Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
56 lines (49 loc) · 6.38 KB

File metadata and controls

56 lines (49 loc) · 6.38 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for jeremyevans/sequel

Description: Attackers inject malicious SQL code into queries executed directly against the database, bypassing ORM protections.

  • Sequel Contribution: Sequel provides methods like Sequel.db.run, Sequel.db.execute, and Sequel.db.fetch that allow developers to execute raw SQL queries. Using these methods with unsanitized user input directly creates SQL injection vulnerabilities by circumventing Sequel's built-in protections.
  • Example:
    user_input = params[:username] # User-provided username from web request
    Sequel.db.run("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '#{user_input}'") # Vulnerable!
    If user_input is crafted as ' OR '1'='1', the resulting SQL query bypasses the intended username check, potentially exposing all user data.
  • Impact: Data breach (reading, modifying, or deleting sensitive data), authentication bypass, privilege escalation, denial of service, complete database compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strictly avoid raw SQL execution with user-provided input. Prefer and utilize Sequel's query builder and prepared statements for all database interactions involving user data.
    • If raw SQL is absolutely unavoidable, use parameterized queries or prepared statements provided by Sequel. This ensures user input is treated as data, not executable code.
    • Input sanitization is a less reliable secondary measure. While validating and sanitizing user input can help, it should not be the primary defense against SQL injection. Parameterized queries are the most effective solution.
    • Implement regular security code reviews and penetration testing specifically targeting potential SQL injection vulnerabilities arising from raw SQL usage.

Description: The unfiltered method in Sequel disables filtering, allowing unfiltered data to be directly incorporated into queries. Incorrect or careless usage, especially with user-controlled input, can lead to SQL injection vulnerabilities.

  • Sequel Contribution: Sequel's unfiltered method is designed for specific advanced use cases where filtering is intentionally bypassed. However, its misuse, particularly when combined with dynamic query construction based on user input, directly undermines Sequel's default security mechanisms and opens injection points.
  • Example:
    column_name = params[:sort_column] # User-provided column name for sorting
    users = DB[:users].order(Sequel.unfiltered(column_name)).all # Vulnerable if column_name is not strictly validated
    If column_name is maliciously crafted as ; DROP TABLE users; --, it could result in arbitrary SQL execution, including database schema modification or data deletion.
  • Impact: Data breach, data manipulation, denial of service, potential for arbitrary code execution depending on database permissions and injection payload.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid using unfiltered in conjunction with user-controlled input. Carefully review all uses of unfiltered and assess the potential for user input to influence the unfiltered data.
    • If unfiltered must be used with dynamic input, implement extremely strict validation and whitelisting of allowed values. Ensure the input cannot be manipulated to inject SQL commands or operators.
    • Favor Sequel's safe query building methods and avoid dynamically constructing column or table names from user input whenever possible. If dynamic column/table names are required, use a predefined whitelist and map user input to safe, pre-approved values.
    • Conduct thorough code reviews to identify and eliminate any unnecessary or risky uses of the unfiltered method, especially in code paths handling user input.

Description: Insecure storage or exposure of database credentials (username, password) used by Sequel to connect to the database can lead to unauthorized database access.

  • Sequel Contribution: Sequel relies on database connection configurations, which inherently include sensitive credentials. If the application's configuration management practices are insecure, the credentials used by Sequel become a direct attack vector. While not a vulnerability in Sequel itself, it's a critical risk directly related to how Sequel is configured and used.
  • Example:
    • Storing database username and password in plain text within configuration files that are accessible through the web server or are committed to version control.
    • Accidentally logging or exposing the database connection string, including credentials, in error messages or application logs.
    • Using default or easily guessable database passwords in Sequel's connection configuration.
  • Impact: Full database compromise, complete data breach, unauthorized data manipulation, denial of service, potential for lateral movement within the infrastructure if database credentials are reused.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never store database credentials in plain text in code, configuration files within version control, or directly within the application codebase.
    • Utilize environment variables or secure secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager) to store and retrieve database credentials.
    • Implement robust access control and permissions for configuration files, environment variables, and secrets management systems to restrict access to sensitive credentials.
    • Regularly rotate database credentials used by Sequel.
    • Avoid hardcoding credentials directly in Sequel connection code. Always retrieve them from a secure external source.
    • Ensure error handling and logging mechanisms are configured to prevent accidental exposure of connection strings or credentials in production environments.