known vulnerabilities: The attacker searches for and exploits known vulnerabilities in the identified version.
      3. 3.1.3. Achieve RCE/Data Exfiltration/Content Manipulation [CRITICAL]: Successful exploitation leads to RCE, data theft, or content modification.
    • Mitigation: Keep Octopress and all its components updated to the latest versions.

  • 3.2. Lack of Source Code Management Best Practices [HIGH-RISK]

    • Description: If the .git repository is publicly accessible, attackers can download the entire source code history, including potentially sensitive information and past vulnerabilities.
    • Steps:
      1. 3.2.1. Check for .git: The attacker checks if the .git directory is accessible via a web browser.
      2. 3.2.2. Download .git: The attacker downloads the entire .git repository.
      3. 3.2.3. Find sensitive information: The attacker analyzes the commit history to find accidentally committed secrets or vulnerabilities that were later patched.
      4. 3.2.4. Use information from .git [CRITICAL]: The attacker uses the discovered information to craft targeted attacks.
    • Mitigation: Ensure the .git directory is not publicly accessible. Use a .gitignore file to prevent sensitive files from being committed.

  • 3.3. Inclusion of Sensitive Data in Source

    • Description: Similar to 2.2, but focuses specifically on secrets hardcoded directly into source files (not just configuration).
    • Steps:
      1. 3.3.1. Search source files: The attacker searches the source files for hardcoded credentials, API keys, or other secrets.
      2. 3.3.2. Use exposed secrets [CRITICAL]: The attacker uses the discovered secrets to access external services or escalate privileges.
    • Mitigation: Never hardcode secrets in the source code. Use environment variables or a secure secrets management solution.