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Threat Model Analysis for jeremyevans/sequel

Threat: Raw SQL Injection

  • Description: Attacker injects malicious SQL code into raw SQL queries executed using methods like Sequel.db[:table].execute_sql. This is achieved by manipulating user inputs that are directly concatenated into the SQL string without proper sanitization or parameterization.
    • Impact:
      • Data Breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive data.
      • Data Modification: Alteration or deletion of data.
      • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing login mechanisms.
      • Remote Code Execution: Potentially executing arbitrary code on the database server in severe cases.
    • Sequel Component Affected: Raw SQL execution methods (execute_sql, << operator on database objects, etc.).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Prioritize using Sequel's query builder methods for safe query construction.
      • Always use parameterized queries when raw SQL is absolutely necessary.
      • Validate and sanitize user inputs even when using parameterized queries as a defense-in-depth measure.

Threat: Dynamic Query SQL Injection

  • Description: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in dynamically constructed queries built using Sequel's query builder but with unsafe practices. This occurs when developers use string interpolation or concatenation to build query parts based on user input instead of using Sequel's safe methods.
    • Impact:
      • Data Breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive data.
      • Data Modification: Alteration or deletion of data.
      • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing login mechanisms.
    • Sequel Component Affected: Query builder methods (where, or, and, select, etc.) when used improperly with dynamic string construction.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Utilize Sequel's built-in methods for dynamic query construction, passing symbols, hashes, or arrays.
      • Avoid string interpolation or concatenation when building dynamic query parts.
      • Thoroughly review and test dynamic query logic to ensure user input cannot manipulate query structure unexpectedly.

Threat: Authorization Bypass via Model Logic

  • Description: Attacker bypasses authorization checks due to flaws in how authorization is implemented within Sequel models or related query logic. This can occur if model relationships or access methods are not properly secured, allowing unauthorized access to data or actions.
    • Impact:
      • Unauthorized Data Access: Accessing data the attacker is not permitted to view.
      • Privilege Escalation: Performing actions beyond the attacker's authorized privileges.
    • Sequel Component Affected: Model definitions, relationships, and custom model methods.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust authorization logic outside of Sequel queries where feasible, using dedicated authorization libraries.
      • Carefully design model relationships and access methods to reflect and enforce access permissions.
      • Thoroughly test authorization logic for different user roles and scenarios.
      • Apply the principle of least privilege to database user permissions.

Threat: Plugin Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Attacker exploits security vulnerabilities present in Sequel plugins or extensions. Vulnerable plugins can introduce various risks, including SQL injection, XSS, or other vulnerabilities depending on the plugin's functionality.
    • Impact:
      • Varies depending on the plugin vulnerability: Could range from data breach to remote code execution.
      • Compromise of application security due to third-party code.
    • Sequel Component Affected: Plugin system and specific vulnerable plugins.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the plugin and vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully evaluate and select plugins from reputable sources.
      • Review plugin code for potential security vulnerabilities before use.
      • Keep plugins up-to-date with security patches and updates.
      • Limit plugin usage to only necessary functionality.
      • Consider security audits for critical plugins.

Threat: Exposed Database Credentials

  • Description: Attacker gains access to database credentials (username, password, connection string) if they are stored insecurely. This could be through plain text configuration files, code, or easily accessible environment variables.
    • Impact:
      • Full Database Compromise: Unauthorized access to the entire database.
      • Data Breach: Complete access to all data within the database.
      • Data Manipulation: Ability to modify or delete any data.
    • Sequel Component Affected: Configuration loading and database connection setup.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Securely store database credentials using environment variables, secrets management systems, or encrypted configuration files.
      • Restrict access to configuration files and environment variables containing credentials.
      • Use least privilege for database user accounts.