attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for jeremyevans/sequel

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise application via Sequel ORM by focusing on high-risk vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Sequel ORM [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Parameterized Query Bypass/Misuse [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Identify code using raw SQL interpolation (e.g., string concatenation) │ │ │ └─── Inject malicious SQL through unsanitized user input [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Identify code constructing complex queries dynamically with insufficient sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Inject malicious SQL by manipulating query parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Second-Order SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Inject malicious data into the database via other application features │ │ └───[AND]─ Trigger Sequel queries that use the injected malicious data without proper sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Logic Flaws due to ORM Misuse [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Data Filtering/Authorization Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Manipulate input to bypass authorization checks and access unauthorized data [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ Exploit Database Connection/Configuration Issues Related to Sequel [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Connection String Management [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Connection string hardcoded in application code or configuration files accessible to attackers [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Extract database credentials and gain direct database access (bypassing application) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Insufficient Database Permissions for Sequel User [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Sequel user in database has excessive privileges (e.g., GRANT ALL) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Exploit application vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection) to leverage these excessive database permissions for broader compromise [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Sequel ORM [CRITICAL NODE]

• Description: This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access to application data, modifying data, disrupting application functionality, or gaining control over the application's infrastructure. Sequel, as the data access layer, is a critical component that attackers will target to achieve this goal.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Description: SQL Injection is a classic and highly prevalent vulnerability. It occurs when an attacker can inject malicious SQL code into database queries executed by the application. Sequel, while providing tools to prevent SQL injection, does not inherently eliminate the risk if developers misuse these tools or bypass them.
• High-Risk Attack Vectors within SQL Injection:
  • Parameterized Query Bypass/Misuse [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Developers might mistakenly use raw SQL interpolation (string concatenation) or Sequel.lit with unsanitized user input, effectively disabling Sequel's built-in protection against SQL injection.
    • Impact: Full database compromise, including data breach, data modification, and potentially database server takeover.
    • Example: Code using string concatenation to build SQL queries directly from user input, or using Sequel.lit to insert unsanitized input into a query.
  • Identify code constructing complex queries dynamically with insufficient sanitization [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: When building complex queries dynamically (e.g., with filters, ordering, or conditions based on user input), developers might fail to properly sanitize or parameterize all parts of the query, leading to injection points.
    • Impact: Similar to Parameterized Query Bypass/Misuse - full database compromise.
    • Example: Dynamically adding WHERE clauses or ORDER BY clauses based on user-controlled parameters without proper validation and parameterization.
  • Second-Order SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Malicious SQL code is injected into the database through one part of the application (e.g., via a form field). Later, this injected data is retrieved and used in a Sequel query in a different part of the application without proper sanitization. This delayed execution of injected SQL is "second-order."
    • Impact: Full database compromise, potentially harder to trace back to the initial injection point.
    • Example: Injecting malicious SQL into a user profile field. Later, a reporting feature retrieves and uses this profile data in a query without sanitization, triggering the injected SQL.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Logic Flaws due to ORM Misuse [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Description: Even when SQL injection is avoided, logical errors in how developers use Sequel to implement application logic, especially authorization, can lead to vulnerabilities.
• High-Risk Attack Vectors within Logic Flaws:
  • Insecure Data Filtering/Authorization Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Developers might create Sequel queries for data filtering or authorization checks that contain logical flaws. These flaws can be exploited to bypass intended access controls and access data that should be restricted.
    • Impact: Unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, potentially leading to broader system compromise.
    • Example: Authorization queries with missing conditions, incorrect use of OR instead of AND in conditions, or insufficient filtering logic that can be manipulated by user input.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Database Connection/Configuration Issues Related to Sequel [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Description: Insecure configuration and management of database connections used by Sequel can create direct pathways for attackers to bypass the application entirely and access the database directly.
• High-Risk Attack Vectors within Connection/Configuration Issues:
  • Insecure Connection String Management [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Database connection strings, which contain sensitive credentials (username, password), are stored insecurely. This could be hardcoding them in application code, storing them in publicly accessible configuration files, or failing to use secure environment variables.
    • Impact: Direct database access for the attacker, bypassing all application-level security controls. Complete data breach and potential database server takeover.
    • Example: Connection strings hardcoded in source code committed to a public repository, or stored in a configuration file accessible via web server misconfiguration.
  • Insufficient Database Permissions for Sequel User [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: The database user account used by Sequel is granted excessive privileges within the database (e.g., GRANT ALL). If an application vulnerability (like SQL injection) is then exploited, the attacker can leverage these excessive database permissions to perform actions far beyond the intended scope of the application.
    • Impact: Amplified impact of application vulnerabilities. For example, a SQL injection vulnerability could be used to not only access application data but also to modify database schema, access other databases on the same server, or even potentially gain operating system access in some database configurations.
    • Example: The Sequel application connects to the database using a user account with DBA or SUPERUSER roles, or with overly broad GRANT statements that are not necessary for the application's function.