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Threat Model Analysis for imathis/octopress

Threat: Malicious Plugin Execution

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious Octopress plugin (or compromises a legitimate one) containing harmful code. This code executes during the site generation process (jekyll build or octopress deploy). The attacker might distribute this plugin through unofficial channels or exploit a vulnerability in a plugin repository. The malicious code could inject JavaScript into the generated HTML, modify other files, or execute commands on the author's system.
    • Impact:
      • Website Compromise: Injection of malicious scripts (XSS, redirects, data theft) affecting site visitors.
      • Author System Compromise: Code execution on the author's machine during the build, leading to data theft, system control, or further malware installation.
      • Persistent Backdoor: The plugin could modify the Octopress installation, ensuring future builds also include the malicious code.
    • Affected Octopress Component:
      • Plugins system (source/_plugins/ directory and the plugin loading mechanism within Octopress's Ruby code). Specifically, any Ruby file within _plugins that is loaded and executed during the build process.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Source Vetting: Only install plugins from trusted sources. Carefully examine the plugin's source code before installation.
      • Code Review: Manually review the plugin's Ruby code for suspicious patterns (e.g., eval, system, network requests, file modifications outside the expected scope).
      • Sandboxing: Run the Octopress build process within a sandboxed environment (e.g., Docker container, virtual machine).
      • Dependency Pinning: Use a Gemfile.lock to ensure only specific versions of plugin dependencies are used.
      • Regular Updates: Keep plugins updated (but always review changes before updating).
      • Least Privilege: Run the build process with the minimum necessary privileges.

Threat: Dependency Hijacking (RubyGems)

  • Description: An attacker compromises a RubyGem that Octopress or one of its plugins depends on. This could be achieved by taking over an abandoned Gem, compromising a Gem maintainer's account, or exploiting a vulnerability in the RubyGems infrastructure. The compromised Gem contains malicious code that executes during the Octopress build process.
    • Impact:
      • Author System Compromise: Code execution on the author's machine during the build, leading to data theft, system control, or further malware installation.
      • Website Compromise: The compromised Gem could inject malicious code into the generated website, similar to a malicious plugin.
      • Supply Chain Attack: A vulnerability in a dependency affects all users of that dependency.
    • Affected Octopress Component:
      • The RubyGems dependency management system (Bundler, Gemfile, Gemfile.lock). Any Gem listed in the Gemfile is a potential target.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Gemfile.lock: Always use a Gemfile.lock to pin the exact versions of all dependencies (including transitive dependencies).
      • Dependency Auditing: Regularly use tools like bundler-audit to check for known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
      • Gem Source Verification: Ensure that the Gemfile sources point to trusted Gem repositories (e.g., https://rubygems.org).
      • Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): If you are a Gem maintainer, enable 2FA on your RubyGems account.
      • Private Gem Repository (Advanced): Consider using a private Gem repository to host vetted and trusted versions of Gems.

Threat: Compromised Theme Injection

  • Description: An attacker creates or compromises an Octopress theme. The theme might contain malicious JavaScript, CSS, or modify layout files to include harmful content. The attacker could distribute the theme through unofficial channels or exploit a vulnerability in a theme repository. This affects the output of Octopress, the generated static site.
    • Impact:
      • Website Defacement: Alteration of the site's appearance.
      • Client-Side Attacks: Injection of malicious JavaScript (XSS, keylogging, etc.) targeting site visitors.
      • Information Disclosure: The theme could leak information about the site's structure.
    • Affected Octopress Component:
      • Theme system (source/_layouts/, source/_includes/, source/stylesheets/, source/javascripts/ directories, and files within these that are part of the active theme). The theme's configuration in _config.yml is also relevant.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Source Vetting: Obtain themes only from trusted sources. Examine the theme's files for suspicious code.
      • Code Review: Manually inspect the theme's HTML, CSS, and JavaScript files.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a CSP to restrict the sources from which the browser can load resources.
      • Regular Updates: Keep themes updated, but review changes before updating.
      • Sandboxing (Less Effective): Sandboxing the build process is less effective against theme-based attacks that primarily target the generated website. This refined list focuses on the most critical and direct threats to Octopress, providing actionable mitigation strategies for each. The key takeaway is the importance of securing the build process and carefully vetting all third-party components (plugins and themes).